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This thesis addresses the question, “Do investment traits intellectual curiosity and 
confidence predict academic performance?” To establish the context for this question, 
the first three chapters introduce several relevant issues. Chapter 1 provides an 
historical account of intelligence research, especially of Cattell’s identification of fluid 
and crystallised abilities, and his “investment theory” to explain their relationship. It 
also surveys Ackerman’s PPIK (Process, Personality, Interests, and Knowledge) theory 
of adult intelligence—also an investment theory—and considers whether there is 
sufficient evidence to continue researching intellectual curiosity (IC) within the 
investment framework. Important within investment theory are so-called “investment 
traits”—including IC—that determine where and how people apply their cognitive 
abilities. Chapter 2 introduces a second tradition of curiosity research, starting with 
Sokolov’s research on the “orienting reflex” and finishing with Mussel’s Intellect 
framework. It is argued that, despite their distinct histories, these approaches overlap 
substantially, and that this overlap has implications for how the relationship between 
intelligence and curiosity is to be understood. Finally, Chapter 3 introduces 
intelligence and personality as predictors of academic performance (AP), and 
introduces cognitive confidence as a potential investment trait that also predicts AP. 
Exegesis 
Chapter 4 provides an exegesis of the four studies that were conducted to assess 
the question of this thesis, and that are reported in Chapters 5–8. Study 1 assessed the 
contents of several different scales of IC, and concluded that despite their substantial 
	 v 
overlap, each scale measured a different profile of factors. Study 2 assessed the 
incremental validity of IC and confidence above intelligence and personality for 
predicting AP, and could not find evidence for this. Study 3 assessed a novel approach 
to testing investment theory in adults, and found that confidence (but not IC) 
predicted variance above Gf in the measure of Gc. Moreover, this study assessed 
whether reading habits should be incorporated within Mussel’s Intellect framework, 
and concluded that this was not necessary. Lastly, Study 4 involved a critical analysis 
of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011)—who argued that IC is the “third pillar” of academic 
performance above cognitive ability and Conscientiousness—and argued that several 
issues call into question this broad conclusion. 
Conclusions 
Chapter 9 interprets these four studies in the broader context introduced in 
Chapters 1–3, and provides several conclusions. Concerning the thesis question, it is 
concluded that although there is substantial evidence for the predictive validity of IC 
and confidence for AP, the evidence for their incremental validity is mixed and cannot 
be asserted broadly with certainty. Concerning investment traits IC and confidence, it 
is concluded that the importance of IC may have been overestimated, whereas the 
importance of confidence may have been underestimated. And it is also concluded 
that investment theory needs to be revised substantially because of challenges to 
several predictions that follow from it. Following this, potential follow-up studies are 
outlined that potentially would help to resolve several outstanding issues in this 
domain. Finally, a concluding statement suggests that, despite traditionally being 
assessed as separate entities, the close relationship between intelligence and curiosity 
in infancy underscores the need to understand these variables together. 
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Two earlier papers provide some background to the series of studies conducted 
as part of this dissertation. The first paper (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a) reported an 
honours project assessing the issue of incremental validity for intellectual curiosity 
(IC) in predicting academic performance (AP) above cognitive ability and 
Conscientiousness. It reported only limited evidence of incremental validity for one 
measure of IC—and none for three others—and concluded that IC may not 
incrementally predict AP. In part, this project was inspired by the meta-analysis of von 
Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011), which proposed that intellectual curiosity is the “third 
pillar” of AP. This initial study was not conducted as part of this dissertation, and 
therefore has not been included. 
 The second background paper (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014b) was a surrejoinder 
to a critique of the first that was published by von Stumm, Hell, and Chamorro-
Premuzic (2014), who claimed that several ‘issues’ they found in Powell and Nettelbeck 
(2014a) called into question its broad findings. The surrejoinder acknowledged several 
of the stated issues, but maintained that they did not affect the original study’s main 
conclusion, namely that the von Stumm et al. (2011) proposal was questionable. 
Because the surrejoinder was published within the period of candidature, it could have 
been incorporated formally within the dissertation. This was not done, however, 
because, although the comments were consistent with subsequent conclusions drawn 
in this thesis, they are largely redundant given the research that has followed.  
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1 INVESTMENT THEORY 
	
1.1  Introduction 
Cattell’s “investment theory” of intelligence was developed as part of 
intelligence theory more broadly, and can be best understood within this context. The 
overall aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of investment theory, and assess 
whether this remains a viable framework for intelligence and personality research in 
the present day. This chapter is presented under five main headings: The Discovery of 
General Intelligence, The Discovery of Fluid and Crystallised Abilities, Cattell’s 
Investment Theory, Ackerman’s PPIK Theory, and Assessment of Investment Theory.  
1.2  The Discovery of General Intelligence 
This history of the discovery of general intelligence has been recounted many 
times before, and need not detain us long. A brief overview of the contributions of 
Galton, Spearman, and Binet will provide the background against which Cattell 
proposed his conceptions of Gf, Gc, and investment theory. 
Galton 
Francis Galton (1822—1911) is a superb candidate with whom to begin a study 
about intellectual curiosity. A man of insatiable curiosity, his contributions to science 
spanned diverse areas including geography, anthropology, genetics, psychology, 
statistics, and personality.1 In these last two areas alone, he discovered independently 
the correlation, regression toward the mean, and the lexical hypothesis of personality. 
Arthur R Jensen (2002) concluded that Galton’s contribution on the topic of general 
																																																						
1 To say nothing of his contributions to domestic life, including how properly to brew 
tea (Galton, 1855) and how to cut a cake in order to leave the least amount of surface 
area exposed (Galton, 1907). 
	2 
mental ability (GMA) was seminal, and directed subsequent research in terms of its 
existence, heritability, measurement, and racial differences.  
Galton believed that GMA was a broad trait, and highly heritable. His book 
Hereditary Genius (1869) was an extended argument that intellectual ability is 
heritable, which Galton substantiated by surveying numerous eminent figures and 
arguing that this eminence (which he used as a proxy for intelligence) was attributable 
to the individuals’ family histories.2 Its third chapter “Classification of Men According 
to their Natural Gifts” argued that because human beings are not born with equal 
physical abilities and physical dimensions, they should not be expected to possess 
equal GMA—evidenced from the distribution of scores for mathematical honours 
students at Cambridge. To quote Galton at length: 
In statesmanship, generalship, literature, science, poetry, art, just the same 
enormous differences are found between man and man; and numerous 
instances recorded in this book, will show in how small degree, eminence, 
either in these or any other class of intellectual powers, can be considered as 
due to purely special powers. They are rather to be considered in those 
instances as the result of concentrated efforts, made by men who are widely 
gifted. People lay too much stress on apparent specialities, thinking over-rashly 
that, because a man is devoted to some particular pursuit, he could not possibly 
have succeeded in anything else. They might just as well say that, because a 
youth had fallen desperately in love with a brunette, he could not possibly have 
fallen in love with a blonde. He may or may not have more natural liking for 
																																																						
2 Galton’s lineage is consistent with this perspective: he was Charles Darwin’s half-
cousin. 
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the former type of beauty than the latter, but it is more probable as not the 
affair was mainly or wholly due to a general amorousness of disposition. 
(Galton, 1869, p. 64) 
Thus, for Galton the abilities of eminent individuals were the consequence of GMA 
applied to specific domains, rather than being more specialised abilities. However, he 
did not neglect environmental factors, seeing them as providing the specific 
opportunities for GMA to be applied. But nurture could only work with what nature 
provided. 
Often, Galton was not able to substantiate fully many of his intuitions, due to 
limitations in the statistical and research methods of his day. Although he used the 
proxies for GMA available to him, such as mathematics scores and perceived 
eminence, he was not only a product of his time but was also constrained by it. 
Nonetheless, Galton was a towering figure, and over the following century many 
researchers have continued the journey from where he left off. 
Spearman 
Like those of Galton, the contributions of Charles Spearman (1863—1945) to 
statistics and psychology are manifold. Spearman came to psychology relatively late in 
life: after many years of military service, at age 34 he began a PhD in experimental 
psychology under Wundt, completed in 1906. During his doctoral studies he published 
a pair of influential papers on rank-order correlation and correction for measurement 
error (Spearman, 1904b) and intelligence (1904a), which were both highly influential. 
Spearman’s account of intelligence (1904a) is the most important for our 
purposes, for this was the first demonstration of a general factor of cognitive ability—
the factor that Galton inferred but could not demonstrate empirically. Spearman’s 
	4 
participants were students from a village school, an Oxford preparatory school, and 
adults from the community, and his assessments included the students’ sensory 
discrimination, academic performance (in Classics, French, English, and Maths), and 
other-rated intelligence. 
 Spearman (1904a) reported that individual measures of sensory discrimination 
correlated substantially with individual measures of intelligence, and that variance 
common to measures of sensory discrimination (which he called “General 
Discrimination”) correlated strongly with variance common to measures of 
intelligence (“General Intelligence”). Moreover, when corrected for measurement 
error, these correlations were exceptionally close to 1—indicating that what was 
common among measures of sensory discrimination was common to measures of 
intelligence. Based on this and other evidence, Spearman concluded: 
On the whole, then, we reach the profoundly important conclusion that there 
really exists a something that we may provisionally term " General Sensory 
Discrimination " and similarly a " General Intelligence," and further that the 
functional correspondence between these two is not appreciably less than 
absolute. (1904a, p. 272, italics in original) 
 
This evidence for general intelligence (g), coupled with Spearman’s argument 
for specific factors (s) that explained variance in tests not explained by the general 
factor, formed his two-factor theory of intelligence (elaborated in Spearman, 1928), an 
account with which future researchers would dialogue. Further, alongside Galton, 
Spearman argued that intelligence was strongly heritable. Although his immediate 
counterpart Binet would disagree with many of his positions (though not entirely), 
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they would make a resurgence later in the twentieth century, especially in the work of 
Jensen (1998). 
Binet 
For a man with no formal training in psychology, Alfred Binet’s (1857—1911) 
impact on this field has been remarkably enduring. Being independently wealthy, he 
could pursue research out of pure interest, and he digested the works of Darwin, 
Galton, and especially John Stuart Mill. Binet initially studied law and received his 
license, but apparently never practiced (Siegler, 1992). His first research career 
involved testing the effects of magnets on human behavior, with positive results. 
However, other researchers had failed to replicate his findings, eventually leading him 
to acknowledge that his subjects knew the purpose of the experiments, leading him to 
abandon this avenue of enquiry (Siegler, 1992). 
Binet’s second career involved assessing intellectual deficiency in children, and 
was far more successful. Rather than assessing intellectual ability indirectly through 
measures of sensory function or academic performance (in the tradition of Galton and 
Spearman), Binet sought to measure ability directly through tests designed for this 
purpose. He argued that cognitive function involved various individual processes and 
therefore measuring intelligence required sampling these processes adequately to 
allow calculation of a composite score that reflected a person’s overall ability (Siegler, 
1992). Moreover, while Galton and Spearman emphasised the “nature” side of the 
origin of intelligence, Binet emphasised the “nurture” side, believing that all people 
could take steps to improve their intellectual function. 
Binet’s lasting contribution involved not only his conception of intelligence, 
but the tests themselves, which were referenced against age-specific norming samples, 
	6 
making this approach conceptually different from measuring objects with physical 
dimensions, as its authors observed (Binet & Simon, 1905). Although initially Binet and 
Simon’s tests were largely ignored in their native France, they impacted greatly 
intelligence testing in the US. Their scales underwent numerous revisions and 
translations during Binet’s and Simon’s lifetimes, and their broad approach proved 
remarkably successful long after their passing (Siegler, 1992). 
1.3  The Discovery of Fluid and Crystallised Abilities 
Introduction 
Raymond B. Cattell (1905—1998) was a brilliant intelligence and personality 
theorist, and a student of Spearman. At the time when Cattell (1943) proposed his 
theory of fluid and crystallised intelligence, he lamented the lack of recent conceptual 
progress for intelligence theory. Although many intelligence tests were available, the 
underlying theory had barely developed in the recent decades, making the 
proliferation of tests meaningless: “A simile adequate to illuminate the present 
incredible state of affairs in intelligence theory is not easy to find. It is as if one came 
prepared to view a museum of prehistoric animals and awoke to a nightmare 
realization that the monsters were alive and loose” (1943, p. 158). 
Cattell was especially concerned that intelligence tests should not float free of 
theoretical moorings: test validation was being spoken of apart from intelligence 
theory, with validation only in the form of correlation with previous tests. This 
circularity assumed a basis in intelligence theory for which Cattell could not find 
sufficient evidence. Especially, Cattell lamented the various contradictory definitions 
of intelligence: 
	 7 
Intelligence is abstract thinking ; it is concrete thinking ; it is verbal skill ; it is 
manipulative ability ; it is innate ; it is a set of acquired skills ; it occurs equally 
in all activities ; it cannot be measured by sampling ; it is one thing ; it is a host 
of things ; it is a few distinct, clear-cut aptitudes. (1943, p. 163) 
Cattell therefore sought to define intelligence in such a way that allowed it to emerge 
from the morass of thinking at the time; was it one thing (Spearman) or many things 
(Thurston)? When faced with two facts in apparent tension, it is sometimes wise to 
suspend judgment, allowing time for a synthesis to appear. Or in Spearman’s words, 
“one fact cannot destroy another, and any apparent conflict merely proves our 
imperfect acquaintance with their true nature” (1904a, p. 271). Although both 
Spearman and Thurston held to their distinctive positions, Cattell discerned that they 
left room for each other—that they shared a “common destiny” (Cattell, 1943, p. 169). 
But the missing element, as Cattell would demonstrate, was a middle tier in the 
hierarchy, between primary abilities and the general factor. 
The Evidence 
Given Cattell’s admiration for Spearman, it was with some unease that he proposed 
that Spearman’s general ability factor was at least two factors. This suggestion was 
based on evidence that was apparently anomalous from the perspective of those 
advocating a sufficient explanation in terms of a general ability factor. Cattell (1987) 
later summarized those six indications that g was more differentiated than first 
thought: 
(1) Research into perceptual (i.e. non-verbal) measures of intelligence, including 
from Spearman’s laboratory, found that these were correlating more 
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substantially with each other than with more verbal and scholastic measures of 
intelligence, which formed their own group. 
(2) Perceptual and verbal tests showed distinct pre-adult developmental 
trajectories, with the growth curve of perceptual abilities flattening out earlier 
(around 13 years) than the same for verbal abilities (around 17 years). 
(3) The second-order analysis of Thurstone (1938) suggested more than one 
general factor. With more adequate methods of determining the number of 
factors to extract, it became clear that a single factor was not sufficient within 
the higher-order analysis. 
(4) The standard deviations for perceptual versus verbal tests were significantly 
different, being around 24 points for the perceptual tests—once these had been 
segregated—compared with the traditional figure of about 15-16 for the 
undifferentiated construct. 
(5) Acquired brain injuries appeared to have distinct effects on identifiable aspects 
of intelligence. For instance, injury to specific brain areas might affect verbal 
ability but leave numerical ability unaffected, while any kind of brain injury 
seemed to result in some decrement to overall perceptual ability.  
(6) The declines in abilities throughout adulthood followed distinct paths, with 
perceptual abilities declining steadily from about 20-25 years, while verbal 
abilities appeared to plateau over the next 40 years, declining thereafter. 
Cattell argued that these observations could not be squared with the notion that a 
single, general construct defines adequately the results from of the subtests of 
intelligence. From his perspective, intelligence theorists were “trying to run before 
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they have learned to walk” (Cattell, 1943, p. 162). He sought an explanation that would 
weave these strands of evidence into a coherent pattern.  
The Synthesis 
However, Cattell was not the only person who noticed these discrepancies; 
others had been wrestling with the same issues, though sometimes in different 
domains of expertise. Donald Hebb (1904—1985) had been researching the impact of 
brain injury on intelligence test scores and had noted that injuries sustained for 
infants had difference consequences than those sustained by adults—as noted in point 
5 above. If a brain were injured before it had developed to maturity, this resulted in a 
more symmetrical reduction of abilities. However, if a mature brain were injured, this 
often resulted in an asymmetry of abilities, where verbal abilities might be retained 
but problem-solving abilities were impaired (Hebb, 1942). As noted earlier, Spearman’s 
g would not predict this difference but, instead, a more consistent effect regardless of 
age.  
From this limited evidence, Hebb (1942) proposed two types of intelligence, 
labeled A and B respectively, in the following hypothesis: 
In any test performance there are two factors involved, the relative importance of 
which varies with the test: one factor being present intellectual power, of the kind 
essential to normal intellectual development; the other being the lasting changes 
of perceptual organization and behavior induced by the first factor during the 
period of development. (p. 287, italics in original) 
Hebb first proposed this distinction at the APA Annual Meeting in 1941, where Cattell 
also presented his interpretation of the evidence. Cattell (1943) regarded Hebb’s 
proposal as “two thirds” (p. 179) of his own theory. He retained the essential 
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distinction between Hebb’s type A and B abilities, but preferred the terms “fluid” and 
“crystallised” intelligence to convey their nature. 
Defining a general factor of fluid intelligence (Gf) is relatively straightforward. 
In Cattell’s words, it “has the ‘fluid’ quality of being directable to almost any problem” 
(1987, p. 97). The rapid increase in fluid ability over the developmental years is a 
function of the brain as it matures, which explains why this increase levels out once 
maturity is reached. Fluid intelligence is a flexible, ubiquitous, effortful, and general 
capacity to perceive relationships, and its strength will be a significant factor in the 
success of any intellectual endeavor. This seems to be the essence of Spearman’s 
definition of general ability as the educing of “relations” and “correlates” (1928, pp. 165-
6). Cattell (1943) understood fluid intelligence to be relatively stable, and free of 
cultural constraints when measured appropriately. He also saw it as heritable, but 
noted that this should not be taken to imply “anything like complete hereditary 
determination”, because the quality of the environment during the gestation period 
and brain injuries sustained after birth could affect subsequent development (Cattell, 
1963, p. 4).  
Cattell labeled crystallised intelligence (Gc) thus because it is “a freezing in a 
specific shape of what was once a fluid ability” (1987, p. 140). As crystallised ability 
represents the brain’s stored knowledge, this capacity can continue to grow after the 
developmental period has ended—thus its different growth curve from Gf. It relates to 
acquired skills, and is thus domain-specific, involves relatively less effort to employ 
than Gf, and is influenced substantially by culture. Defined more extensively: 
“crystallized ability (gc) expressions, though of a judgmental, discriminatory, and 
reasoning nature, operate in areas where the judgments have been taught 
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systematically or experienced before” (1987, p. 115). Thus, essentially, these two types 
of general intelligence perform similar functions, but which one is used depends on 
whether the learning task has been encountered previously. 
However, despite the above definition, a closer look at Gc suggests that it is 
relatively more difficult to capture and fully understand than Gf—an issue that 
remains to this day (Keith & Reynolds, 2010). Cattell called it “Protean”3 because of its 
changeable nature. As he observed, “Cultural change, shift of mixture of areas 
intellectually fashionable, or a change in the school curriculum can weaken its identity 
and unity as a discernible factor, even in the teenage school period when it is most 
prominent” (1987, p. 149). Thus, being at the mercy of whim, culture, and curriculum, 
crystallised intelligence can take various forms. This definition of Gc will be expanded 
shortly, but this must wait until two other issues have been unpacked: Cattell’s 
interpretation of Spearman’s g, and Cattell’s proposed “investment theory” to explain 
the relationship between Gf and Gc. 
This bifurcation of g into Gf and Gc raises the question of whether Spearman’s 
g retains a place in Cattell’s framework. Cattell (1963) argued that g could be 
interpreted meaningfully, and that it represented the fluid ability of yesteryear—that 
is, the historical fluid intelligence that was operating at the time when the crystallised 
ability currently being measured was formed. Through the process of maturation, 
historical Gf “fathers” current Gf out of time, and is “invested” in Gc (Cattell, 1963, p. 
15). He illustrated this concept of a factor which represents historical influence with 
the illustration of a group of adults, some who had not skied since turning 15 years old, 
																																																						
3 Proteus was the Greek god of rivers and oceans, who is said to be constantly 
changing, as is the nature of bodies of water. 
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and others who had never skied (1987, p. 142). He suggested that we should expect to 
find a correlation between current skiing ability and prior experience—weak but 
significant—which would represent the residual effect of skiing experience in the 
developmental period. In the same manner, Spearman’s g would reflect the 
“investment” of Gf into Gc during the developmental period, which produced the type 
of Gc at hand.  
1.4  Cattell’s Investment Theory 
Having introduced Cattell’s language of “investment”, we can now explain his 
“investment theory”. Although Cattell’s account was the most extensive at the time, 
others had provided briefer accounts which expressed a similar idea. As noted earlier, 
Galton had argued that eminent individuals were not necessarily specially gifted by 
nature for those domains in which they excelled, but that their abilities were “the 
result of concentrated efforts, made by men who are widely gifted” (Galton, 1869, p. 
64). Spearman proposed a hypothesis of “energies”, “engines”, and (more tentatively) 
an “engineer”. He suggested that the brain contained a general mental energy, which 
was supplied to engines, which he thought were different neural systems (1928, p. 133). 
This process was directed by the engineer, which he suggested was the w factor 
identified by Webb (1915)—now seen to approximate Conscientiousness within the 
Five Factor Model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992a). And Hebb, whose contribution we 
have already noted, theorised that “Intellectual development then would involve 
stable, qualitative changes of behavior and perception, dependent for their first 
appearance upon more elaborate intellectual processes than for their later 
functioning” (1942, p. 286). All these suggestions resemble the account provided by 
Cattell, whose theory owed a large debt to his predecessors. 
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However, Cattell developed his ideas far beyond any of these suggestions, by 
clarifying the nature of these general factors, and providing an account of their 
relationship and development. He labeled this “investment theory”, drawing upon 
financial imagery: “because crystallized ability becomes the trustee of gains from 
investment by fluid ability” (Cattell, 1987, p. 120). As Cattell noted, investment theory 
also incorporated evidence from developmental and social research to explain the 
manner of this investment (1987, p. 138). Thus, its wide-ranging nature made it 
complex and speculative at points—perhaps necessarily, given the complexity of 
human beings.  
Cattell believed that Gc was substantially influenced by two aspects of culture: 
the school system earlier in life, and occupational differences later in life. As Cattell 
noted in his earlier statement on the subject, “Intelligence tests test at all ages the 
combined resultants of fluid and crystallized ability, but in childhood the first is 
predominant whereas in adult life, owing to the recession of fluid ability, the peaks of 
performance are determined more by the crystallized abilities” (1943, p. 178). For the 
development of Gc from Gf in adolescent populations, investment theory held a 
unique role for the school curriculum. In modern times, most adolescents within 
developed countries are exposed to a common curriculum including maths, the 
country’s native language, and science. Therefore, despite the students’ natural 
inclinations, school curricula direct their mental energies to “invest” predominantly in 
those pre-determined subject domains. Cattell held this curriculum in the widest 
sense to be largely responsible for the general factor of crystallised knowledge. When 
speaking of the pattern for several distinct school subjects to exist as defining the Gc 
factor, he argued: 
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Empirically, we have to recognize that this unitary pattern, long the target of 
traditional intelligence tests, expresses itself in the school years and for some 
time afterwards as a set of high correlations among numerical ability, 
grammatical sense, size of vocabulary, and other relationally complex and 
abstract skills trained in the typical school curriculum. (Cattell, 1987, p. 142) 
In this way, the presence of a common curriculum was crucial for the development of 
the Gc factor. Without this, we would not expect to find it at all—at least when 
measured by school-based knowledge. Therefore, in a teenage population g, Gf, and 
Gc should all correlate strongly, because the rapidly-developing Gf will quickly 
overtake more domain-specific abilities, making a large discrepancy between these 
areas difficult to sustain for long (Cattell, 1987, p. 151). Gc is thus prevented from 
developing far ahead of the Gf due to the latter’s rapid development.  
Once maturity is reached, however, this situation would change. Adults have 
left the common school curriculum behind, and so the natural decay of knowledge 
from the school years, coupled with the diversification of interests and occupations, 
would lead to a situation where the ongoing development Gc factor would look quite 
different in adults: 
As to the latter we must note that after school, as investments of intelligence in 
different occupational and other skills are added to scholastic skills (e.g., skills 
in selling, in engineering, in driving buses, in making pies, and in managing 
small children) the older pattern common to all people who attend school 
should begin to disperse – or, at least, abrade – and give way to the rise of new 
kingdoms. Empirically, this means that the correlations constituting the earlier 
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crystallized ability pattern should begin to be less dependable (Cattell, 1987, p. 
142). 
Thus, the strength of the relationships between Gf, Gc, and g might be substantially 
less than they were during the childhood developmental period. “Indeed, beyond the 
school years the correlation of present gf and present gc may become relatively poor” 
(Cattell, 1987, p. 152). As Cattell noted, we might expect as many crystallised 
“intelligences” as there are occupations (1987, p. 143). 
This raises another important consideration, that to speak of a “general” 
crystallised factor may be too simple. Cattell argued for at least four distinct Gc 
factors, the presence of which will differ according to the cohort being investigated. 
Given two-fold distinctions between both the third-order g and the second-order 
crystallized intelligence factor, and between childhood and adulthood crystallised 
ability, Gc could be decomposed into four distinct concepts: (1) school age crystallized 
intelligence, (2) school age crystallized achievement, (2) adult activity crystallized 
intelligence, and (4) adult activity crystallized achievement. This obviously makes for 
a complicated equation and, given the strong relationship between these four aspects, 
they may only be distinguishable theoretically—or through a “comprehensive 
organization of experiments” (Cattell, 1963, p. 10). 
The difference between school-age and adult factors is the presence of the 
school curriculum, but the difference between crystallised “intelligence” and 
crystallised “achievement” requires more nuance. We might distinguish here between 
“narrow” Gc and “broad” Gc. Narrow Gc relates to Cattell’s preferred understanding of 
Gc: specific knowledge which is the consequence of applying insightful perception to a 
difficult intellectual task. This is to be distinguished from broad Gc, which can be 
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produced by relying less on applied, insightful perception, and more on rote memory 
and exposure. For instance, Cattell understood school age crystallised achievement to 
be a broader concept which spanned “intelligence, memory, special ability areas, etc., 
corresponding purely to the effect of common time, interest, memory, and 
curriculum” (1963, p. 9). In a significant way, the narrow investment of Gf into Gc was 
the core of investment theory, while the broad’ products of Gc (in childhood and 
adulthood) were the Protean, incidental consequences of this process. We can speak 
of a broad Gc factor in adolescence only because of the historical accident of 
schooling, but history might have been otherwise. 
Thus, Gc proper is not reducible simply to verbal ability, because a large 
vocabulary might be obtained by somebody with poor Gf but an excellent memory. 
We will not critique Cattell’s fine-grained distinctions here, but simply note that 
Cattell’s definition of Gc proper was fairly narrow, and thus excluded concepts such as 
school achievement, with which initially it may be thought to be identical. Cattell’s 
four distinctions within Gc did identify school achievement as a form of Gc, but 
distinguished this from investment in his narrow sense—a distinction that subsequent 
research has not always been careful to follow. 
Moreover, although investment theory may look like a one-way street, where 
investment takes place uniformly from Gf to Gc, Cattell noted that the reality would 
be more complicated than this, and that these factors might exist in a relationship of 
reciprocal determinism. In labeling these factors, alternative labels for Gf and Gc were 
“process” and “product” respectively, which had been used by other researchers, 
including Newland (1962). However, despite their intuitive appeal, Cattell objected to 
these labels, except as loose descriptions. He argued that the capacity to learn is not 
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simply a function of the process, but may also be influenced by the product: prior 
learning (Cattell, 1963). Thus, Gc may not only be the product of invested fluid ability, 
but may also be a product of earlier instances of itself. Essentially, the idea was that 
learning begets learning—adding complexity to an otherwise more straightforward 
equation. 
In addition, Cattell suggested that levels of interest would play a role in the 
investment process—especially because this interest is predicted by personality 
variables that influence engagement with the school curriculum. Speaking of the 
positive correlations found between different subjects within the school curriculum—
the basis of the Gc factor—Cattell noted that “they arise also from dynamic causes, in 
the form of some children being more strongly interested in all that may be called 
intellectual matters and school achievement” (1987, p. 143). This personality 
characteristic might be labeled “intellectual curiosity” (IC), and has a place not only as 
a predictor of academic achievement, but also in the development of Gc. Personality 
traits held to play a part in the development of Gc have been called “investment traits” 
(von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011). Although Cattell noted them, their role in the process 
of investment has been more fully developed in Ackerman’s account of intelligence 
(1996). 
Predictions of Investment Theory 
Cattell provided a remarkable synthesis of the evidence available to him, not 
only by distinguishing between Gf and Gc, but by providing a lucid account of their 
mutual development and influence. In the years since Cattell’s comprehensive 
statement of investment theory (1987), various studies have been conducted that bear 
weight on his theory. Although more predictions could be elaborated, we shall survey 
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four here: (1) correlations between Gf and Gc, (2) homogeneity and the relationship 
between g and Gf, (3) heritabilities of Gf and Gc, and (4) the developmental influence 
of Gf on Gc. 
(1) Correlations between Gf and Gc. An important prediction of Cattell’s 
theory was that Gf and Gc should correlate strongly in the developmental years, due to 
the common content of the education system. However, once this rapid 
developmental period was over, and the students had left school and had more 
opportunity to pursue selective interest (either through tertiary or other vocational 
training), this relationship would be expected to diminish, because the common 
school curriculum no longer binds Gf and Gc together. Gf and Gc would remain in a 
strong relationship until the end of compulsory education, but less so thereafter. 
(2) Homogeneity and the relationship between g and Gf. Investment 
theory predicts that the relative loading of g on Gf and Gc will be a function of cultural 
similarity, especially educational opportunity. As noted before, Cattell saw Gf as a 
ubiquitous entity, involved in all manner of mental operations. Therefore, the Gf of 
those students who have experienced very similar upbringings and educations (i.e. 
homogeneous populations) should load very strongly on a higher-order g factor. Their 
mental effort has largely been applied within a set framework, and thus differences 
should be attributed largely to differences in ability. Nevertheless, Cattell himself 
expected this relationship to fall short of parity: “However, the gf factor will not 
account for all of the correlation in this case, as it does in the non-cultural, 
overlearned, or new problem-solving, because years at school, interest in school work, 
and other influences will also determine, perhaps substantially, the level of crystallized 
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abilities” (1987, p. 139). Conversely, the Gf of those with less similar backgrounds (i.e. 
heterogeneous populations) should be lower. 
Thus, Cattell’s investment theory predicts that Gf should possess the most 
stable meaning of these three factors. The meaning of Gc in any assessment is in part 
determined by culture, the school curriculum, experiences over time, and differences 
in occupational knowledge. Spearman’s g is variable, too, and the strength of its 
relationship with Gf depends on the degree to which a test sample has a uniform 
upbringing of culture and education.  
(3) Heritabilities of Gf and Gc. Investment theory also predicts that the 
heritabilities of Gf and Gc would differ significantly. As Gf is interpreted as an innate, 
biological reasoning capacity, its heritability should be higher than that of Gc, which is 
more culturally determined. In samples where experiences of participants were highly 
homogeneous, heritabilities for measures of Gc might approach those of Gf, but would 
not be expected to exceed them. Cattell (1987) acknowledged the limitations of the 
data available to him, but argued that the broad trend of these data supported—
though not unequivocally—his perspective on the relative heritability of Gf and Gc. 
(4) Developmental influence of Gf on Gc. Finally, investment theory 
predicts that Gf should exert a stronger developmental (i.e. longitudinal) influence on 
Gc than Gc does on Gf. Given that Gf is conceptually and developmentally prior to Gc, 
we should expect that longitudinal studies in which these variables had been 
measured at different points in time, and with sufficient statistical power, would show 
this pattern. Although Cattell also allowed that the development could also flow from 
Gc to Gf, this should not be as strong as the influence from Gf to Gc because of the 
primacy of Gf in this theoretical account. 
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Summary 
Cattell’s theory of the investment of Gf into Gc clearly related more strongly to 
children more than to adults, and predicted that this investment would change 
significantly in the years following mandatory education. Although Cattell provided 
several intuitions about what investment might look like in adult populations, his 
statements regarding this group were less detailed and more speculative. For Cattell, 
investment in childhood and adult cohorts were qualitatively different, but beyond 
some speculations about personality variables that might be important in the 
development of adult intelligence, he left some pieces of a puzzle for others to 
complete. 
1.5  Ackerman’s PPIK Theory 
Introduction 
Phillip Ackerman has provided a comprehensive, integrative account of adult 
intelligence in the spirit of Cattell. His PPIK (intelligence–as–process, –personality, –
interests and –knowledge) theory of adult intelligence (1996) was also an investment 
theory, and an extension of Cattell’s model. It provided an extended account of the 
development of intelligence in adults, with special concern for the different structures 
that determine knowledge acquisition in adults. As Cattell noted, the nature of the 
investment of Gf into Gc would change dramatically once compulsory education had 
ended, and PPIK incorporated this insight. In this section, we will survey: (1) the 
historical background, (2) the components of PPIK theory, and (3) its relationship 





 According to Ackerman (1996), the early contribution of Binet and Simon 
strongly influenced the subsequent approach to intelligence research. Binet and 
Simon (1905) identified three potential approaches to testing intelligence: (1) the 
medical method, which looked for physiological explanations for differences in 
intelligence, (2) the pedagogical method, which assessed intelligence as the sum of 
acquired knowledge, and (3) the psychological method, which assessed intelligence 
directly through sampling reasoning ability. Binet and Simon (1905) identified the 
psychological method as having the most promise, and their pursuit of this method, 
noted Ackerman (1996), set the course for the subsequent research across much of the 
20th century. 
Ackerman (1996) accepted that the psychological method had been very 
successful in children: “There is, indeed, no essential difficulty with this approach for 
the testing of children and adolescents for the school performance criterion” 
(Ackerman, 1996, p. 228), because school performance is the appropriate outcome 
variable in childhood and adolescence. However, Ackerman (1996) questioned 
“whether upward extensions of the Binet-Simon scales are optimal for describing adult 
intellect, or the development of intellect in adults” (p. 228).  
Specifically, Ackerman (1996) argued that applying to adults the same construct 
of intelligence that had been developed for children was inappropriate for three 
reasons: (1) the concept of an intelligence quotient—a child’s mental age divided by 
her chronological age—makes little sense for adults, because many aspects of 
intellectual development usually plateau before the age of twenty; (2) many adults 
with apparently lower intelligence nonetheless develop expertise in their professions 
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and hobbies, suggesting that acquired, relevant knowledge may become increasingly 
important for adults—a concept not thoroughly assessed in many intelligence tests; 
and (3) applying such intelligence tests in adult populations predicted only a portion 
of the variables in adult achievement, such as academic or work outcomes, suggesting 
that variables such as personality traits may become more salient predictors in 
adulthood. Thus, given the differences between adolescent and adult populations, 
Ackerman argued that assessing intelligence in adults warranted a fresh conception, 
which he introduced in PPIK. 
The Components of PPIK Theory 
Process. We shall survey the components of PPIK in order, starting with 
intelligence-as-process. Ackerman retained the notion of a general abstract problem 
solving ability (Cattell’s Gf) but preferred to designate it as “Process”. Process included 
Gf but was broader, involving a number of aspects crucial for information processing, 
such as working memory, processing speed, and spatial rotation—abilities which 
seemed to develop together during adolescence, suggesting their close mutual 
relationship (Ackerman, 1996). However, having proposed the continued significance 
of Process intelligence for adults, he noted that it may not be as powerful a predictor 
of intellectual development as it was in adolescence. Thus, Ackerman highlighted the 
inherent difficulty in separating process intelligence from knowledge, because in 
adults existing knowledge structures may be the best predictors of future development 
(1996). It is noteworthy that this objection is the same that Cattell made of Newland’s 
(1962) use of “process” and “product”, where the prior amounts of a product may 
determine its future acquisition. However, for description and analysis, Ackerman 
preferred the label Process to Gf. 
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Personality. The second component of PPIK is intelligence-as-personality. 
Ackerman’s (1996) move to formally incorporate personality variables into the 
framework of intelligence marked a significant shift in perspective for intelligence 
theory. When introducing Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE), Goff and Ackerman 
(1992) suggested that the history of intelligence theorising had been characterised by 
measuring “intelligence as maximal performance”—the traditional domain of 
intelligence tests. However, they argued that the lack of predictive power when using 
this approach in circumstances such as late-stage skill acquisition implied that 
something was missing in this conception, which they argued was “intelligence as 
typical performance”. Thus, the development of the TIE scale was intended to measure 
this tendency, and to define clearly a personality variable understood to be relevant to 
acquiring knowledge. 
 Ackerman (1996) noted two particular personality variables that captured 
intelligence-as-personality: Openness within the Five Factor Model (FFM; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a), and Typical Intellectual Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). In this 
earlier study (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), these two factors appeared to show little 
overlap with intelligence-as-process, with negligible correlations between Gf and TIE 
(r = -.06, p > .05) and between Gf and Openness (r = -.02, p > .05) indicating their 
independence. Goff and Ackerman (1992) also reported correlations between Gc and 
Openness (r = .22, p < .05), and between Gc and TIE (r = .22, p < .05), indicating 
significant overlap with intelligence-as-knowledge. In addition, the meta-analysis of 
Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) reported substantial correlations for both TIE and 
Openness with Gc (ρ = .35 and .30 respectively, both p < .05), and with a measure of 
knowledge and achievement (ρ = .23 and .28 respectively, both p < .05)—far more 
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substantial than for the other FFM variables surveyed. Thus, the correlations between 
both Openness and TIE and the relevant factors of intelligence were consistent with 
the predictions of PPIK theory. 
This raises the question of the relationship between Openness and TIE. Goff 
and Ackerman (1992) reported a strong correlation between Openness and TIE (r = 
.65, p < .05). This overlap, considered alongside the very similar correlations between 
both TIE and Openness with Gf and Gc indicated to Rocklin (1994) that these factors 
were addressing the same underlying construct, and that the correlation was less than 
perfect only because of measurement error. However, Ackerman and Goff (1994) 
rejected Rocklin’s arguments, citing TIE’s differential relationship with the six facets of 
Openness to Experience as evidence of its theoretical distinctness—TIE related most 
closely with the facet Openness to Ideas (r = .77, p < .05), but least closely with 
Openness to Fantasy (r = .26, p < .05). Thus, they argued that Openness and TIE were 
distinct constructs, despite being related. 
Having confirmed the relationship of Openness and TIE with broad Gc, 
Ackerman and colleagues then related them to more specific knowledge measures. In 
the first study, Rolfhus and Ackerman (1996) compared FFM domains and TIE with 
self-reported knowledge across 20 domains including music, literature, biology, 
architecture, algebra, and statistics. They obtained salient correlations (r > .3) between 
both TIE and Openness and several knowledge domains, particularly those from the 
art, and humanities and social science clusters. No other FFM factors correlated 
saliently with any self-reported knowledge domain, indicating that TIE and Openness 
might relate more strongly to some knowledge domains than others. The remaining 
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four FFM factors did not show substantial correlations with these domains, indicating 
that they were not part of the investment process. 
However, a substantial weakness of this study was its reliance on self-reported 
knowledge rather than assessed knowledge. This weakness was addressed by Rolfhus 
and Ackerman (1999), who developed scales to measure the 20 knowledge domains 
used in the earlier study. They predicted that Openness and TIE would relate more 
strongly with knowledge of humanities than science domains, while the other FFM 
variables would not relate substantially to intelligence-as-knowledge. These 
predictions were broadly confirmed, although Extraversion had significant, negative 
relationships with nearly all domains. TIE and Openness broadly predicted knowledge 
across domains, but the trend was a more substantial overlap with humanities and arts 
subjects than with science and mechanical domains. The broad pattern of 
relationships therefore matched predictions based on PPIK. 
Interests. The third component of PPIK is intelligence-as-interests. To assess 
interests, Ackerman (1996) used Holland’s (1959, 1973) framework, which identified six 
types of occupational interest: Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, 
and Conventional (Holland, 1996). The meta-analysis of Ackerman and Heggestad 
(1997) assessed these six interest types, and found that only the first three overlapped 
substantially with intelligence. Defined briefly: realistic (originally “motoric”) interests 
express themselves in occupations that involve physical strength and motor skills, 
such as labouring, mechanical trades, and engineering; investigative (originally 
‘intellectual’) interests express themselves through occupations involving the pursuit 
of knowledge and understanding; and artistic (originally “esthetic”) interests express 
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themselves through artistic pursuits such as painting, writing, and music (Holland, 
1959).  
Comparing these three interest domains with intelligence, Ackerman and 
Heggestad (1997) reported that realistic interests correlated predominantly with 
spatial, mathematical and mechanical (i.e. process) abilities, investigative interests 
correlated with spatial, mathematical, and verbal (process and knowledge) abilities, 
and artistic interests correlated mainly with verbal (knowledge) ability. This 
differential pattern of relationships depending on interest type is predicted by PPIK, 
which suggests that interests and relevant abilities will overlap significantly because 
they are both involved in the developmental process. 
 Not only do interests relate to the broad abilities, but they also relate to the 
narrower domains of knowledge. The study of Rolfhus and Ackerman (1996) compared 
Holland’s interest types with self-reported knowledge scales across the same 20 
narrow domains and found that knowledge in the mathematics and physical sciences 
cluster correlated saliently with realistic and investigative interests; knowledge in the 
technology cluster was predicted by realistic interests; knowledge in the bio-social 
science cluster was predicted by investigative interests; and knowledge in both the art 
and humanities and social sciences clusters were predicted by artistic interests. These 
correspondences between knowledge and their corresponding interest type are 
consistent with the predictions of PPIK theory. 
 In their follow-up study which used assessed knowledge scales, Rolfhus and 
Ackerman (1999) also compared interest types with assessed knowledge domains. 
They reported that realistic interests predicted knowledge within science and 
mechanical knowledge clusters, as did investigative interest, while artistic interests 
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predicted knowledge in the humanities, civics, and some domains of science. 
Concerning the relationship between interest types and knowledge domains, the 
results were consistent with PPIK theory. 
 Given these results, the question arises as to how interests and abilities are 
understood to develop within PPIK theory. Ackerman (1996) proposed that abilities 
and interests most likely develop in tandem, in a form of reciprocal determinism. 
Thus, when a person succeeds in developing competence in a domain, this will likely 
increase both confidence and the knowledge to which future knowledge can be 
added—thereby making future endeavours within this domain more successful. 
Likewise, an unsuccessful attempt to achieve competence might reduce confidence in 
this domain, and leave domain-relevant knowledge unchanged—making future 
attempts to increase competence less likely. This point re-iterates Cattell’s (1963) 
argument against using “Process” and “Product” to designate Gf and Gc respectively—
that knowledge acquisition can be affected by the present level of knowledge, not 
simply the “Process” component. 
Knowledge. The fourth component of PPIK is intelligence-as-knowledge. 
Although conceptually similar to the broad Gc factor already discussed, PPIK makes 
two significant departures from the mainstream perspective on Gc. First, in line with 
Cattell’s intuition, knowledge in adults is understood to be increasingly variegated and 
domain-specific when compared with adolescents. Once people leave the constraints 
of the school curriculum, Gc would become increasingly diverse, being influenced by 
occupation and interest factors. Moreover, Ackerman noted that the research of 
expertise provided a perspective consistent with PPIK, given that adults with expertise 
in particular domains do not “solve most real-world problems with brute force Gf 
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processes of reasoning and rote memory” but instead rely on “specific knowledge that 
is brought to bear on a problem” (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999, p. 315). Thus, across the 
lifespan, people shift from relying on intelligence-as-process to intelligence-as-
knowledge abilities. 
Second, the essence of Gc in adults is understood to include domain-specific 
knowledge, not simply verbal ability. Ackerman and Rolfhus (1999) assessed Gc in an 
adult population, and reported that verbal ability predicted knowledge in some 
domains, but not others. Having partialled out a factor for general ability (the shared 
variance between verbal, spatial, and numerical abilities) using a Schmid-Leiman 
rotation (Schmid & Leiman, 1957), they reported that verbal ability correlated 
significantly with various knowledge domains. However, the correlations were not 
uniform, ranging from r = .15 with geography to r = .64 with world literature, while the 
other correlations were spread between figures, most being salient (r > .3 for 14/20). 
Thus, Ackerman and Rolfhus (1999) concluded that intelligence-as-knowledge was 
related to verbal ability in adults, but was not identical with it.  
This shift in the conception of Gc, from simply verbal ability to including 
diverse knowledge, allowed a more nuanced assessment of whether young adults 
really were more intelligent than middle-aged adults. This longstanding issue had 
been raised by the developmental trajectory of Gf compared with Gc. As reported by 
Schaie and Strother (1968), cross-sectional results have suggested that younger 
participants outperform older participants in most domains of intelligence, while the 
longitudinal data have suggested that most abilities are well-retained (or even 
increased) up until about 60 years of age. Ackerman and Rolfhus (1999) attributed this 
apparent anomaly to reliance on the psychological method of Binet and Simon when 
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measuring Gc. Instead, Ackerman and Rolfhus (1999) compared young adults (18–27 
years) and mature adults (30–59 years) for knowledge across the 20 identified 
knowledge domains, reporting that mature adults on average knew more in every 
domain except for chemistry, which was not significantly different between groups. 
On this basis, they concluded that intelligence-as-knowledge provided a better 
account of the nature of adult Gc than the traditional approach. This led Ackerman 
(2000) to label domain-specific knowledge as the “dark matter” of adult intelligence—
knowledge that is difficult to measure directly, but which exerts an influence on its 
environment. 
 Another issue this approach allows to be assessed is the presence of a general 
factor across these knowledge domains. Rolfhus and Ackerman (1999) conducted 
exploratory factor analysis across 20 knowledge domains, and identified four first-
order factors (in addition to a single second-order factor), which they labelled 
Humanities, Science, Civics, and Mechanical. Of the variance explained at the test 
level, the second-order factor across these domains accounted for approximately 60% 
of that variance, while the first-order factors accounted for the remaining 40%. This 
finding suggests both that all knowledge domains are affected by a general knowledge 
factor, and that they cluster in a way which supports Holland’s types. Therefore, 
despite the proposed differentiation of knowledge domains when assessed in adults, it 
appears that a significant general knowledge factor remains. 
 Finally, despite appearances, PPIK does not clearly state “where to put the 
‘causal arrow’” (Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999, p. 325) in the relationship between 
knowledge, interests, and personality. It could plausibly point from interests to 
knowledge, but it could also point from knowledge to interests. Perhaps it is best to 
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view their relationship as reciprocal, at least until future research can test this 
question more robustly (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999). 
Relationship of PPIK with Cattell’s Investment Theory 
Ackerman acknowledged that PPIK “draws heavily” (1996, p. 237) on Cattell’s 
framework, resulting in numerous similarities. Despite this overlap, however, 
Ackerman argued that PPIK departed from Cattell’s investment theory in three 
significant ways, quoted in full: 
1. General Intelligence as two broad factors (process and knowledge), 
rather than Gf and Gc, but closer to Hebb’s notions of Intelligence A and 
Intelligence B. 
2. To the degree possible, as revealed by metaanalysis and our own recent 
research, explicit representation is provided for a small set of personality 
factors and interest factors as related to intelligence and adult 
intellectual development. 
3. Representation of adult intellectual knowledge and skill as complexes, 
for which different individuals may demonstrate very little overlap (e.g., 
the knowledge structures of a physicist may have little in common with 
the knowledge structures of a historian). (1996, pp. 237-8). 
We shall assess these departures in turn. 
 First, although Ackerman preferred the labels Process and Product, we may ask 
what this difference in terminology has meant in theory and practice. Cattell’s 
investment theory clearly implies that Gf corresponds to processing ability, and that 
Gc corresponds with the product of such processing. Moreover, Hebb’s (1942) 
distinction between intelligences A and B was recognised by Cattell as the same as his 
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distinction between Gf and Gc. Thus, despite the different labels, Cattell means by Gf 
essentially what Ackerman means by Process, and by Gc essentially what Ackerman 
means by Product. Ackerman has operationalised Process by using what are mostly 
traditional measures of Gf—except for some of his research before his proposal of 
PPIK (1996), which included speed of processing measures as they related to skill 
acquisition (e.g. 1988). Because it is a change in the label but not the content, we 
might wonder whether this aspect of PPIK is as distinctive as Ackerman suggests. 
However, Ackerman’s research agenda has provided a more detailed 
perspective on the Product component, particularly his demonstration that interest in 
various domains predicted knowledge in those domains—consistent with the theory 
that interest directs investment, resulting in domain-specific knowledge. This 
approach clarified Gc as being defined not just by verbal ability, but also by 
knowledge. Thus, his identification of intelligence as Process and Product as a 
departure has some substance, but more in terms of Product than Process abilities.  
Second, we turn to the place of personality variables in the investment process. 
More than once, Ackerman (1996) stated that Cattell’s investment theory does not 
include personality variables. For instance, he wrote: “Also, although not specified in 
the discussion of the Investment Theory, Cattell did indicate some personality factors 
that are related to different domains of intellectual abilities” (p. 235). Moreover, in the 
same place Ackerman wrote: “Cattell also integrated interest influences (though not 
personality) into the configuration, but again the detail of specific relations is not 
provided” (1996, p. 235). We may agree with the second part of this statement, but not 
the first. First, Cattell (1987) devoted an entire chapter (12) to interactions between 
personality and ability. Second, Cattell’s clearest statement on the subject confirms 
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that he was fully cognizant of the relevance of personality variables to investment 
theory: 
As to the compositeness of crystallized general intelligence, one must recognize 
that the positive correlations arise not only from the widespread uniformity of 
the school curriculum – at least in the three R’s – and the fact that different 
individuals are exposed to it for different numbers of years, but they arise also 
from dynamic causes, in the form of some children being more strongly 
interested in all that may be called intellectual matters and school 
achievement. Examined closely, these influences that are not gf, and not length 
of learning in school, are themselves complex. The personality researcher will 
pry them apart into such demonstrated contributors as affectothymia (A 
factor), superego strength (G), strength of self-sentiment (Q3), and so on. (1987, 
p. 143) 
Thus, Cattell uses “interest” and “dynamic causes” to denote, among other things, 
“personality”. Although he did not elaborate the influence of personality variables 
within the investment process in as much detail as he did for the influence of the 
school curriculum, for example, Cattell certainly considered personality variables in 
his approach. In this respect, Cattell’s theory was more inclusive than Ackerman gave 
him credit for. 
This leads us to ask what Ackerman has contributed to our understanding of 
investment. Rather than providing a wholly novel contribution, Ackerman’s approach 
has differentiated “interest” and “personality” variables that Cattell simply termed 
“interest”. We might say that Ackerman did for Cattell’s “interest” variable what 
Cattell did for Spearman’s g: he bifurcated a single entity into two and, in doing so, 
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has provided a richer theoretical account. His subsequent research agenda has shown 
the relevance of both aspects for predicting domain-specific knowledge in adults 
(Ackerman, 2000; Ackerman & Rolfhus, 1999; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1996, 1999). 
 Third, we consider Ackerman’s position that knowledge exists in domains that 
may overlap very little with one another. Ackerman has successfully shifted attention 
from the apparent, broad factor that relates to verbal ability and knowledge to its 
more discrete, domain-specific components which relate to professional expertise and 
interests. However, understanding the existence of this broad factor, and why it gives 
way to domain-specific knowledge, requires investment theory’s understanding of the 
school curriculum: if the school curriculum produces the Gc factor, then its absence 
would weaken this factor. Moreover, the research subsequent to Ackerman’s formal 
statement of PPIK indicates that these knowledge domains are distinct, but still 
overlap, especially the finding of Rolfhus and Ackerman (1999) that a general factor 
derived from across knowledge domains explained substantial variance in each 
domain. This leads us to conclude that that knowledge is simultaneously broad and 
domain-specific. Therefore, although Ackerman labels this aspect of PPIK a 
“departure” from Cattell’s investment theory, he might have labelled it more 
appropriately as an “extension”. 
Conclusion 
Perhaps our overall assessment of PPIK depends on what Ackerman meant by 
“departure”. If he meant “different” or “at odds with”, then it may be an overstatement 
which exaggerated the originality of his own contribution. But if he meant simply that 
PPIK starts with investment theory and continues the journey from there, then there 
is much to be affirmed in both theories, as the former is fulfilled in the latter. 
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1.6  Assessment of Investment Theory 
Introduction 
We will now assess a selection of studies that have tested predictions that 
follow from investment theory. As the previous survey has shown, the investment 
theories of Cattell and Ackerman did not contradict one another in any substantial 
respect, but each provided particular details lacking in the other. However, their 
principal difference is that Cattell’s model provides more detail for the investment 
process in adolescent populations, while Ackerman’s provides more detail for 
investment among adults. Thus, some studies will be relevant to one, the other, or 
both theories. This survey does not aim to be comprehensive, but to assess the major 
research findings that relate to investment theory, and thus to establish whether 
investment theory remains a viable framework for future research. This survey 
specifically assesses subsequent research included here as it concerns the four 
predictions of investment theory that we identified earlier: (1) the relationship of g 
with Gf and Gc; (2) interpreting the broad Gc factor; (3) tests of Gf as a predictor of the 
growth of Gc; (4) the heritability of Gf and Gc. It will also consider (5) alternative 
models of intelligence and investment.  
 (1) The Relationship of g with Gf and Gc 
 As noted earlier, a significant prediction of Cattell’s investment theory is that 
the relative loading of Gf and Gc on g will depend upon the homogeneity of the cohort 
in question. In other words, for populations that have a more similar upbringing, 
culture and learning opportunities, g should load more strongly on Gf than on Gc, 
while the opposite trend should appear for populations with less similar backgrounds.  
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 This prediction has been tested using both adolescent and adult populations. 
For adolescent populations, Undheim and Gustafsson (1987) used three samples of 
Norwegian primary school students, aged 11, 13, and 15 years. They assessed a broad 
range of intelligence subtests which were used to calculate factors including Gf, Gc, 
cognitive speed (Gs), visual perception (Gv), and retrieval ability (Gr), and tested 
model fit using LISREL structural equation modelling.  However, regardless of which 
age group they assessed, or which broad factors were assessed in the battery, g loaded 
upon Gf with near unity in each case. On this basis, the authors concluded that Gf is 
equivalent to the general factor of intelligence within such cohorts. 
 Valentin Kvist and Gustafsson (2008) conducted a complementary analysis 
using an adult population. They assessed the relative loading of g on measures of Gf, 
Gc, Gv, and Gs using three samples with different learning opportunities: Swedes (n = 
2,358), European immigrants (n = 620), and non-European immigrants (n = 591). From 
Cattell’s investment theory, the authors predicted that the relative loading of g on Gf 
would be stronger in path models which assessed each subgroup individually, than for 
models which assessed all three groups together. This prediction was supported; the 
analysis conducted on the combined sample reported that g loaded .83 on Gf, .80 on 
Gc .55 on Gv, and .61 on Gs—indicating that all loadings were far from unity. However, 
the relationship between g and Gf was near-perfect within each of the subgroups (.98 
to .99), with g loadings on the other three second-order factors ranging from .80 to .37 
(Swedes), .67 to .49 (European immigrants), and .63 to .38 (non-European 
immigrants). The authors concluded:  
This result provides support for the Investment theory, and for the hypothesis 
that Gf is equivalent to g. However, the results of this study also imply that the 
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hypothesis of Gf–g equivalence only holds true when the subjects have had 
approximately equally good, or equally poor, opportunities to develop the 
knowledge and skills measured. (Valentin Kvist & Gustafsson, 2008, p. 433) 
Subsequent research, therefore, has found substantial support for this prediction of 
investment theory. 
(2) Interpreting the Broad Gc Factor 
 Since the investment theories of Cattell and Ackerman were proposed, 
researchers have not held to a unanimous position on the precise nature of Gc, 
disagreeing about two aspects. First is the question over the nature of Gc: is it a true 
factor that exerts an influence on its various subtests (the realist interpretation)? Or is 
it a statistical entity that forms from the application of Gf across various knowledge or 
language domains (the non-realist interpretation)? Second is the question of the 
content of Gc: is it composed primarily of verbal or factual knowledge? 
 Kan, Kievit, Dolan, and van der Maas (2011) assessed the nature of Gc using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on a dataset with a homogeneous population of 
male naval recruits (N = 483). They found that g and Gf were statistically 
indistinguishable, as were verbal comprehension and Gc. Their conclusions were that 
Gc is not an ability per se but is an outcome of applied verbal ability, and thus Gc is 
best understood from a non-realist perspective. They argued that this finding 
concerning Gc contradicted the notion within Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) theory that 
Gc is a distinct ability, but broadly supported Cattell’s investment theory—which they 
concluded remained a viable approach within intelligence research.  
Concerning the content of Gc, Schipolowski, Wilhelm, and Schroeders (2014) 
assessed its relationship with verbal ability and declarative knowledge in a large-scale 
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sample of German school students (N = 6,701) across different academic tracks. They 
reported that these two factors overlapped substantially (r = .91), but that each also 
possessed substantial unique variance, and concluded that verbal ability and 
knowledge are distinguishable facets of Gc. However, if researchers could not assess 
both, they suggested that measures of verbal ability should be preferred because it 
permits brief and reliable assessments. Moreover, they argued that the conclusion of 
Kan et al. (2011), that Gc was indistinguishable from verbal ability, was due to relying 
on a relatively narrow assessment of Gc, unlike their own study. It is difficult to 
compare these results directly, however, because Schipolowski et al. (2014) did not use 
a similarly homogeneous sample to that of Kan et al. (2011)—which the latter argued is 
a prerequisite to testing investment theory. Thus, in conclusion, the investment 
approaches of Cattell and Ackerman remain plausible avenues for research on the 
nature of Gc, because evidence supports the interpretation that it contains both verbal 
ability and knowledge. 
(3) Tests of Gf as a predictor of the growth of Gc  
 Several studies have assessed whether the investment relationship can be 
observed over time, assessing participants through studies with longitudinal designs. 
Ferrer and McArdle (2004) used dynamic modelling to assess the influence of Gf upon 
both Gc and academic achievement across time in participants 5-24 years old. They 
found mixed support for investment theory; although Gf did not predict changes in Gc 
(inconsistent with investment theory), Gf did predict changes in performance on 
measures of quantitative abilities and academic knowledge (consistent with 
investment theory). The authors concluded that Gf was the leading predictor of 
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changes in variables related to academic knowledge, but that the relationship between 
Gf and Gc may be more complex than Cattell specified. 
 Thorsen, Gustafsson, and Cliffordson (2014) assessed Gf as a predictor of Gc 
using data obtained from a sample of Swedish school students (N = 9,002) with 
measures obtained at grades 3, 6, and 9. They assessed both Cattell’s investment 
theory and the Encapsulation hypothesis: that the effects of Gf will become 
“encapsulated” within Gc, with the result that Gf will only influence specific outcomes 
such as school grades indirectly through its influence on broad Gc. Results indicated 
that the influence of Gf upon Gc increased across the years of schooling, but also that 
Gf influenced school grades only indirectly through its influence on Gc. They 
concluded that this study provided support for investment theory, and for the 
Encapsulation hypothesis. Moreover, Soares, Lemos, Primi, and Almeida (2015) 
reached similar conclusions using N = 284 Portuguese students: grade 7 AP was the 
best predictor of grade 9 AP, and the influence of cognitive ability measured in grade 7 
on grade 9 AP was mediated by grade 7 AP. These studies provide some support for 
the investment process as it relates to academic outcomes. 
 Christensen, Batterham, and Mackinnon (2013) assessed whether higher levels 
of Gf predicted accelerated acquisition of Gc, measured by vocabulary knowledge 
(assessed by the Spot-the-Word test; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1993) in a 
population-representative sample of young adults. The authors concluded that this 
study showed no support for investment theory; although participants with Gf had 
correspondingly higher levels of Gc, there was no evidence of an accelerated 
acquisition of Gc. However, a potential oversight of this study involved the 
participants, being a community sample initially aged 20-24 years, whose vocabulary 
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knowledge was re-assessed four and then eight years later. As noted earlier, Cattell 
specified that the education system is the common link between Gf and Gc. However, 
because this cohort was beyond the age of compulsory education, these variables 
would be expected to behave differently than for a cohort still undergoing compulsory 
education. Therefore, it is possible that this conclusion was based on an interpretation 
of investment theory that did not take full account of the parameters within which 
Cattell expected investment to operate. 
 Rindermann, Flores-Mendoza, and Mansur-Alves (2010) assessed investment 
theory in two groups of adolescents: a Brazillian sample (N = 833, aged 7-15) with 
below-average ability (IQ M = 92, SD = not reported), and a German sample (N = 722, 
aged 11-19) with above-average ability (IQ M = 118, SD = not reported). They assessed 
Gf and Gc measured two years apart, and reported that both Gf and Gc exerted similar 
influence on the latter measure of Gc—inconsistent with investment theory. However, 
parental SES and education predicted Gc more strongly than they predicted Gf—
consistent with investment theory’s view of the malleability of Gc.  
In evaluating this research, it remains possible that not every study assessing 
investment theory assesses hypotheses that follow from investment theory (see also 
McArdle, Hamagami, Meredith, & Bradway, 2000 on this issue). For instance, although 
Schmidt and Crano (1974) argued that the influence of Gf upon Gc should be 
discernible through cross-lagged correlations, Gustafsson and Undheim (1992) argued 
that this may not necessarily be the case. Therefore, the mixed results concerning the 
influence of Gf on Gc may result from misunderstandings of investment theory in 
some cases, a real lack of support in others, or the possibility that the process of 
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investment in the real world is more complex than the theory—at least from the 
perspective of some researchers—has given it credit for. 
(4) The Heritability of Gf and Gc 
 Investment theory suggests that heritability estimates should be higher for Gf 
than Gc, because the former is understood to be the more innate, biological capacity 
for perceiving relationships, while the latter is more affected by the environment. 
However, in a very significant study, Kan, Wicherts, Dolan, and van der Maas (2013) 
assessed the heritability of Gf and Gc using data from 23 twin studies assessing adults 
and children. Here, the cultural load of intelligence subtests was assessed by the 
proportion of items in intelligence subtests which were modified when being adapted 
for use in different countries.  The authors reported two novel, important findings: (1) 
subtests with a stronger cultural load possessed stronger heritability coefficients than 
those with weaker cultural load, and (2) a subtest’s cultural load correlated 
substantially and positively with its loading on the statistical general factor, indicating 
that, in the words of the paper’s title, “the more heritable, the more culture 
dependent”. The authors noted that these findings are not consistent with investment 
theory, but make sense when viewed from the perspective of models that include the 
contribution of genotype-environmental covariance. This recent evidence concerning 
the heritability of Gf and Gc indicates that the process by which Gc develops is more 
complex than investment theory has suggested, and may require the addition of 
genotypic-environmental covariance. 
(5) Alternative Models of Intelligence and Investment  
 Lastly, several researchers have proposed either modifications to investment 
theory, or alternative models of intelligence which they argue fit the data more closely. 
	 41 
In the former category, Schweizer and Koch (2002) included learning as a mediating 
variable in the relationship between Gf and Gc. They reported that their modified 
investment model was supported in the sample of younger participants (aged 19-23 
years), but not in the older sample (24-30 years). Although they explained this 
difference in terms of Cattell’s expectation that the investment process weakens 
considerably as people age, due to professional specialisation, this explanation is 
questionable because both samples were obtained from the same university course 
and were thus past the age of compulsory education. 
 In the latter category, the first of two models we consider here has argued that 
the structure of intelligence is verbal, perceptual, and image rotation (VPR) rather 
than fluid and crystallised. Johnson and Bouchard (2005) noted that relatively little 
work had assessed the fit of CHC and extended Gf-Gc theories, compared with other 
approaches, and proposed VPR theory as an alternative model for intelligence. This 
model retains an overarching g factor, and places image rotation (R) alongside verbal 
(V) and perceptual abilities (P). Using a heterogeneous sample and SEM, the authors 
reported that VPR theory fitted an assortment of 42 test batteries better than did the 
two alternative theories. Furthermore, Major, Johnson, and Deary (2012) followed up 
this line of enquiry by assessing the fit of these three models, using a representative 
study of American high school students from the 1960s named Project TALENT. Major 
et al. (2012) obtained the same broad result: VPR theory obtained closer fit statistics 
than did either CHC or extended Gf-Gc theory. The authors noted that “No study to 
date has contradicted this conclusion” (Major et al., 2012, p. 555).  
In response, two comments are in order. First, although VPR theory achieved 
better fit statistics than the alternatives, the differences were comparatively minor and 
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these results may not constitute a major theoretical advance. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, a modest rearrangement of the hierarchy of human abilities would 
not likely make redundant the developmental account that investment theory 
provides. Because the factors in the VPR model are conceptually very close to their 
CHC and extended Gf-Gc counterparts, their existence and interrelationship still 
require a developmental explanation. Therefore, even if researchers were to adopt 
wholeheartedly the VPR framework for subsequent research, the essence of 
investment theory could probably be retained with little modification. 
 We turn now to the second of the two alternative models advanced as 
providing a better fit to pre-existing data. Termed OFCI (Openness-Fluid-Crystallized-
Intelligence), this model was proposed as an alternative investment framework by 
Ziegler, Danay, Heene, Asendorpf, and Bühner (2012). The authors noted that this 
model is not proposed as a comprehensive alternative to PPIK (or Cattell’s investment 
theory, presumably), but is concerned with the narrow question of the relationship 
between Gf, Gc, and Openness to Experience. It provides two perspectives on how 
these variables are related: the immediate performance perspective, and the 
developmental perspective. We survey these in turn. 
 The immediate performance perspective states that variables Gf, Gc, and 
Openness to Experience can interact with one another as they predict variance in task 
performance, such as academic achievement. For instance, a higher level of 
intellectual curiosity might allow a student to make more use of his intellectual 
potential in class, while a lower level of curiosity might preclude another equally 
capable student from doing the same. Thus, Gf and Openness might interact 
significantly to predict performance within immediate situations (Ziegler et al., 2012). 
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From its developmental perspective, OFCI accepts Cattell’s investment theory 
as a starting-point, with its position that Gf influences Gc developmentally. However, 
OFCI notes that Gf and Openness overlap moderately, and incorporates two 
complementary hypotheses that might account for this overlap. The environmental 
success hypothesis states that those with initially higher levels of Gf have more 
successful experiences in any environments they encounter, increasing their Openness 
to Experience subsequently. The environmental enrichment hypothesis states that 
those with initially higher levels of Openness are more likely to seek out environments 
that are stimulating and challenging, increasing their Gf subsequently.  
 Two research papers have assessed aspects of the OFCI model, in younger and 
also older participants. Ziegler et al. (2012) assessed both the immediate performance 
perspective and the developmental perspective of OFCI using a population of 
psychology students (n = 180, age m = 24). The authors found the expected evidence 
for an interaction between Gf and Openness in the prediction of Gc, and concluded 
that this supports OFCI specifically and Cattell’s idea of investment more generally. 
They also assessed the developmental perspective with longitudinal data from 174 
adolescents, assessed at 17 and 23 years of age for several variables, including Gf, Gc, 
and Openness to Experience. They found evidence for the environmental enrichment 
hypothesis, reporting that Openness predicted changes in Gf, but they did not find 
support for the environmental success hypothesis—an outcome that they argued was 
due to an insufficient sample size. Moreover, Ziegler, Cengia, Mussel, and Gerstorf 
(2015) assessed OFCI in an older population (initial n = 516, 70-103 years of age), where 
higher levels of Gf might be expected to protect against Gc declines in a population 
that is experiencing cognitive decline generally. They found support for environmental 
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success and enrichment, and investment theory. Overall, the two studies assessing 
investment theory within the OFCI model have found support for it.  
Conclusion 
From this selective review of research since Cattell proposed investment theory 
we see that the theory has received mixed support. First, its prediction of a strong 
relationship between g and both Gf and Gc as a function of homogeneity has been 
supported. Second, Cattell’s and Ackerman’s multi-dimensional perspectives on the 
definition of Gc—whether it is primarily verbal ability or knowledge-based—have 
found support, though researchers have disputed which is primary. Third, although 
studies that have assessed whether Gf is a leading indicator of changes in Gc have 
reached different conclusions (when the findings regarding the OFCI model are also 
considered), this may reflect different methodologies. This work has suggested that 
the relationship may be different for typical measures of Gc compared with Gc 
measured by academic outcomes. Fourth, studies which have assessed the 
heritabilities of Gf and Gc have concluded that Gc is more heritable than Gf, which 
contradicts Cattell’s predictions, and suggests that genotypic-environmental 
covariance may have been overlooked in this model. Fifth, some researchers have 
added additional elements to Cattell’s model (e.g. learning), or proposed alternative 
models (e.g. VPR), some of which have incorporated and found support for his 
essential ideas (e.g. OFCI).  
1.7  Conclusion 
As the foregoing review makes clear, investment theory has been highly 
influential in the history of intelligence research. Cattell retained Spearman’s notion of 
a general ability, but suggested it be subdivided into fluid and crystallised abilities, 
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and proposed investment theory to explain their relationship, with the education 
system as an essential element. In his PPIK model, Ackerman took the essential 
insights of Cattell’s model and reformulated these as they applied to adult 
populations. Subsequent research has assessed various predictions of investment 
theory and, while support has not been without question, with some aspects requiring 
modification, such support has been sufficient to endorse investment theory as a 
viable platform on which to base future research. This conclusion is also vindicated by 
the fact that research on investment theory has regularly appeared since it was first 




2 OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON CURIOSITY 
	
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of intellectual curiosity as it relates to the 
investment theories of Cattell and Ackerman. There are, however, alternative 
perspectives on curiosity that come from different domains of research, and the aim of 
this chapter is to survey these other perspectives. This chapter is presented under 
three main headings: The State Approach, Precursors to the Trait Approach, and  
The Trait Approach. The measures included here have been selected because they 
share a lineage, and address several broad distinctions within the domain of curiosity. 
Other measures of IC including Openness to Ideas (Costa & McCrae, 1992b) and the 
Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) are addressed in the next chapter. 
2.2  The State Approach 
Sokolov 
Evgeny Sokolov (1920—2008) was a Russian scientist whose research 
contribution included 12 books and over 400 articles—many of which have not been 
translated into English (Spinks, Näätänen, & Lyytinen, 2008). His research spanned 
several disciplines, including physiology, psychology, and neuroscience, and he 
contributed more to understanding the orienting reflex (or orienting response; OR) 
than anyone else in the 20th century. Surveying research on the OR is important 
because this phenomenon provided a point of departure for two other lines of 
research we shall cover shortly: preference for novelty (Fagan), and curiosity (Berlyne). 
Broadly, Sokolov defined the OR as “a set of reactions evoked in humans and 
animals by a novel stimulus” (Sokolov, 2001, p. 10978). These reactions include 
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observable behaviors (directing sensory organs at the stimulus), but far more 
abundant are the discrete reactions, including changes in heart rate, blood flow, 
neural activation, skin conductivity, and event-related potentials (Sokolov, 2001), 
which Sokolov continued to study until his death (Spinks et al., 2008). He also 
documented the tendency for the OR to habituate when the stimulus was presented 
repeatedly (Sokolov, 1963)—a tendency that reflects learning, and that research on 
“preference for novelty” would later rely upon. 
The OR was first described by Senechov, an earlier Russian physiologist whom 
Pavlov described as “the Father of Russian physiology”. Moreover, Pavlov himself also 
investigated this phenomenon, clearly defining it and explaining its functions: 
It is this reflex which brings about the immediate response in man and animals 
to the slightest changes in the world around them, so that they immediately 
orientate their appropriate receptor-organ in accordance with the perceptible 
quality in the agent bringing about the change, making full investigation of it. 
The biological significance of this reflex is obvious. If the animal were not 
provided with such a reflex its life would hang at every moment by a thread. 
(Pavlov, 1927, p. 27) 
Here, Pavlov argued that the OR has survival value for animals because it directs them 
toward imminent threats. However, he followed this by suggesting that the OR 
possesses a unique significance for human history: 
In man this reflex has been greatly developed in its highest form by 
inquisitiveness-the parent of that scientific method through which we hope one 
day to come to a true orientation in knowledge of the world around us. (1927, p. 
27) 
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While not all researchers would concur with Pavlov’s far-reaching interpretation, 
probably most would agree that the OR orients humans to stimuli of interest, and is 
thus a precursor to the form of curiosity that seeks information and understanding. 
Fagan 
Research on the “preference for novelty” was pioneered by Fantz, who studied 
this tendency using infant chimpanzees (1956) and humans (1964)—the approach that 
Fagan developed further. To assess preference for novelty, infants were initially shown 
an image, and subsequently shown the original image alongside a novel image. If the 
infant spent more time looking at the novel image, this indicated a preference for 
novelty. This preference was explained in terms of learning: an infant who preferred a 
novel image thereby showed that he had recognised the original image (Fantz, 1964). 
 Fagan (1941–2013) spent much of his research career assessing evidence of 
memory in young humans, especially the existence of preference for novelty and its 
ability to predict functioning later in life. His early research included comparing digit-
span memory in children with normal or impaired cognitive ability (Fagan, 1966), and 
developing approaches to assessing preference for novelty in infant humans (Fagan, 
1970). He demonstrated that infants can perceive colour (Fagan, 1974), can recognise 
the same face when photographed from different angles (Fagan, 1976), and can 
recognise the same face despite being presented with a similar face during a retention 
interval (Fagan, 1977b). On the basis of this research, Fagan (1977a) proposed an 
attention model of infant recognition, comprised of two components: (1) the orienting 
response, and (2) the fixation response. These two theoretical components are 
captured by the measure of the infant’s preference for novelty: “Both the attentional 
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and the fixation responses are covert; the only observable behavior is the actual 
amount of time spent viewing the two targets” (1977a, pp. 346-7). 
 Preference for novelty has been especially significant, however, as a marker of 
intelligence. Previously, measures of sensorimotor skills had been used to assess infant 
intelligence—influenced by the perspective of Piaget (1952)—but proved to be poor 
predictors of intelligence later in life (Fagan, 1981). This lack of a relationship led some 
theorists to surmise that infant intelligence was discontinuous with adult intelligence 
(e.g. Bayley, 1955). However, Fagan and McGrath (1981) assessed preference for novelty 
in a group infants four to seven months old, and obtained correlations with verbal 
intelligence of r = .37 at four years of age, and .57 at seven years. The authors also 
noted that these correlations were virtually unaltered when a proxy of SES (parental 
education) was partialled out, and were probably underestimates of the true 
correlations due to restriction of range and measurement error. Moreover, subsequent 
longitudinal research has shown preference for novelty to predict adult intelligence 
and academic achievement (Fagan, Holland, & Wheeler, 2007); while a similar line of 
enquiry has shown that a similar index of infant cognition to predict executive 
function at 11 years (Rose, Feldman, & Jankowski, 2012). Taken together, this research 
has provided powerful evidence that a substantial proportion of adult intelligence can 
be predicted from measures obtained during infancy of basic processes, indicating that 
the development of intelligence is continuous from birth (or at least early infancy) to 
adulthood. 
 This evidence raises the question of the basis for this continuity. Fagan (1984) 
noted that “The ability to detect similarities among otherwise diverse stimuli, for 
example, is a basic intellectual process” (p. 3), which he understood to be “information 
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processing”. On the assumption that individuals differ in their speed of information 
processing, Fagan noted that “what we measure on an intelligence test is the result of 
the interaction of speed of knowledge processing with the environment the person has 
been allowed to process” (1984, p. 5). This view is consistent with the investment 
theory of intelligence surveyed in the previous chapter, in the sense that some early 
basic characteristic is held to influence how cognitive abilities develop. Specifically, 
Fagan held that information processing ability was the basis of the continuity of 
intelligence across the lifespan, and therefore of general intelligence itself (Fagan, 
2000). 
 For our purposes, it is noteworthy that the preference for novelty construct 
bears a striking similarity to the concept of curiosity as it appears in other research 
contexts. Although the survey of Berlyne’s contribution to curiosity research will make 
this resemblance clearer, the preference for novelty appears to assess curiosity for 
infants. Moreover, most significant is the connection between infant curiosity and 
adult intelligence. Given that subsequent research has sometimes sharply 
distinguished the domains of intelligence and personality—where personality is 
sometimes defined as variables that have no relationship with intelligence—it is ironic 
that the best predictor of adult intelligence from infancy is a trait that has come to be 
associated with personality variables! Although the distinction between intelligence 
and personality variables in adults has proved useful, and has improved prediction, 
accounting for far more variance in important life outcomes than either could alone, 
research on preference for novelty indicates that curiosity and intelligence may be 
indistinguishable for infants. The significance of this observation will be explored 
more fully in the Conclusions chapter. 
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Berlyne 
Daniel Berlyne (1924—1976) was a British-Canadian researcher who completed 
his PhD at Yale University in just in two years (while teaching full time in the second). 
After this he returned to Britain, travelled to California, and spent time in Switzerland 
studying with Jean Piaget (Konečni, 1978). However, despite the fact that Piaget’s 
subsequent influence has endured, his influence on Berlyne’s research appears to have 
been slight (Konečni, 1978). Later, he worked at the University of Toronto, Canada, 
until his untimely death from prolonged illness (Konečni, 1978). 
Berlyne’s career has been described as an effort to explain “a broad array of 
human and animal behaviour” with “a small number of motivational principles” 
(Konečni, 1978, p. 134). While his most significant contribution to research revolved 
around curiosity, starting with his first publication (Berlyne, 1949) and reaching its 
high-point with his book Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity (1960), he also researched 
aesthetics extensively during the last decade of his life, an effort that effectively 
opened up this area for future researchers (Konečni, 1978, 1996).  
Like most researchers, Berlyne’s work was indebted to his predecessors and 
contemporaries, especially Pavlov and Fantz. This was especially so regarding the 
orienting reflex as it related to curiosity variables. Given the close connection between 
the orienting reflex and exploratory behavior, Berlyne assessed whether variables 
shown to affect the level of perceptual curiosity (explained below) also affected the 
orienting response. He found this to be so, and concluded that complexity and novelty 
“elicit the investigatory reflex” (Berlyne, 1958, p. 295). Therefore, people are more 
likely to orient towards objects that are novel and complex, and such objects will 
command their attention for longer than for objects that are familiar and less 
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complex. Berlyne also observed the tendency for responses to habituate after repeated 
exposures, and suggested the following hypothesis: “As a curiosity-arousing stimulus 
continues to affect an organism’s receptors, curiosity will diminish” (Berlyne, 1950, p. 
74, italics in original). Thus, alongside Fantz his contemporary, Berlyne’s research had 
identified the elements necessary to assess the construct of preference for novelty 
(Fagan, 2011), and the process by which this took place—novelty as a drive, leading to 
investigation, leading to habituation. 
Berlyne’s contribution to curiosity research involved empirical work inducing 
curiosity in research participants, and distinguishing between varieties of curiosity. In 
his early work, Berlyne (1949) argued that research to that time had not grappled 
sufficiently with why people become absorbed in activities “whose biological necessity 
is not obvious, such as building model boats or solving cross-word puzzles” (p. 189), 
and therefore he began a program of research to discover what would predict such 
engagement. He also argued that novelty was a key factor in piquing interest, which 
led to exploring the object of interest, a process common to humans and other 
animals such as rats (Berlyne, 1950). While Pavlov saw a drive toward human 
civilisation in the orienting reflex, Berlyne saw the same drive in the human desire for 
novelty: 
An active striving to encounter new experiences, and to assimilate them when 
encountered, underlies a huge variety of activities highly esteemed by society, 
from those of the scientist, the artist and the philosopher to those of the polar 
explorer and the connoisseur of wines. (Berlyne, 1950, p. 68) 
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However, it was not mere novelty that was most powerful, but novelty where this is 
not expected, such as in an unexpected feature of an otherwise familiar object 
(Berlyne, 1950). 
Berlyne (1950, 1954, 1966) distinguished curiosity along two dimensions, and 
these distinctions survive (with some variation) to the present day. His first distinction 
was between perceptual curiosity (PC) and epistemic curiosity (EC); that is, 
distinguishing curiosity that is aroused by sensory information from curiosity aroused 
by the realm of ideas—similar to the distinction between Openness to Experience and 
Openness to Ideas in the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). These drives can be 
defined more extensively positively and negatively; by what behaviour they produce, 
and by the effect of this behavior on the underlying drive. Positively, PC is the 
“curiosity which leads to increased perception of stimuli”, while EC is the curiosity 
“whose main fruits are knowledge” (Berlyne, 1954, p. 180). Negatively, PC is “a drive 
which is reduced by perception”, while EC “is reduced by the acquisition of 
knowledge” (Berlyne, 1957, pp. 399-400). While both human beings and other animals 
experience PC, EC has been argued to be to humans (Berlyne, 1954; Loewenstein, 
1994).  
Berlyne’s second distinction was between diversive curiosity (DC) and specific 
curiosity (SC), where the former arises from boredom, while the latter arises from a 
puzzle or knowledge deficit (1966). He suggested that these two classes of exploratory 
habits serve biological needs: specific curiosity arises when an animal “is disturbed by 
a lack of information, and thus left a prey to uncertainty and conflict” (1966, p. 26), 
whereas diversive exploration allows an animal to maintain an optimum level of 
physiological arousal (1966). Moreover, these two dimensions can combine to produce 
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four distinct categories of curiosity: perceptual curiosity—specific (PC/S), perceptual 
curiosity—diversive (PC/D), epistemic curiosity—specific (EC/S), and epistemic 
curiosity—diversive (EC/D; Loewenstein (1994) provides some useful examples of 
each). 
In summary, Berlyne’s contributions to curiosity research have been enduring. 
His rich theoretical accounts have inspired and informed many researchers, and his 
main distinctions between forms of curiosity have also endured—especially 
concerning EC, which has appeared (with adjustment) in the research of Litman and 
Mussel. However, as researchers have noted, Berlyne did not assess curiosity as a 
dimension of personality (Litman & Spielberger, 2003), which would become the 
dominant approach to subsequent research in this field.  
2.3  Precursors to the Trait Approach 
Although Berlyne broadly measured “state” curiosity, while Litman employed a 
“trait” approach, there were several developments in between these two approaches, 
including the development of scales to measure both constructs, such as the State-
Trait Curiosity Inventory (Spielberger, Peters, & Frain, 1976).  
 Earlier in the 1970s, Langevin (1971) distinguished between Berlyne’s conception 
of curiosity as a motivational state (leading to exploratory behaviour) from the 
individual difference approach. To assess whether curiosity was a unitary or 
multifaceted construct, he factor analysed several state and trait measures of curiosity. 
He reported evidence for curiosity factors corresponding to “breadth of interest” and 
“depth of interest”—roughly equivalent to Berlyne’s distinction between diversive and 
specific curiosity—and that, although the factors of curiosity were distinct from 
intelligence, their intercorrelations were quite low, suggesting that measures of 
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curiosity should therefore be developed more thoroughly to capture their distinctness. 
Furthermore, Langevin (1976) also conducted a follow-up study assessing the 
psychometric properties of self-report and performance (i.e. behavioural) measures of 
curiosity. His major conclusions were much the same: while both approaches 
overlapped with discriminant variables (measures of social desirability and 
intelligence), self-report scales did so more, and therefore needed further 
development to capture their intended constructs more clearly.  
Roughly a decade later, Olson, Camp, and Fuller (1984) compared scores on the 
Need for Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) with several other measures of 
curiosity. NFC correlated r = .55 and r = .67 with the Melbourne Trait Curiosity scale 
and the Spielberger Trait Curiosity scale respectively, and r = .45 and r = .55 with the 
Melbourne State Curiosity scale and the Spielberger State Curiosity scale respectively. 
Although NFC correlated more strongly with the trait than state measures—
unsurprisingly, given that NFC is intended as a trait measure—this suggests that state 
and trait approaches share a large overlap. Moreover, Olson and Camp (1984) factor 
analysed several curiosity scales, including state and trait measures, and reported 
evidence for a general curiosity factor. Obviously, these conclusions were not easily 
reconciled, and more research on the state-trait distinction was needed. 
2.4  The Trait Approach 
Litman 
Jordan Litman has been a highly-active researcher in the domain of curiosity in 
recent years. Although Berlyne’s main contributions were his stimulating theoretical 
account of curiosity, and his use of “state” or possibly more “objective” measures of 
curiosity, Litman’s research has rigorously transformed these constructs into 
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personality scales, while offering theoretical advances along the way. We will assess 
his contribution under three headings: (1) definitions of curiosity, (2) research on PC, 
SC, and EC, and (3) theoretical advances.  
Definitions of curiosity. Because measures of curiosity overlap, it is useful to 
first define them. In Litman’s research, both EC and PC remain largely unchanged 
from Berlyne’s perspective. Litman, Collins, and Spielberger (2005) defined EC as 
being “stimulated by intellectual uncertainty, and motivates behaviors such as asking 
questions in order to acquire knowledge”; and defined PC as being “aroused by the 
presentation of new or unusual sights or sounds’ and as motivating ‘exploratory 
behaviors such as visual inspection or attentive listening” (Litman, Collins, et al., 2005, 
p. 1124). Thus, EC and PC are expressed through information-seeking behaviour. 
Litman, Collins, et al. (2005) have also developed a measure of sensory curiosity (SC). 
Although SC might appear to be identical with PC, the difference is that PC is a desire 
for understanding prompted by sensory information, whereas SC is curiosity for 
sensory experiences themselves (Litman, Collins, et al., 2005). Moreover, although SC 
might also appear to be similar to sensation seeking, SC “does not involve the physical 
or social risk-taking or the desire for intense emotional arousal” characteristic of 
sensation seeking (Litman, Collins, et al., 2005, p. 1125). 
Not only has Litman moved Berlyne’s conceptions of curiosity into the domain 
of individual differences, but he has also redefined “diversive” curiosity as a “feeling-
of-interest” (CFI or I-type), and “specific” curiosity as a “feeling-of-deprivation” (CFD 
or D-type). We shall survey four reasons for these redefinitions. First, as Loewenstein 
(1994) observed, Berlyne proposed the “diversive” and “specific” distinction as it 
related to exploratory behaviour rather than curiosity per se, and therefore this 
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distinction would need to be established properly as it concerned curiosity itself 
(Litman, 2008). Second, the term “diversive” is somewhat ambiguous: it might be 
understood to indicate either breadth of interest, or curiosity that serves to alleviate 
boredom. This ambiguity underscored the need for a clearer conception of this 
dimension of curiosity (Litman, 2008). Third, in addition to the “interest” dimension 
of curiosity, Berlyne’s (1954) account emphasised that being deprived of information 
was also a strong force that motivated exploratory behaviour. This “deprivation” 
dimension had been neglected by curiosity research, but showed potential to be 
important within the broad domain of curiosity (Litman & Jimerson, 2004). And 
fourth, “interest” and “deprivation” dimensions of curiosity focus more directly on the 
subjective experiences associated with these constructs, whereas “diversive” and 
“specific” constructs do this less clearly. Given the salience of emotional states within 
theoretical accounts for curiosity, terms that expressed these different experiences 
were to be preferred (Litman, 2008). Therefore, on the basis of these and other 
considerations, Litman and colleagues re-defined the diversive and specific 
components of curiosity as “interest” and “deprivation” factors, respectively. 
Research on PC, SC, and EC. To begin, an important aspect of this research 
was to demonstrate that the dimensions of curiosity that Berlyne outlined were 
distinct from one another when assessed as personality traits. Litman and Spielberger 
(2003) used an initial pool of 56 items worded to capture either EC and PC, including 
their proposed diverse and specific components, to assess this. Exploratory factor 
analysis suggested a two-factor solution, with the substantial correlation between EC 
and PC (r = .56) indicating overlap but not identity. Moreover, following rotation, the 
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items also loaded onto diversive and specific components, indicating that this 
distinction is also meaningful from a personality perspective. 
PC has also been researched more extensively. Collins, Litman, and Spielberger 
(2004) demonstrated that 33 items worded to measure PC loaded onto a broad factor 
of PC, and also loaded onto diversive and specific components following rotation. 
Moreover, the resultant factors showed moderate correlations with scales measuring 
sensation seeking and knowledge, indicating that PC involves curiosity for both 
knowledge and experiences. The divergent validity of the PC scale from other 
personality variables was established by demonstrating small and generally non-
significant correlations with trait measures of anxiety, anger, and depression. 
 Moreover, Litman, Collins, et al. (2005) validated a measure of sensory curiosity 
(SC) and assessed its distinctness from EC and PC, and from sensation seeking. They 
reported convergent validity among the three curiosity measures—correlations 
between SC and both EC and PC were stronger than correlations between sensation 
seeking and both EC and PC—and discriminant validity was demonstrated by minimal 
correlations between SC and measures of trait anxiety, anger, and depression. The 
authors proposed that that EC, PC, and SC were distinct but somewhat related 
measures that might be overarched by a broad curiosity construct (Litman, Collins, et 
al., 2005). 
Notwithstanding the research conducted on PC and SC, Litman’s most 
extensive contribution has been his development of EC scales. In a series of four 
studies, Litman (2008) developed and validated a more concise measure of EC 
intended to differentiate I-type and D-type curiosity more clearly. These measures of 
the I-D (or wanting-liking) model of curiosity were then tested in a subsequent study 
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(Litman, 2010) as they related to measures of ambiguity tolerance (MacDonald, 1970) 
and need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The I-D model would predict that 
higher I-type curiosity would correspond with higher tolerance for ambiguity, and that 
higher D-type curiosity would correspond with a stronger need for closure. This is 
what Litman (2010) found; the study’s findings were consistent with these predictions. 
Litman (2008) and Litman (2010) used student populations, but these same 
scales have been validated in non-student populations (Litman, Crowson, & Kolinski, 
2010), and therefore the conceptual distinction between I-type and D-type curiosity 
has strong empirical support (see also Litman & Mussel, 2013). Moreover, Lauriola et 
al. (2015) conducted a cross-cultural study (using Italian, American, and German 
undergraduate students) using the I-D model of EC, and assessed its relationship with 
variables measuring self-regulation. They concluded that I-type curiosity overlaps with 
“carefree intellectual exploration”, while D-type EC “orients individuals to apply 
cognitive resources judiciously” (Lauriola et al., 2015, p. 206, italics in original)—
concepts consistent with the studies already surveyed here. Finally, Piotrowski, 
Litman, and Valkenburg (2014) developed a scale to measure NFC in young children 
aged 3 to 8 years as measured by parents’ reports, and reported evidence for the I-D 
model in this demographic. 
 Additionally, it should be noted that D-type curiosity (i.e. CFD) has been 
assessed more extensively in its own right. Litman and Jimerson (2004) noted that 
while several scales had been developed to measure I-type curiosity, none measuring 
D-type curiosity had yet appeared. They therefore developed a 27-item questionnaire, 
and obtained evidence for a strong general factor corresponding to D-type curiosity, 
with three meaningful subfactors (labelled intolerance, competence, and problem-
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solving) emerging following rotation. This outcome therefore provided further 
evidence of the existence and nature of this dimension. 
Theoretical advances. Along with the refined and validated scales measuring 
EC, PC, and SC, Litman and colleagues have also provided a fresh theoretical account 
from the perspective of brain systems to explain the existence of these factors of 
curiosity. Since Berlyne’s time, evidence that the drive reduction and optimal arousal 
theories could not explain easily—such as the observation that organisms will often 
engage in behaviour to increase levels of arousal; and that physiological levels of 
arousal show only weak correlations with emotions and behaviour—increasingly led 
to many researchers to abandon these models as they underpinned accounts of 
curiosity (Litman, 2005). Obviously, this meant that new explanations were required. 
Litman (2005) theorised that an important aspect of the I-D model of curiosity is that 
new knowledge might be expected to increase pleasurable feelings (I-type) or decrease 
unpleasant feelings associated with uncertainty (D-type), depending on the recipient’s 
context (Litman, 2005). The differences between these types of behavior have been 
suggested to correspond to the opioid “liking” and dopaminergic “wanting” systems in 
the brain, for which there is evidence of differential patterns of brain activity (Litman, 
2005). Importantly, both systems may be activated at the same time, and a person may 
therefore “want” and “like” something simultaneously. In the I-D model, D-type 
curiosity (CFD) is posited to involve high “wanting” and high “liking”, while I-type 
curiosity (CFI) is theorised to involve low “wanting” and high “liking” (Litman, 2005). 
 A useful analogy for the wanting/liking distinction as it relates to acquiring 
knowledge might be appetite for salted food. Salt can be desired because it is required 
for the body to function, and therefore a nutritional deficit of salt would result in a 
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wanting-type hunger. However, salt can also be desired for its hedonic value 
(consistent with its presence in fast-food), and therefore eating salted food for pure 
enjoyment would correspond to a liking-type hunger. Similarly, a person may desire a 
piece of knowledge because she is bothered by not knowing it (i.e. “wanting” or D-type 
curiosity), or because she finds learning new things enjoyable (i.e. “liking” or I-type 
curiosity). 
 There also remains the theoretical question of how state and trait curiosity 
might interact to promote exploratory behaviour. To assess this, Litman, Hutchins, 
and Russon (2005) asked participants questions that they could answer with one of 
three responses: “I know”; that the answer was on the “tip of the tongue” (TOT); or 
“don’t know”. This approach was intended to induce different feelings-of-knowing 
(FOK; a form of metacognitive judgment), which could then be compared with types 
of curiosity. Although the authors did not expect “I know” judgments to correspond 
with major components of curiosity, TOT judgments were expected to correspond 
with D-type curiosity, and “don’t know” judgments with I-type curiosity. 
Using this approach, they reported evidence for a hypothetical “chain reaction” 
relationship between trait curiosity, state curiosity, and exploratory behavior using 
path modelling. For “don’t know” judgments, I-type trait curiosity (but not D-type) 
had a significant path to state epistemic curiosity, which had a significant path to 
exploratory behaviour. For TOT knowledge judgments, the D-type (but not I-type) 
trait curiosity had a significant path to state curiosity. Additionally, in both models 
FOK intensity also had significant paths to state curiosity. From this evidence, the 
authors hypothesised that trait variables “directly exerted their influences on state 
variables, which in turn would have a direct effect on behaviour” (Litman, Hutchins, et 
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al., 2005, p. 574). Furthermore, Litman (2009) used this study to elaborate a 
theoretical model of the relationship between curiosity and metacognition. Here, he 
suggested that TOT judgments are understood to be of high intensity (arousing D-
type curiosity), “don’t know” judgments are of moderate intensity (arousing I-type 
curiosity), and “I know” judgments are of low intensity (arousing only desire for 
performance feedback). Grounding curiosity in research on brain systems thus 
provides further evidence of the distinctions Berlyne observed in animal and human 
behaviour. 
Moreover, theoretical advances for curiosity have been made in terms of its 
relationship with approaches to learning. Richards, Litman, and Roberts (2013) 
compared the I-D model of curiosity, and NFC (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), with deep 
and surface approaches to learning in medical students. Their findings were generally 
consistent with intuitive expectations: curiosity variables correlated positively with 
deep approaches to learning, and negatively with surface approaches. 
However, an unusual finding of this study was that NFC did not have a 
significant path to the “deep approach” to learning in either path model, unlike I-type 
and D-type curiosity. This finding may be explained by the relationship between these 
curiosity variables. NFC correlated strongly with I-type curiosity (r = .74) and D-type 
curiosity (r = .57), and its zero-order correlations with deep approach, deep motives, 
and deep strategies were all substantial (rs = .47, .40, and .46 respectively)—though 
slightly less than those between I-type and D-type measures and these “deep” 
variables. Therefore, the strong overlap between NFC and the I- and D-type curiosity 
may have suppressed the path from NFC to “deep” variables. However, the NFC scale 
has also been shown to measures “intellectual avoidance” (Ferguson, 1999), so its 
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substantial negative correlation with surface approaches to learning might be 
explained by this factor. 
 Overall, Litman has made practical and theoretical contributions to research on 
curiosity, especially the concise and well-validated scales assessing the I-D model 
using an individual differences approach. This leaves one more researcher to survey 
before drawing these threads together. 
Mussel 
Patrick Mussel has taken the concept of EC, as expounded by Berlyne and 
Litman, and has moved it in significant new directions. In an early study in this 
domain, Mussel (2010) called attention to several similar measures that have appeared 
in distinct research contexts, including TIE (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), Need for 
Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and Openness to Ideas (Costa & McCrae, 1992b)—
an observation made by other researchers (e.g. Woo, Harms, & Kuncel, 2007). Mussel 
(2010) reported strong correlations between all measures of curiosity, and an 
exploratory factor analysis that showed a single factor explaining 67% of the variance 
across the six curiosity scale totals, suggesting a lack of discriminant validity between 
these scales. On this basis, Mussel (2010) suggested the need for future research to 
integrate findings from across these measures.  
 Mussel (2013a) subsequently proposed a framework called “Intellect” to 
integrate these measures, along with a corresponding scale. This framework proposes 
that personality variables relating to intellectual operations can be located along two 
dimensions, labelled Process and Operation. The first dimension Process refers to the 
motivational aspect of the framework, and is subdivided into two components: Seek 
and Conquer. Seek refers to the desire to search for new intellectual challenges, while 
	64 
Conquer refers to the desire to master existing domains of knowledge. As Mussel 
observed, “The differentiation between Seek and Conquer is best understood from a 
process perspective as situational demands change in the course of an action” (2013a, 
p. 887). Notably, these processes have appeared in several previous approaches to 
organising curiosity variables, and correspond closely with Interest and Deprivation 
components of EC, respectively (Litman, 2008). 
The second dimension Operation refers to specific activities undertaken in the 
course of an intellectual endeavour, and is subdivided into three components: Think, 
Learn, and Create. Mussel derived the components of this dimension from theories of 
intelligence (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1987), and noted that Think corresponds with fluid 
intelligence, Learn corresponds with crystallised intelligence, and Create corresponds 
with creativity. The meanings of these labels are intuitive: those who score high on 
Think spend time making logical deductions, and considering complex issues; those 
who score high on Learn spend time seeking knowledge and understanding; and those 
who score high on Create spend time “developing new ideas, concepts, strategies, and 
products” (Mussel, 2013a, p. 887). Further, combining the two dimensions produces six 
distinct facets that are proposed to span the conceptual space of Intellect: Seek Think, 
Seek Learn, Seek Create, and Conquer Think, Conquer Learn, Conquer Create (Mussel, 
2013a, Figure 3).  
Mussel (2013a) assessed predictions of the Intellect framework, principally in 
two ways. First, he assessed whether the scales identified previously (TIE, NFC, OI) 
could be integrated within this framework. He reported that they corresponded 
approximately with the relevant Intellect facets; for instance, both TIE and NFC 
aligned closely with the Seek Think facet. Second, the facets of Intellect were related 
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to relevant outcomes, such as mathematics and English achievements, and the 
intention to work in a creative occupation, and the relative strengths of these 
correlations were generally as the model would predict. Overall, therefore, the 
Intellect framework (and its corresponding scale) has support as an effort to organise 
personality variables relating to intellectual activity. However, the reading dimension 
captured by the TIE scale showed substantial deviations from normality, and reading 
habits were therefore excluded from the Intellect framework. Thus, the question of 
whether reading habits should be integrated within the Intellect framework remains 
unanswered. 
For our purposes, the most significant development in Mussel’s approach has 
been his explicit attempt to align the components of Intellect with current thinking in 
intelligence theory. Although personality traits have often been defined based on their 
discriminant validity from intelligence variables, those within the Openness/Intellect 
domain are a clear exception. Mussel’s approach acknowledges the close connection 
between these domains, and integrates them more thoroughly than previous 
attempts—an endeavour that Cattell probably would have commended.  
2.5  Conclusion 
 As we have seen, an important shift in curiosity research has taken place over 
time, moving from a reliance on state to trait measures. Although many of the 
concepts have remained, the approach to measuring them has changed substantially. 
Because of this change, most recent attempts to measure curiosity have treated it as an 
individual difference variable (e.g. von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011). 
 It is certainly legitimate to measure curiosity as a personality characteristic. 
However, we must ask whether something has been lost in this transition. As the 
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survey in the precursors to the trait approach section made clear, the relationship 
between state and trait personality was not entirely clear, with conflicting evidence 
about how closely they related. Moreover, Litman’s theoretical account treats them as 
distinct variables in a causal chain, suggesting that they both play necessary but 
unique roles in influencing exploratory behaviour. 
There are other reasons to think that the state approach to researching 
personality is worth re-invigorating. For instance, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
the best measure of intelligence in infancy is preference for novelty, which looks 
remarkably like a precursor to intellectual curiosity, but also like general intelligence 
as indexed by IQ. This suggests that curiosity and intelligence are very closely related 
in the developmental period; is it likely that they simply part ways thereafter? 
Although measures of intelligence in adulthood often show only a modest association 
with curiosity, these measures of curiosity are usually trait-based and self-report. Far 
less research assessing the relationship between state curiosity and intelligence 
appears to have been conducted. Relying almost exclusively on self-report personality 
measures may have obscured the strength of this relationship. 
For instance, Poropat (2014) provided evidence that self-report approaches to 
measuring personality variables attenuate the strength of their relationships with 
measures of academic achievement. He compared self- and other-rated FFM 
personality as predictors of achievement, and reported substantially stronger 
predictive validity for other reported measures for each FFM variable. This evidence 
suggests that self-report measures do not fully capture the potential of trait 
approaches to personality, and that these measures should be augmented with other-
reported assessments. In the same vein, it is highly likely that state approaches to 
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curiosity could also improve predictive validity, if only because they should 
correspond more closely with actual behaviours. As Langevin (1971) observed, 
“Personality measures of curiosity, like most personality measures, have been 
introspective reports of behavior rather than operational measures of observed 
behavior” (p. 362).  
 Clearly, in recent years curiosity research has shifted largely to the realm of 
trait-based approaches. While such personality scales are valid, useful, and easy to 
administer, the possibility remains that they are still limited proxies for the behaviours 
they intend to assess. Moreover, because of the unknowns that remain for measuring 
curiosity as a state, it may be time for research in this domain to swing back, and 




3  INVESTMENT TRAITS AND ACADEMIC 
PERFORMANCE  
 
3.1  Introduction 
As Chapter 1 indicated, a central feature of the investment theories of Cattell 
and Ackerman is that investment traits are argued to influence where and how people 
apply their intellectual abilities. In this regard, the domain of AP recently has been a 
focus of attention for the potential influence of investment traits IC and confidence. 
This final introductory chapter aims to assess the importance of these investment 
traits for predicting AP. Although these traits demonstrate predictive validity for AP, 
both share some degree of overlap with cognitive ability and aspects of FFM 
personality—variables that are also known to predict AP. Therefore, the predictive 
validity of intelligence and other personality measures for AP will first be evaluated, 
before the distinct contributions of IC and confidence are assessed in terms of their 
incremental validity. This chapter is presented under three main headings: Intelligence 
and Academic Performance, Personality and Academic Performance, and Confidence 
and Academic Performance. 
3.2  Intelligence and Academic Performance 
In general terms, the best predictor of AP is intelligence, as operationalised by 
IQ and similar tests (Neisser et al., 1996). This is to be expected, because measures of 
cognitive ability were developed in terms of AP: Spearman (1904a) used school grades 
to demonstrate the existence of g, and Binet developed his intelligence test to identify 
children who would struggle with the school curriculum (Nicolas, Andrieu, Croizet, 
Sanitioso, & Burman, 2013).  
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However, although this relationship is generally strong, evidence from a 
plethora of individual studies has indicated that strength of correlation varies 
substantially. Probably the strongest correlation has been reported by Deary, Strand, 
Smith, and Fernandes (2007). Using a population of more than 70,000 English school 
children, they obtained a correlation between latent variables of intelligence 
(Spearman’s g) at age 11 and AP at age 16 of r = .81—supporting strongly Spearman’s 
(1904a) intuition that these two constructs would associate close to unity (Deary et al., 
2007). Other studies have reported substantial but lower correlations. For instance, 
Laidra, Pullmann, and Allik (2007) reported a cross-sectional study of intelligence, 
FFM personality and AP using Estonian school children from grade 2 to grade 12. Here, 
intelligence was the most powerful predictor in every grade, with correlations ranging 
from r = .32 to .54, with a median of .48.  
Importantly, both studies listed above assessed primary or secondary cohorts, 
but the predictive power of cognitive ability has often been substantially reduced 
within tertiary cohorts. For instance, Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham, and Ackerman 
(2006) reported a correlation of r = .31 (p < .01) between intelligence and exam 
performance in undergraduate psychology students, and Furnham, Chamorro-
Premuzic, and McDougall (2003) found no significant relationship (r = .07, p > .05) 
between these variables in a very similar cohort. Smaller correlations have usually 
been explained by restriction of range for intelligence (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997): 
because tertiary students are usually selected based on prior academic performance, 
the predictive power of intelligence in tertiary samples is curtailed, sometimes 
drastically  
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Moreover, the impact of range restriction has also been demonstrated by meta-
analyses that have assessed this relationship at different levels of education. Roth et al. 
(2015) assessed this relationship for students in primary, middle, and high schools, 
with correlations of r = .45 (primary), .54 (middle), and .58 (high)—and with an 
overall association of r = .54 (all corrected for measurement error and range 
restriction). In this study, the trend was for the predictive power of cognitive ability to 
increase through the years of schooling. However, Poropat (2009) assessed this 
relationship for primary, secondary, and tertiary cohorts, and obtained meta-analytic 
correlations of r = .58, .24, and .23 respectively (corrected for measurement error but 
not range restriction), suggesting that the predictive power of cognitive ability drops 
substantially between primary and both secondary and tertiary education. Moreover, 
Richardson, Abraham, and Bond (2012) assessed a very large number of different 
constructs as predictors of university GPA, and reported the correlation r = .21 
(corrected for measurement error but not for range restriction) between intelligence 
and AP. Furthermore, Kuncel, Hezlett, and Ones (2004) assessed the relationship 
between cognitive ability and grade point average (GPA) in graduate school (where 
students take masters or doctoral degrees), and reported an association of r = .39 
(corrected for measurement error and range restriction). Therefore, although the 
evidence from meta-analyses is not entirely consistent with expectations, the 
predictive power of cognitive ability appears to diminish—but not disappear—
between unselected (primary and secondary) and selected cohorts (tertiary), probably 
because of restriction of range.  
Finally, although verbal (Gc) and non-verbal (Gf) abilities are relatively distinct 
from each other and from general ability (g), all three consistently correlate with AP. 
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Roth et al. (2015) reported the following fully-corrected estimates between AP 
measured across all measures of education and these abilities: r = .53 (verbal), .44 
(non-verbal), and .60 (mixed measure/g). Once again, although individual studies will 
demonstrate variability in these associations, all three approaches to measuring 
intelligence are powerful predictors of AP. 
Taking these results together, the predictive power of intelligence for AP 
appears to vary substantially, because the probable values for this correlation range 
from as high as about .8 to as low as about .2 depending on the population. 
Nonetheless, if the midpoint of approximately .5 is taken as a reasonable estimate, 
then intelligence accounts for about 25% of the variance in AP. Clearly, this estimate 
leaves most of the variance in AP unexplained. Several variables have been researched 
as having potential to bridge this gap, especially those in the domain of personality. 
These will be addressed next. 
3.3  Personality and Academic Performance 
Introduction 
Much like the development of intelligence theory, the history of personality 
research has consisted of several models that have been proposed and then contested 
among researchers. In addition to debates concerning how best to measure such 
constructs, a major difference between models has been the number of personality 
factors that are argued to account for individual differences in behaviour. Although 
the contents of these proposals are not mutually exclusive—some are hierarchical and 
accommodate several levels of explanation—prominent models that have been 
proposed involve a single factor (van der Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010), two 
(Digman, 1997), three (Eysenck, 1978), five (Costa & McCrae, 1992a), six (Ashton, Lee, 
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& Son, 2000), 10 (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007), and 16 factors (Cattell, Eber, & 
Tatsuoka, 1970). Many other less prominent models could be added to this list. 
Structure of the Five-Factor Model 
Factors. However, since the early 1990s, the most dominant framework for 
assessing personality has been the five-factor model (FFM), also known as the Big 5 
(John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). The proposed factors are Openness to Experience 
(OE), Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992a), and are sometimes remembered through the acronym OCEAN. But 
although this framework is dominant, it does not command universal assent. In 
addition to the issue of the number of factors, researchers have contested whether the 
FFM is truly universal (Gurven, von Rueden, Massenkoff, Kaplan, & Lero Vie, 2013), 
and have questioned the theoretical approaches used to arrive at the five factors 
(Block, 1995; Paunonen & Jackson, 2000). However, because it remains the most 
common taxonomy for personality, it possesses the most extensive evidence base to 
assess the question of personality associations with AP. 
Facets. Although there are indeed several measures of the five factors, the most 
well-known are the NEO-PI-R, and its briefer version the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 
1992b), which some consider to be the gold standard measures. The NEO-PI-R is a 
hierarchical scale that measures the five broad factors, and beneath each factor are six 
facets—narrow factors that assess more specific tendencies. This allows personality to 
be assessed at the factor and facet levels when this full scale is administered, and 
research indicates that the facets sometimes predict more variance than do the broad 
factors (see below). It is not necessary to list each of the 30 factors here; those of 
special interest will be introduced as required. But it should be noted that, similar to 
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the debates concerning the FFM model at the factor level, other researchers would 
dispute the specific factors identified by Costa and McCrae (1992b) that inform the 
NEO-PI-R. 
The Openness / Intellect domain. One such debate concerns the Openness / 
Intellect domain, which has received attention for being factorially complex, as is 
suggested by its alternative labels Openness, Culture, and Intellect (Goldberg, 1992). 
Within the NEO-PI-R, OE comprises the six facets Fantasy (O1), Aesthetics (O2), 
Feelings (O3), Actions (O4), Ideas (O5), and Values (O6), that are proposed to load on 
the higher-order OE factor. However, some research has indicated evidence for a tier 
in the hierarchy between factors and facets. DeYoung et al. (2007) argued that each of 
the five factors could be subdivided meaningfully into two sub-factors; in the case of 
this domain, they distinguished between Openness (to Experience) from Intellect, and 
used results from factor analysis to support their position. When considering the 
implications of this for the proposed structure of personality that underlies the NEO-
PI-R, this rearrangement would in effect promote the facet Openness to Ideas, demote 
the factor Openness to Experience, and overarch them both by a higher-order factor 
whose contents are difficult to capture in a single term—hence the compound label 
“Openness/Intellect”.4 
The proposed Openness/Intellect distinction was then assessed by DeYoung, 
Shamosh, Green, Braver, and Gray (2009) using fMRI, who hypothesised that brain 
activity when subjects completed a difficult working memory task related to Intellect 
																																																						
4 For the other four FFM factors, DeYoung et al. (2007) provided sub-domain names 
that were different from the factor name (e.g. Extraversion comprises the sub-domains 
Enthusiasm and Assertiveness). But for Openness/Intellect, the sub-domains are 
simply Openness and Intellect. 
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but not Openness. Because the facets Ideas and Values demonstrated patterns of 
neural activity that, although not identical, were distinct from the patterns of the 
other four facets, the authors concluded that their proposed distinction between 
Openness and Intellect was supported by this study. Moreover, DeYoung et al. (2010) 
assessed the relationship between FFM traits and volume in brain regions where these 
traits were expected to have a biological basis. They found evidence for this for each 
FFM variable except for Openness/Intellect, thus adding to the growing body of 
evidence for biological underpinnings of personality variables.  
Measures of intellectual curiosity. At this point, the research surveyed in 
this chapter converges with the research covered earlier, because the Intellect sub-
domain overlaps explicitly with several measures introduced earlier. Chapter 1 
introduced TIE in the context of Ackerman’s PPIK theory of intelligence, where this 
dimension was distinguished from Openness to Experience in the FFM (Ackerman & 
Goff, 1994; Rocklin, 1994), and where Ackerman (1996) theorised that both dimensions 
would be important for the investment process. Moreover, Chapter 2 introduced 
Epistemic Curiosity—first from Berlyne’s (1954) state perspective, and then from 
Litman’s (2005) trait perspective—and noted that EC has been distinguished from 
Perceptual Curiosity, which appears to overlap very substantially with OE. Therefore, 
in each account of these avenues of research dimensions corresponding to Openness 
and Intellect have appeared. If the lexical hypothesis is legitimate for personality 
theory—that important personality traits would be expressed in language (Allport & 
Odbert, 1936)—then the distinction between Openness and Intellect has notable 
evidence in this regard. Considering the similarity between these measures, and 
despite their distinct origins, several researchers have suggested that these measures 
	 75 
TIE, EC, and OI assess the same broad construct that could be termed “intellectual 
curiosity” (Mussel, 2010, 2013a; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2007). 
Need for Cognition. Although it has not yet been covered in any detail, the 
construct Need for Cognition (NFC) belongs on this list, and has a two-part history. In 
its early history, Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955) defined NFC in the context of the 
process of making sense of the experiential world: “Need for cognition can be defined 
as a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways. It is a need 
to understand and make reasonable the experiential world” (Cohen et al., 1955, p. 291). 
In this sense, higher NFC would probably be required for those with higher Openness 
to Experience, because they would have more experiences to make sense of. 
Interestingly, the authors also note that the “assumption of such a need also implies 
that feelings of tension and deprivation arise from its frustration” (Cohen et al., 1955, 
p. 291). This aspect of the original definition of NFC parallels to some degree D-type 
curiosity within EC research—cognition that is prompted by feelings of discomfort. 
However, NFC research along the lines of this early definition was short-lived, possibly 
because the authors did not produce a scale to measure this tendency (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982) 
In its later history, Cacioppo and Petty (1982) borrowed the term but redefined 
it as “the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (p. 116). This 
positive redefinition clearly made NFC much more like other prominent measures of 
IC. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) developed a 34-item scale to measure this tendency, and 
Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris (1983) later condensed this to 18-items (Cacioppo, Petty, 
& Kao, 1984). Under its new definition, a very extensive program of research for NFC 
has ensued, including assessing its relevance for evaluating the strength of arguments 
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(Cacioppo et al., 1983), and its relationship with AP, gender roles, intelligence, and 
problem solving behaviour (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Considering 
potential problems associated with some of its negatively-worded items (Bors, 
Vigneau, & Lalande, 2006), Furnham and Thorne (2013) produced positively-worded 
version of the 18- and 34-item scales that correlated very strongly with the originals. 
Research using NFC scales continues to the present day, and includes approaches that 
do not rely exclusively on self-report (Fleischhauer, Strobel, Enge, & Strobel, 2013; 
Fleischhauer, Strobel, & Strobel, 2015). 
 As noted in Chapter 1, several researchers have called attention to the very 
substantial overlap between these various constructs. In this respect, the following 
assessment seems appropriate:  
That is, measures of intellectual investment and curiosity have matching 
conceptual roots, including semantically identical items, and share criteria 
validity for academic performance and intelligence; therefore, they appear to 
assess the same trait dimension, and corresponding scales might be 
interchangeably used. (von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011, p. 577) 
Although these scales appear to be importantly different in several respects—
including the measurement of reading habits by TIE, and the measurement of D-type 
curiosity by EC—they relate consistently enough to have been integrated within 
Mussel’s Intellect framework (Mussel, 2013a). When taken together, this evidence 
indicates that the Openness/Intellect distinction is meaningful, and that both warrant 




Personality and Intelligence Associations 
Because intelligence is a powerful predictor of AP, and because it cannot be 
assumed that intelligence is entirely separate from some aspects of personality, it is 
first necessary to assess the overlap between personality variables and intelligence 
before considering personality variables as predictors of AP. In theory, correlations 
between measures of intelligence and personality should be near zero, but in practice 
this is often not the case (von Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Ackerman, 2011). This 
overview will consider relationship between cognitive ability and the FFM traits 
broadly, with a more detailed assessment of its overlap with the Openness/Intellect 
domain, starting with those FFM traits that show the least overlap. 
Factors. Within the FFM, Agreeableness shows no consistent significant 
correlation with intelligence (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; Moutafi, 
Furnham, & Crump, 2006). Although Extraversion and Neuroticism sometimes 
correlate substantially with cognitive ability, these correlations may reflect the nature 
of intelligence testing rather than intelligence per se. The direction of the association 
between Extraversion and intelligence depends on the nature of the test: extraverts 
tend to perform better on timed tests, and introverts on tests requiring understanding 
and thoughtfulness (Moutafi et al., 2006). The explanation may lie in resting cortisol 
levels, which are higher for introverts (Moutafi et al., 2006). And although 
Neuroticism sometimes correlates negatively with intelligence, this may be explained 
by neurotic individuals being more prone to test anxiety, which increases worry and 
hampers intelligence test scores (Moutafi et al., 2006). Therefore, it appears that 
Agreeableness, Extraversion, and Neuroticism are broadly independent of cognitive 
ability once their effects on performance in test-taking situations are considered. 
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 Conscientiousness has proved a more difficult trait to assess in its relationship 
with ability. It sometimes demonstrates a small negative association with intelligence 
(Judge, Jackson, Shaw, Scott, & Rich, 2007; Moutafi et al., 2006), which has been 
explained by the so-called intelligence compensation hypothesis. This proposes that 
Conscientiousness is an adaptive trait: individuals with higher intelligence learn to 
rely on their intelligence for success in life, while those with lower intelligence must 
work harder to succeed, and become more conscientious in the process (Chamorro-
Premuzic & Furnham, 2005; Moutafi, Furnham, & Paltiel, 2004). However, recent 
evidence has suggested that the weak negative correlations between these variables 
may have been a result of sampling non-representative cohorts, and that unselected 
cohorts demonstrate negligible or even weak positive associations between cognitive 
ability and Conscientiousness (Murray, Johnson, McGue, & Iacono, 2014). If this is the 
case, the intelligence compensation hypothesis may not apply at the population level. 
Despite this dispute, most research indicates that the correlations between these 
constructs are small—even if sometimes significant—and therefore they can be 
treated as relatively independent constructs for most purposes (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997; Poropat, 2009; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011). 
Openness/Intellect. If the aim is to identify personality factors that correlate 
consistently and substantially with intelligence, then only the Openness/Intellect 
domain qualifies. Occasionally, individual studies have reported no significant 
relationship between the two (DeYoung et al., 2009), but meta-analyses have tended 
to report substantial small-to-moderate correlations between cognitive ability and OE, 
including r = .15 (Poropat, 2009), .22 (Judge et al., 2007), and .33 (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997). Importantly, when Gf and Gc are measured as distinct constructs, 
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OE tends to show non-significant (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; Goff & 
Ackerman, 1992) or weak (r  = .09, p < .001) correlations with Gf (Moutafi et al., 
2006)—although moderate correlations (up to r = .18, p < .001) have been reported 
(Ashton, Lee, Vernon, & Jang, 2000). However, correlations with Gc have been more 
consistent and substantial, including r = .22 (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), r = .30 
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997), and r = .37 (Ashton, Lee, Vernon, et al., 2000). 
Therefore, the general trend has been that where OE correlates substantially with 
general ability, this owes more to its relationship with Gc than with Gf. 
Moreover, several studies have reported associations between general 
intelligence, Gf, Gc, and the facets of OE. Thus, DeYoung et al. (2009) reported 
correlations of these facets with general ability but found significant relationships only 
for Ideas (r = .27) and Values (r = .33; p < .01). Moutafi et al. (2006) associated OE 
facets with Gf, and reported significant correlations with Actions (r = .07) and Ideas (r 
= .20; p < .001). And von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) reported meta-analytic 
associations between OE facets and Gc, where all facets except Actions correlated 
significantly with Gc. Using a random effects model, the authors reported modest 
associations between Gc and Fantasy (r = .17), Aesthetics (.25), and Feelings (.25), 
while strong associations were reported for Ideas (.52) and Values (.53; all p < .05). 
Overall, the facets of OE vary substantially in their overlap with intelligence, but Ideas 
and Values appear to overlap the most. 
Other measures of intellectual curiosity. Finally, having assessed those 
constructs that relate predominantly with the Openness subdomain, the other 
measures that relate to the Intellect dimension will now be assessed in terms of their 
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overlap with cognitive ability. Openness to Ideas was addressed in the previous 
paragraph, leaving TIE, NFC, and EC, and Mussel’s Intellect scale to be considered. 
 Typical Intellectual Engagement. Several individual studies have assessed 
the relationship between TIE and cognitive ability, including Schroeders, 
Schipolowski, and Böhme (2015) who reported a correlation of r = .20 (p not reported)5 
between TIE and Gf. Moreover, Mussel (2010) reported correlations between TIE and 
both Gf (r = .11, p > .05) and Gc (r = .20, p < .05), and Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) 
obtained a correlation of r = .33 (p < .01) between TIE and Gf. Furthermore, von 
Stumm and Furnham (2012) reported the correlation r = .12 (p < .01) between TIE and 
general cognitive ability. Two meta-analyses have also assessed this relationship. 
Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) reported a correlation of r = .22 (p < .05) between TIE 
and g, r = .07 (p > .05) between TIE and Gf, and r = .35 (p < .05) between TIE and Gc. 
Finally, von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) reported a meta-analytic correlation of r = 
.38 (p < .05) between TIE and Gc. Therefore, TIE appears to correlate substantially 
with g, possibly because it overlaps more extensively with Gc than with Gf. 
Need for Cognition. The relationship between NFC and cognitive ability has 
been assessed in several studies. Mussel reported non-significant correlations between 
NFC and both Gf (r = .16, p > .05) and Gc (r = .07, p > .05), whereas Powell and 
Nettelbeck (2014a) obtained a correlation of r = .36 (p < .01) between NFC and Gf. Bors 
et al. (2006) reported the non-significant correlation r = .07 (p >.05) between NFC and 
Gf, and a significant correlation r = .23 (p < .05) between NFC and a measure of Gc. 
However, probably the strongest result from a single study of the relationship between 
																																																						
5 The reported sample size n = 4032 suggests this correlation would be highly 
significant. 
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NFC and cognitive abilities is that reported by Hill et al. (2013), who used WAIS-III 
scores to estimate these associations. They reported a zero-order correlation of r = .38 
(p < .001) between NFC and g, and used structural equation modelling to provide the 
estimates b = .40 (p < .001) between NFC and Gf (p < .001), and b = .32 (p < .001) 
between NFC and Gc. Finally, using meta-analysis, von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) 
reported a meta-analytic correlation of r = .27 (p < .05) between NFC and Gc. Clearly 
these correlations are variable, but NFC appears to overlap substantially with all 
measures of cognitive ability—perhaps more so with Gf than with Gc, although this is 
not certain. 
Epistemic Curiosity. There are fewer studies available to assess the 
relationship between cognitive ability and EC than there are for TIE and NFC. Powell 
and Nettelbeck (2014a) obtained a correlation of r = .21 (p < .01) between EC and Gf. 
Mussel (2010) assessed the relationship between diversive and specific EC with Gf and 
Gc, but found no significant correlations, although specific curiosity correlated weakly 
in the positive direction with Gc (r = .19, p < .10). Thus, the trend for these correlations 
appears to be positive, although no firm conclusions about this relationship can be 
obtained from this limited sample. 
Mussel’s Intellect scale. Finally, and probably because it is quite recent, little 
information is available about the relationship between Mussel’s Intellect scale and 
cognitive ability. The validation study of Mussel (2013a) reported a correlation of r = 
.20 (p < .01) between Intellect and Gf, and .14 (p < .01) between Intellect and Gc. 
Therefore, it appears that Intellect overlaps with Gf and Gc, and perhaps slightly more 
with the former than with the latter. 
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Conclusion. These results of this review suggest that measures of Intellect 
correlate substantially with measures of intelligence, but also that these correlations 
are not consistent. NFC appears to overlap more substantially with Gf than with Gc, 
whereas TIE shows the opposite trend. There are very few associations available 
between cognitive ability and both EC and Intellect, but what is available indicates 
some overlap between these domains. Mussel (2010) suggested that the more 
substantial overlap between TIE and Gc may be attributed to its measurement of 
reading, which no other scale appears to measure. However, the differences apparent 
in these associations may also be due to different scale lengths (EC is 10 items, whereas 
TIE is 59 items), the limited numbers of studies, and differences across sample 
populations. Nonetheless, these domains overlap clearly, and therefore any study that 
seeks to measure the incremental validity of IC measures must first take account of 
cognitive ability—preferably by measuring both Gf and Gc. 
Personality as a Predictor of Academic Performance 
Predictive validity. There exists a large body of evidence addressing the 
predictive validity of FFM personality traits for AP (as noted by Briley, Domiteaux, & 
Tucker-Drob, 2014), which has been evaluated in several meta-analyses conducted in 
the last decade. Although most of these meta-analyses have analysed self-reported 
data using tertiary students, Poropat (2014) compared the predictive validity of other-
reported FFM personality variables to self-reported data, using secondary and tertiary 
students. Here, Poropat’s (2009) analysis, which addressed the predictive validity of 
FFM personality for AP across all academic levels (i.e. primary, secondary, and 
tertiary), will be surveyed first, followed by studies using tertiary students, and then 
followed by the study comparing other-reported with self-reported data. Moreover, 
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rather than citing every correlation, only meta-analytic correlations above .10 (usually 
Pearson’s r or Spearman’s r) will be considered to be of practical significance (i.e. 
substantial), even though outcomes have been statistically significant in most cases 
because of the very large samples involved. Because of different methodologies in each 
study, the most fully-adjusted and corrected correlations in each study will be cited to 
permit comparison. 
Factors. Poropat (2009) assessed FFM variables as predictors of AP across all 
levels of education. Here, Agreeableness predicted substantial variance in AP only in 
primary samples (r = .30). Conscientiousness did so when all levels of education were 
assessed together (.24), and for primary (.28), secondary (.21), and tertiary (.23) 
samples individually. Emotional stability (lower scores on Neuroticism) only predicted 
substantial variance in primary samples (.20), and the same was true for Extraversion 
(.18). The predictive validity of Openness differed substantially by academic level, 
although the relationship was significant overall (.12), for primary (.24) and for 
secondary students (rho = .12). However, Openness was not a substantial predictor for 
tertiary students. Overall, in this study Conscientiousness was the most substantial 
and reliable FFM predictor of AP, followed by Openness; whereas Agreeableness, 
Neuroticism, and Extraversion were substantial predictors only for primary student 
samples. 
Four meta-analyses that assessed the relationships between FFM variables and 
AP only in tertiary students were identified (O’Connor & Paunonen, 2007; Richardson 
et al., 2012; Schuler, Hirn, Hell, & Trapmann, 2007; Vedel, 2014). Every study obtained 
a substantial relationship between Conscientiousness and AP, ranging from r = .23 
(Richardson et al., 2012) to µr = .27 (Schuler et al., 2007). Openness to Experience 
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associated µ = .13 in Schuler et al. (2007), but the 90% credibility value crossed zero, 
indicating that this result cannot generalised. The other studies did not report 
substantial correlations between Openness to Experience and AP; and in no study did 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Neuroticism correlate substantially with AP in 
university students. Therefore, tertiary samples appear to show much the same 
pattern of association between FFM personality and AP as do general samples. 
However, as noted above, all these studies relied on self-reported FFM 
personality. Poropat (2014) assessed whether self-reported personality measures 
underreport the true relationship between FFM personality and AP by comparing 
their predictive validity with other-reported FFM measures, using secondary and 
tertiary samples. Here, Conscientiousness was the most powerful predictor (r = .38), 
followed by Openness to Experience (.28), followed by Neuroticism (.18) and then 
Agreeableness (.10). Extraversion did not predict substantial variance in AP. Clearly 
the trend of these associations was the same as for the self-reported measures, 
although the correlations were substantially stronger. 
This finding is enlightening, because potentially it demonstrates a source of 
substantial measurement error that has contributed to systematically underestimating 
the relationship between FFM and AP outcomes. If this is so, four of the five FFM 
variables may be substantially related to AP, when usually only Conscientiousness and 
(possibly) Openness to Experience have been thought to do so. Moreover, this raises 
the possibility that the combined predictive power of personality variables may exceed 
that of intelligence. Nonetheless, many studies—including those reported in this 
thesis—will continue to rely on self-report FFM measures, because they are easier to 
administer. And the results of meta-analyses on these studies have indicated that 
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Conscientiousness is a consistent and substantial predictor of AP, and that Openness 
to Experience provides a less consistent and more modest contribution to predicting 
AP. 
 Facets. In passing, it is worth noting that some researchers have reported that 
FFM personality variables measured at the facet level can potentially predict more 
variance in AP than can the broad factors. Paunonen and Ashton (2001) compared the 
relative efficacy of FFM traits and facets in predicting AP, and found that the narrow 
traits of need for achievement (a facet of Conscientiousness) and need for 
understanding (a facet of OE) predicted more variance in AP than their respective 
broad traits. In addition, Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham (2003) found that 
although broad FFM traits accounted for about 15% of variance in AP in university 
exams, selected facets for Conscientiousness (achievement striving and self-discipline) 
and Extraversion (activity), when combined, accounted for nearly 30%. This raises the 
possibility that certain facets of FFM personality possess more predictive power for AP 
than do the broad factors. Moreover, research on the Openness to Ideas facet of OE in 
effect is an application of this point. However, Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006) noted 
the lack of a consistent pattern for facet-level associations with AP. Currently, whether 
assessing facet-level associations more closely will help to bridge the explanatory gap 
between AP and its predictors remains uncertain—except for OI within OE. 
 Measures of intellectual curiosity. Because the contents of the 
Openness/Intellect domain are factorially complex, and because this domain tends to 
predict AP, the relationship between measures of IC and AP will be assessed in more 
detail. In research to date, Typical Intellectual Engagement has shown the strongest 
relationship with AP. Although the meta-analysis by von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) 
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assessed this to be r = .33, ostensibly on the basis of four studies, this correlation was 
later reduced to .29 by von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) because two of the 
correlations in the earlier study were actually derived from the same participants. 
Moreover, Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported a correlation of r = .35 between self-
reported university entrance scores and TIE measured approximately six months later, 
and Schroeders et al. (2015) reported r = .27 between TIE and mathematics 
achievement in German secondary students. Finally, probably the strongest 
relationship between TIE and AP has been reported by Furnham, Monsen, and 
Ahmetoglu (2009), who obtained r = .41 when assessing total subject scores in British 
secondary students. Therefore, TIE and AP show substantial zero-order correlations of 
around r = .3 in several studies. 
 A meta-analysis of Need for Cognition as a predictor of AP by Richardson et al. 
(2012) estimated this relationship to be r = .17 in university students. This result was 
similar to that reported by von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) who estimated it to be r 
= .22 in what were almost exclusively tertiary samples. However, only recently have 
more studies appeared that have assessed the relationship between NFC and AP in 
primary and secondary students. Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported a correlation 
of r = .33 between university entrance scores (i.e. grade 12 achievement) and NFC 
measured about six months later—very similar to r = .35 association between TIE and 
AP noted above. Further, Luong et al. (2017) assessed NFC–AP associations in N = 
4,279 Finnish students, and reported latent correlations of r = .09 (grade 3), .27 (grade 
6), and .31 (grade 9; all ps < .01). Finally, Preckel (2014) assessed NFC–AP associations 
in N = 745 German school students, and reported positive associations with 
mathematics achievement in grade 5 (r = .16/.17; scale means/factor scores, 
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respectively) and grade 6 (.24/.23), whereas associations between grades for other 
subjects were “positive but mostly nonsignificant” (p. 69). Therefore, although the 
trend appears to put the NFC–AP association closer to .2 than to .3, the possibility 
remains that this variation is a consequence of the samples used, with stronger 
correlations appearing for unselected than selected samples. 
 Lastly, relationships between AP with EC, Intellect, and OI can be summarised 
briefly due to the more limited data available. Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported 
r = .20 between AP and EC; Mussel (2013a) reported correlations between the Intellect 
scale and mathematics achievement of r = .19, and between Intellect and English 
achievement of r = .10 in a sample mostly comprised of German secondary students; 
and von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) reported r = .08 between OI and AP in their 
meta-analysis. Therefore, across all measures of IC, the trend appears to be for 
consistent, positive associations with AP—although the possibility exists that some 
predict AP more strongly than do others. 
Incremental validity. Considering the predictive validity of both cognitive 
ability and personality measures for AP, the question remains about the distinct 
contribution of IC measures over and above these ability and personality traits. 
Because of the overlap demonstrated between these variables, it is not sufficient to 
show that IC has predictive validity; to be a useful predictor of AP, it must also 
demonstrate incremental validity. There are five studies that have assessed this issue: 
two studies that assessed secondary students, two that assessed tertiary students, and 
a meta-analysis that pooled results from both academic levels. 
For secondary students, Furnham et al. (2009) assessed TIE, measures of 
cognitive ability, FFM personality, and approaches to learning as predictors of AP in a 
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British sample. The predictive power of TIE was assessed using two hierarchical 
regressions, each with a different order of entry. Unfortunately, the approach to these 
regressions makes it difficult to assess the incremental validity of TIE above cognitive 
ability and FFM personality, because in neither regression was TIE entered after both 
cognitive ability and FFM personality. In the first regression, TIE explained 2–3% 
incremental variance in AP (total scores across subjects) above cognitive ability, 
whereas in the second regression TIE (and measures of approaches to learning) 
explained 13–16% incremental variance in AP (total scores) above FFM personality 
measures. Therefore, had the incremental validity of TIE been assessed above 
cognitive ability and FFM personality, it would have been no more than 2–3%. 
Moreover, Schroeders et al. (2015) assessed the contribution of TIE above 
background measures, Gf, and subject-specific interest in German secondary students. 
Using the outcome variables of mathematics and science grades, they reported very 
limited incremental validity for TIE above gender, migration, SES, Gf, and subject-
specific interest; between 0.5% and 1.8% depending on the subject. However, they did 
not assess other personality measures at all, which probably would have reduced the 
extent of incremental validity further still. 
Finally, in the validation study for the Intellect scale, Mussel (2013a) used a 
sample of mostly German high school students to assess the incremental validity of 
the three Intellect operations (Seek, Learn, Create) above measures of Gf and Gc for 
self-report high school grades for mathematics and English. For mathematics grades, 
Gf and Gc predicted 5.1% of variance (adjusted R2, p < .01) at step 1, and adding the 
three Intellect operations at step 2 increased the explained variance by 3.7% to 8.8% 
(adjusted R2 change p < .01). At step 3, adding six interaction terms between Intellect 
	 89 
operations and both Gf and Gc did not increased the variance explained (adjusted R2 
change p = .70). For English grades, Gf and Gc predicted 1.3% of variance (adjusted R2, 
p = .03) at step 1, and adding the three Intellect operations at step 2 increased the 
explained variance by 2.2% to 3.5% (adjusted R2 change p = .01). At step 3, adding six 
interaction terms between Intellect operations and both Gf and Gc did not increased 
the variance explained (adjusted R2 change p = .60). Therefore, in secondary samples 
TIE appears to have only modest incremental validity, and in some cases this is 
without removing the unique variance explained by FFM personality measures. 
For tertiary students, Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006) used a psychology 
sample to assess the incremental validity of TIE above cognitive ability and FFM 
personality. They used several different measures of AP (including continuous 
assessment, essays, a final project, and exams), and obtained incremental validity in 
each case, ranging from 3–9% across methods. However, Powell and Nettelbeck 
(2014a) assessed the incremental validity of four different measures of IC—TIE, NFC, 
EC, and IPIP-Intellect (essentially Openness to Ideas in the NEO-PI-R)—in a sample 
of psychology students, controlling for Gf and Conscientiousness. Importantly, 
although this study used a tertiary sample, its outcome measure for AP was the 
achievement score awarded each student in final state-wide exams held at the 
conclusion of the final year of secondary education (year 12). Participants provided 
their own score. These scores were earned about six months earlier than the other 
measures, and probably therefore make the results of this study more comparable to 
those using secondary samples. Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported that, of the 
four scales measuring IC, only TIE showed evidence of incremental validity (1.8% 
above Gf and Conscientiousness). Furthermore, a general factor of IC extracted from 
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the four scales showed no evidence of incremental validity. Therefore, the evidence for 
incremental validity of measures of IC for AP in tertiary samples is mixed—although 
the difference between the outcome measure of AP in these studies should be noted. 
Finally, von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) assessed whether IC (measured by TIE) 
made a distinct contribution in predicting AP above g and Conscientiousness with 
meta-analysis and structural equation modelling. Their meta-analysis used several 
studies—including Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006)—to calculate meta-analytic 
coefficients for the relationships between TIE and AP, g, and Conscientiousness, and 
borrowed coefficients from previous meta-analyses for the other correlations. They 
reported that the direct path from TIE to AP explained distinct variance in AP (beta = 
.20)—equivalent to the influence of Conscientiousness (beta = .20) but less than the 
influence of g (beta = .35). Therefore, the authors concluded that IC is the “third pillar” 
of AP alongside intelligence and Conscientiousness. 
Conclusion 
 Overall, the evidence for the incremental validity of IC appears to be mixed. 
The two studies using secondary students showed only modest incremental validity. 
Moreover, if the study of Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) is placed in this category 
(because it relied on high school scores used to gain entry to university), the evidence 
in tertiary samples relies entirely on a single study, which provides the only evidence 
for substantial incremental validity. If evidence for incremental validity can only be 
obtained in a cohort with substantially restricted range for intelligence, this might call 
into question the ability to generalise this to unselected cohorts. Moreover, although 
von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) concluded that IC is the “third pillar” of AP, only a very 
limited number of studies have assessed the incremental validity of IC measures. 
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Finally, although the approach to the meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) 
assumed that the relationships between these variables within secondary and tertiary 
populations are interchangeable, this assumption requires closer examination to 
substantiate. Overall, the variable nature of the evidence available suggests that the 
incremental validity of IC for predicting academic outcomes remains an open 
question. 
3.4  Confidence and Academic Performance 
Having considered IC as an investment trait that predicts AP, this section will 
now turn to assessing confidence in this regard. This section will proceed under five 
headings: Introduction to Confidence; Confidence and Intelligence Associations; 
Confidence and Personality Associations; Confidence, Metacognition, and Investment 
Theory; and Confidence and Academic Performance.  
Introduction to Confidence 
 Stankov, Kleitman, and Jackson (2015) have identified two distinct approaches 
to measuring confidence6. The first approach uses self-report, which assesses 
confidence through questionnaire items designed to tap into characteristics of 
confidence—in a similar manner to much personality assessment—and thus relies on 
a person’s self-insight. The second approach is the so-called “online” methodology, 
which has been inspired by the work of Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977). Here, the 
question “How confident are you that your answer is correct?” follows each item in an 
assessment, scored on a scale of 0–100%, and responses are then averaged to measure 
																																																						
6 As Stankov, Lee, Luo, and Hogan (2012) note, although “confidence” is synonymous 
with “self-confidence”, the shorter designation is to be preferred given that the 
meaning of “confidence” is already self-referential. 
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overall confidence. The total scores can also be compared with actual test scores to 
calculate whether participants are under- or over-confident, given the difficulty of the 
test. The online approach has been shown to have excellent internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability (Stankov et al., 2015), to predict achievement across different 
countries and cultures (Morony, Kleitman, Lee, & Stankov, 2013), and to vary less 
substantially between countries than do assessments of cognitive ability (Stankov & 
Lee, 2014). 
 Moreover, it is noteworthy that only one study has assessed simultaneously 
both self-report and online measures of confidence—probably because these methods 
have been developed independently. Burns, Burns, and Ward (2016) assessed scores on 
two self-reported measures of confidence, online confidence scores attached to two 
measures of Gf, one measure of Gc, and measures of five-factor model (FFM) 
personality. Among other analyses, the authors reported a three-factor exploratory 
structural equation model for measures of confidence, Gf and Gc test accuracy scores, 
and FFM personality variables. Here, self-report confidence measures and Neuroticism 
defined the first factor, the four other FFM variables defined the second factor, and 
measures of online confidence and accuracy scores defined the third factor. The 
correlations between the three factors were weak (r = .05, .11, and .13) and non-
significant. On this basis, the authors concluded that measures of self-report and 
online confidence are separate factors that cannot be used interchangeably, and that 
self-report confidence sits closer to personality measures (especially Emotional 
Stability, the obverse of Neuroticism), whereas online confidence sits closer to ability 
measures. Considering this evidence, and because the online approach has more 
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substantial support for predicting academic performance, this section on confidence 
will be limited to addressing this construct. 
Several studies have indicated that online confidence is a broad trait, because it 
appears when factor analysis is applied to measures of confidence which are attached 
to different kinds of assessment (reviewed below). Given this evidence, some 
researchers have suggested that confidence may be a general factor, analogous to the 
general factor of intelligence: “It appears that empirical evidence for a broad or 
perhaps general confidence factor is mounting” (Stankov et al., 2012, p. 757; Stankov et 
al., 2015).  
 Another pertinent question is the relationship between confidence and other 
apparently similar variables that assess self-belief. In particular, three measures of self-
belief have been identified as being educationally relevant through a large-scale, 
international study reported by Lee (2009): self-efficacy, self-concept, and anxiety. 
Self-efficacy refers to a person’s ability to effect outcomes; an example item is, “I am 
sure I can do difficult work in my English class”. Self-concept refers to a person’s self-
perception; an example item is, “In my mathematics class I understand even the most 
difficult work”. Anxiety refers to a person’s emotional and physiological reaction to 
performing work in specific domains; an example item is, “I often worry that it will be 
difficult for me in mathematics classes” (definitions and example items from Stankov 
et al., 2012, p. 749).  
 The principal difference between online confidence and these self-belief 
measures is their relative domain specificity. Although confidence measures are 
attached to individual test items, the overall confidence scores have the nature of a 
broad trait, predicting outcomes in different domains than those from which they 
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were obtained. However, the efficacy of self-belief measures appears to be domain-
specific; for instance, mathematics self-concept appears to be unrelated to 
performance in an English class (Stankov et al., 2015). Moreover, Stankov, Morony, 
and Lee (2014) reported that confidence captures much of the variance explained by 
these three measures of self-belief, suggesting that measuring confidence makes 
measuring self-belief unnecessary. 
 Nevertheless, the distinctness of confidence from self-belief measures has 
previously been demonstrated by Stankov and Crawford (1997), who assessed English 
and Maths self-concept measures in a sample of 271 (193 females) first-year university 
students. Because self-concept and confidence are both self-assessments of one’s 
abilities, the researchers anticipated a modest overlap when these were assessing the 
same domain. They reported that confidence ratings for Gc correlated significantly 
with English self-concept (r = .32), and confidence ratings for Gf correlated 
significantly with Maths self-concept (r = .20), while confidence ratings for non-
relevant task performance did not significantly predict English or Maths self-concept 
(i.e. Gv and Gf for English; Gv and Gc for Maths). These findings were consistent with 
expectations, and indicated that, while confidence measures overlap modestly with 
self-concept measures in the same domain, they are also distinct constructs. This leads 
us to an assessment of other constructs to which confidence has been compared. 
Confidence and Intelligence Associations 
In theory confidence ratings could be attached to any test, but in practice they 
are usually yoked to tests of cognitive ability. Several studies have indicated that 
confidence judgments assessed across tests of both fluid and crystallised abilities load 
onto the same broad factor. Stankov and Crawford (1996) assessed measures of broad 
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visualization (Gv), Gf, and Gc, and found that confidence scores attached to these 
measures correlated substantially with each other (Gv–Gf r = .47, Gv–Gc r = .39, Gf–Gc 
r = .52), indicating a distinct factor. Moreover, they reported that the correlations of 
confidence with accuracy (i.e. number of items correct) were r = .21 (Gv), .51 (Gf), and 
.63 (Gc) respectively, suggesting that confidence scores predict Gf and Gc abilities 
more than they do Gv ability.  
 Stankov (2000) compared confidence with self-evaluation (i.e. where 
participants estimated how many test items they solved correctly upon completing a 
test) on five tests of Gf, and demonstrated a distinct confidence factor using 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, plus weaker evidence for a distinct self-
evaluation factor. Measures of confidence predicted substantial variance in Gf test 
scores (rs = .40—.68), confirming that confidence overlaps substantially with 
intelligence, but is also distinct from it as indicated by factor analysis. 
 Kleitman and Stankov (2007) assessed confidence in relation to performance on 
a battery of different cognitive tests. Using confirmatory factor analysis, they reported 
that a solution with five factors obtained the best fit, with distinct factors 
corresponding to Gf, Gc, speed, confidence, and metacognition, and that the 
confidence factor correlated substantially with Gf (r = .34), Gc (r = .20), and 
metacognition (r = .41)—indicating that it is distinct from, but related to, both 
intelligence and metacognition. Moreover, Stankov and Lee (2008) attached 
confidence ratings to a measure of verbal comprehension (including listening and 
reading components), and reported an exploratory factor analysis in which verbal 
ability and confidence measures loaded distinct factors.  
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However, a distinct confidence factor has also been obtained using batteries of 
tests including both cognitive and perceptual tasks. Pallier et al. (2002) demonstrated 
that confidence ratings on perceptual tasks (including discriminating line length, 
pitch, and smell) loaded onto the same factor as confidence ratings attached to 
cognitive tests. Taken together, these studies indicate that confidence overlaps 
substantially with cognitive ability, but is more than cognitive ability, as is shown by 
its overlap with sensory modalities. 
Confidence and Personality Associations 
 A small number of studies have assessed the relationship between confidence 
and factors of personality. Pallier et al. (2002) compared confidence ratings with 
Extraversion at the factor and facet levels (using the NEO PI-R), and found no 
significant correlation between Extraversion broadly, but a significant correlation with 
its facet Activity (r = .26, p < .01), as well as a correlation of r = .35 (p < .01) between 
confidence and a measure of proactiveness. Furthermore, Stankov and Lee (2008) 
compared confidence scores with each FFM factor, and found substantial overlap with 
Openness to Experience (r = .33) and Agreeableness (r = .23), with an average 
correlation across the five factors of r = .18. They noted that FFM variables appear to 
have the same relationship with confidence as they do with cognitive abilities, which 
suggests that the overlap between confidence and Openness to Experience may be due 
to the shared variance of each with intelligence. 
Lastly, Burns et al. (2016) assessed the relationship between FFM variables and 
online confidence samples. In their sample of younger adults, online confidence 
attached to two measures of Gf correlated significantly with Neuroticism (r = -.28 and 
-.27) as did confidence scores attached to the measure of Gc (r = -.22), but no other 
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correlation between online confidence and FFM variables was significant. In the 
sample of older adults, significant associations between online confidence and each 
FFM variable were reported. However, these were generally inconsistent between the 
two measures of Gf, and this instability may have been due to the smaller sample of 
older adults (n = 91) compared with the sample of younger adults (n = 144), making the 
true extent of this overlap difficult to ascertain. Although this limited number of 
studies does not allow a firm estimate of the degree of overlap between confidence 
and each FFM variable, they suggest that substantial overlap between these domains 
may exist.  
Confidence, Metacognition, and Investment Theory 
In addition to the above empirical findings, confidence has been discussed in 
connection with Cattell and Ackerman’s investment theories. Stankov (1999) 
described confidence—along with other variables including emotional intelligence—
as residing on the so-called “no man’s land” between intelligence and personality. He 
surveyed evidence which indicated that cognitive abilities became less powerful 
predictors of life outcomes as people moved into occupational pursuits, but that non-
cognitive variables (including personality) become increasingly important at the same 
time—with special reference to those abilities that straddle the borderline of ability 
and personality. 
Stankov (1999) assessed the question of whether confidence was closer to 
cognitive ability, personality, or metacognition. He reviewed the evidence available, 
noting that confidence showed only modest or negligible correlations with 
intelligence and personality, and that it appeared to overlap most substantially with 
aspects of metacognition. More specifically, he argued that confidence appeared to 
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assess the dimension of self-monitoring: “an individual’s propensity to appraise (or 
judge) the degree of accuracy of one’s own performance in the course of working 
through the items of a cognitive test” (Stankov, 1999, p. 324). 
When seen in this light, confidence appears to fit Cattell’s definition of an 
“investment trait”, in its capacity as a motivational variable. Those with higher levels 
of confidence may be quicker to act than those with less confidence, who may be less 
decisive due to excessive rumination. When this process is considered in terms of 
acquiring knowledge, those with greater degrees of confidence may engage new 
intellectual pursuits more readily, and therefore be quicker to initiate the interaction 
between ability, knowledge, and interests as described by Ackerman’s PPIK theory. 
Indeed, viewed from a broad perspective, the role of confidence 
 may be to provide a person with the information relevant for an evaluation of 
his or her strengths and weaknesses and to act as a motivational force that is 
important for ensuring maximal cognitive effort in that person’s areas of 
strength. The level of self-confidence may be related to feelings of self-esteem 
and contribute to one’s realistic outlook on aspects of achievement and on life 
in general. (Stankov, 1999, p. 325) 
Moreover, in a more recent review, Stankov (2013) applied the above process to 
investment theory specifically: “It seems reasonable to assume that self-beliefs and 
confidence in particular are the most potent forces that lead to the development of 
crystallized intelligence as postulated by the investment part of the theory of fluid and 
crystallized intelligence” (p. 731). This view was re-affirmed in a recent analysis of the 
relationship between measures of self-belief (including confidence) as they relate to 
intelligence and mathematics achievement (Stankov & Lee, 2017). Although recent 
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discussions highlight variables such as intellectual curiosity as potentially important in 
the investment process (e.g. von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011), confidence may also have 
an important part to play. 
Confidence and Academic Performance 
In a selective review of non-cognitive predictors of academic performance, 
Stankov (2013) reported that confidence was the only measure consistently to correlate 
stronger than r = .45 with academic outcomes. However, a more stringent assessment 
is to assess the incremental validity of confidence beyond variance explained by other 
variables, including domain-specific ability, which at least two studies have assessed. 
For verbal ability, Stankov and Lee (2008) reported associations between 
confidence and self-reported high school GPA and SAT scores, and for the Test of 
English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL)—a measure of verbal ability which assesses 
reading, listening, writing, and speaking skills in English. Although the measure of 
verbal comprehension showed predictive validity for GPA and SAT scores (R2 = .079 
and .307 respectively), adding confidence ratings did not improve prediction, which 
the authors speculated may have been due to using self-report measures. For TOEFL 
reading and listening scores (summed), the total TOEFL scores predicted R2 = .875, 
and adding confidence scores to this raised explained variance to R2 = .877 (R2 change 
p < .05).7 However, although significant, the authors conceded that “the value of 
obtained incremental validity is minimal” (Stankov & Lee, 2008, p. 974). 
																																																						
7 The sample size in this comparison appears to have been n = 824. Although the 
difference of .2% between these figures seems unlikely to have been statistically 
significant, the authors did not provide sufficient details about the regression model to 
check this. But regardless of whether these numbers were significantly different, they 
are not practically different. 
	100 
 For maths ability, Stankov et al. (2012) compared confidence with other self-
belief constructs as predictors of maths grades in a sample of 15-year-old Singaporean 
students. This study involved assessing measures of maths accuracy (using an 
achievement test), maths confidence (attached to the achievement test), maths self-
efficacy, maths self-concept, and then compared these measures to maths class 
achievement three months later. Both maths confidence and maths anxiety were 
significant (p < .01) zero-order predictors of maths school grades (r = .55 and -.39 
respectively), and both remained significant predictors after maths accuracy had been 
partialled out (r = .27 and -.23), while maths self-efficacy and maths self-concept were 
not significant predictors in either respect. Therefore, maths confidence (and maths 
anxiety) appears to possess incremental validity for predicting maths school grades 
beyond maths achievement. 
 Overall, therefore, there is limited evidence of incremental validity for 
confidence above domain-specific ability for maths scores, and for English ability to a 
lesser degree. However, despite the apparent overlap between confidence and FFM 
variables already noted, no study has assessed the incremental validity of the former 
over the latter. Several studies have been conducted assessing the incremental validity 
of FFM personality variables above ability measures for academic performance 
(Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006; Furnham et al., 2009; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011), 
and yet this method has not been applied to measures of confidence. Given that the 
predictive power of cognitive ability measures—particularly Gf and Gc—and certain 
personality measures (including Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience) for 
predicting academic outcomes is substantial but by no means comprehensive, it is 
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worth exploring whether something as simple to measure as “online” confidence 
should be added to this suite of predictors.  
3.5  Conclusion 
 This chapter has surveyed the evidence that has accrued in recent years for 
both IC and confidence as predictors of AP. Its conclusion is that both IC and 
confidence show promise as predictors of AP, but in each case the main question is 
the degree of incremental validity these investment traits possess above the 
established predictors of cognitive ability and FFM personality. Because of significant 
overlap between these traits and both intelligence and personality, it is not sufficient 
that these constructs demonstrate zero-order prediction of AP; they must predict 
variance over and above the established predictors. For IC, the evidence for this is 
generally positive, though mixed; and for confidence this approach does not appear to 
have been conducted. Moreover, these investment traits do not appear to have been 
studied together, so relatively little is known about their relationship. Therefore, this 
chapter underscores the need to assess IC and confidence—preferably together—as 





4.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the studies assessing the thesis that 
investment traits intellectual curiosity (IC) and confidence predict academic 
performance (AP). Although these studies are significant in several other respects—
regarding Cattell’s investment theory of intelligence, the measurement of the broad 
Openness/Intellect domain, and other potential investment traits including 
confidence—they were prompted by recent interest in IC as it relates to academic 
outcomes, especially the meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011). Here, each 
study will be outlined briefly and considered for its relevance to this thesis. 
4.2  Study 1 
 The aim of the first study (published as Powell, Nettelbeck, & Burns, 2016) was 
to assess the number of factors to be found across several measures of IC. As several 
researchers have noted (Fleischhauer et al., 2010; Mussel, 2010; Rocklin, 1994; von 
Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2007), several scales have been developed in 
distinct domains of research that appear to measure the same broad construct of IC. 
Therefore, to assess the importance of IC in predicting AP, it is important to ensure 
that IC is being measured appropriately, and that results using different scales are 
broadly comparable. Factor analyses of the several scales have reported different 
numbers of factors, with TIE containing as many as five factors (Ferguson, 1999), NFC 
up to three (Furnham & Thorne, 2013), and EC possessing up to two factors (Litman, 
2008). Moreover, the study of Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) indicated that whereas 
TIE showed (modest) evidence of incremental validity above cognitive ability and 
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Conscientiousness, NFC, EC and IPIP-Intellect did not. This raised the question of 
whether these scales measure the same broad construct, or perhaps different profiles 
of factors.  
 To assess this issue, the first study was an exploratory factor analysis of items 
pooled from across TIE, NFC, and EC scales. Specifically, it assessed three research 
questions: (1) How many factors exist in the general domain occupied by TIE, NFC, 
and EC? (2) Do all these factors load substantially onto a higher-order factor? (3) 
Which factors do each scale measure? First, results suggested that six factors spanned 
these scales, labelled Intellectual Avoidance, Deprivation, Problem Solving, Abstract 
Thinking, Reading, and Wide Interest. Second, analysis using the Schmid-Leiman 
rotation (Schmid & Leiman, 1957) indicated that although five of these factors loaded 
predominantly on an orthogonal higher-order factor, Reading items loaded 
predominantly on their first-order factor. This indicated that Reading items from the 
TIE scale may not fit within this broad domain. And third, relative importance 
regression assessed the degree to which each scale measured each factor. Results 
suggested that NFC mostly measured Intellectual Avoidance and Problem Solving, TIE 
measured all factors except for Deprivation, and EC principally measured Deprivation. 
Therefore, despite the strong overlap between these scales and evidence of a 
substantial higher-order general factor, these scales appeared to measure different 
profiles of factors within the IC domain. This being the case, the incremental validity 
of some scales (such as TIE) but not others (NFC and EC; Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a) 
may have been due to these different profiles of factors. 
	104 
Despite these results, however, it remains possible that factor labelled 
Intellectual Avoidance may be a consequence of negatively-worded items.8 The 
significance of negatively-worded items in this domain was explored by Bors et al. 
(2006) for the NFC scale, who reported that correlations between this scale and 
measures of AP and verbal ability are partly a consequence of negatively-worded 
items. If so, this would reduce the number of factors across these scales to five, as 
Intellectual Avoidance would simply be the obverse of intellectual engagement. 
Nevertheless, this probably would have made little difference to subsequent studies, 
which focussed particularly on the factors Reading and Deprivation. 
4.3  Study 2 
The aim of the second study (accepted for publication) was to assess the 
incremental validity of IC for predicting academic performance. Although this issue 
was assessed in the earlier study of Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a), its weaknesses of 
relying on self-report data for AP, omitting a measure of Gc, and measuring only 
Conscientiousness among FFM variables highlighted the need to assess this issue more 
stringently. Further, because the Deprivation factor within the EC scale measures 
information-seeking that comes from a perceived lack of knowledge, this study also 
assessed whether EC-D predicted distinct variance in AP. Moreover, this study 
included a measure of online cognitive confidence. Confidence has been assessed in 
several studies as a non-cognitive predictor of AP (Stankov et al., 2012; Stankov et al., 
2014), and has been argued to be an important trait in the investment process 
(Stankov & Lee, 2017). Therefore, despite the largely negative result reported by Powell 
																																																						
8 This suggestion was made by an audience member during a conference presentation 
of this study. 
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and Nettelbeck (2014a), but also considering other studies that had reported 
substantial incremental validity for IC (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006), the second 
study hypothesised that: (1) TIE predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, Gc, 
and FFM personality; (2) EC-D predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, Gc, and 
FFM personality; and (3) Confidence predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, 
Gc, and FFM personality. This appears to have been the first study to assess measures 
of IC and confidence together as investment traits for AP.  
 This study used a convenience sample of third-year psychology students who 
gave permission for their subject grades to be accessed from university transcripts. 
Hypotheses were tested using three separate stepwise hierarchical regressions where 
cognitive ability was measured in step one, followed by FFM variables in step two, 
followed by the relevant investment trait in step three. Results indicated that neither 
TIE nor EC-D possessed incremental validity for predicting AP above measures of 
ability and FFM variables, but confidence did. However, confidence and AP related 
negatively, both within the regression model and when assessed as a zero-order 
correlation. This finding contradicted the positive relationship usually reported 
between confidence and AP, and raised doubts about the meaning of this finding. 
Therefore, when compared within the same study, confidence appeared to have more 
promise as an investment trait for academic outcomes than did IC—although this 
finding would need to be replicated to be stated with more certainty. This study 
provided further evidence that the incremental validity of IC for predicting AP may be 
highly variable, and cannot be assumed to be present in all educational settings. 
 This study also contained a significant limitation seen in the data: a lack of 
correlation between AP and both Gf and Gc. This unusual finding may be explained by 
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two observations: (1) the sample had a strong restriction of range for ability, as they 
were advanced final-year psychology students at a competitive Australian university; 
and (2) the variable for AP appeared to contain a strong degree of error variance. This 
variable was derived by calculating a two-year average grade using not only different 
psychology subjects, but including subjects from other majors and electives taken 
from diverse university offerings. Variations in assessment methods and marking 
standards across university faculties may have made these scores more variable than 
scores obtained from a more uniform curriculum. Moreover, error variance may also 
have been introduced by the differing numbers of subjects used to calculate this grade. 
Many psychology students at this university study part-time, and calculating an 
average grade from fewer subjects produces more error variance. Because of this, AP 
scores for students enrolled less than 75% of a full-time load were excluded from 
analysis, reducing the degree of error for the measure of AP, but also reducing the 
sample size. It is likely that this error variance attenuated the relationships between 
AP and other variables without affecting other correlations. 
In this situation, therefore, it is likely that the most powerful predictors of AP 
(e.g. Conscientiousness) still predicted substantial variance in AP amidst the error 
variance (such as Conscientiousness), but those whose contribution was already 
attenuated due to restriction of range did not (such as Gf and Gc). This might also 
explain why the results of study two differed from those of Chamorro-Premuzic et al. 
(2006) who also assessed the incremental validity of TIE above intelligence and FFM 
personality in university psychology students. If the course offerings at their university 
were more uniform, and grades were produced using more stringent standardisation 
procedures, this might explain the larger amount of overall variance explained by TIE 
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in their model (between 13.0% and 29.2% of variance in AP, depending on the 
assessment method) compared with the present study (13.6% of variance in AP). 
Therefore, in addition to its conclusion regarding investment traits, the second study 
indicated that differences in cohorts and university standards have the potential to 
affect the degree of incremental validity for IC as a predictor of AP. 
4.4  Study 3 
The third study (written for publication) had two main aims: to assess Cattell’s 
investment theory in an adult population, and to assess whether reading habits should 
be incorporated within the Intellect framework (Mussel, 2013a). 
The background to this study was an aspect of Cattell’s investment theory that 
has sometimes been overlooked: the distinction between how investment operates in 
adolescents compared with adults. Cattell argued that the compulsory education 
system in adolescence largely was responsible for the existence of the broad Gc factor. 
However, once students had left compulsory education and entered working life, 
Cattell expected that this factor would become highly tenuous, leading potentially to 
as many Gc factors as there are occupations, and making the investment process more 
difficult to assess in adults. However, it became apparent that university psychology 
students provided an opportunity to assess investment theory in adults: they are 
exposed to a common curriculum over several years, and therefore the influence of 
investment traits on investment outcomes might be observable in this group. 
Moreover, Cattell also distinguished between different types of Gc, including between 
the broad Gc factor and AP. Because many of the recent studies on investment traits 
in adults had used AP as the investment outcome, it seemed useful to obtain a 
measure of Gc that was distinct from AP to see if this might produce a different result. 
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Given the perspective of investment theory, especially its prediction that 
strength of investment from Gf into Gc would be influenced by investment traits, six 
hypotheses were proposed: (1) IC possesses incremental validity above Gf for domain-
specific knowledge; (2) IC moderates the relationship between Gf and domain-specific 
knowledge; (3) Confidence possesses incremental validity above Gf for domain-specific 
knowledge; (4) Confidence moderates the relationship between Gf and domain-
specific knowledge; (5) Items designed to measure an Intellect–Read factor will load 
substantially on a general factor from across the Intellect scale; and (6) When assessed 
in a latent variable model consistent with the Intellect framework, variables Learn and 
Read will associate at close to unity. 
An initial phase of this study involved developing a measure of domain-specific 
psychology knowledge, and a reading scale to complement the Intellect scale. The 
experimental measure of domain-specific psychology knowledge (with “online” 
confidence ratings attached) and the measures of Gf and Gc were administered to 
participants under test conditions as part of a class lecture, and the other variables 
(including personality variables) were collected online. Regarding investment theory 
(hypotheses 1–4), only hypothesis 3 was supported, wherein confidence predicted 
variance in domain-specific knowledge above that predicted by Gf. Contrary to 
investment theory, no evidence of moderation was found for any investment trait. 
However, the strength of this study was hampered by the poor reliability of the 
measure of domain-specific knowledge. 
Concerning reading habits, both hypotheses 5 and 6 were supported. The 
Intellect–Read scale was highly reliable, and its items appeared to be indistinguishable 
from the original items. Moreover, the path model that included the Read operation 
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indicated that Learn and Read operations overlapped at close to unity, indicating that 
the essence of reading habits was already captured by items that assessed the Learn 
operation. In conclusion, confidence showed more promise than did IC as a potential 
investment trait, and there appeared to be no clear benefit from incorporating reading 
habits within the Intellect framework. 
4.5  Study 4 
The aim of the fourth study (written for publication) was to critically assess the 
meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) which concluded that IC was the “third 
pillar” of academic performance alongside cognitive ability and Conscientiousness. 
This analysis was prompted by the inconsistent results produced by several studies on 
assessing this question, especially comparing the negative results of the second study 
with positive results of Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006). This inconsistency was also 
indicated by the correlations used in the meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et al. 
(2011) to estimate the relationship between TIE and AP, which ranged from r = .04 
(Goff & Ackerman, 1992) to r = .37 (Wilhelm, Schulze, Schmiedek, & Süß, 2003).9 This 
critique was an effort to understand how a meta-analysis could conclude that IC was 
an important factor in AP when the underlying data appeared to be contradictory.  
This critique comprised four stages, and argued that: (1) von Stumm, Hell, et al. 
(2011) miscalculated the correlation between TIE and AP by treating the results of a 
single study as two correlations, which widened the possible estimates for this value; 
(2) the incremental validity of TIE varies substantially by study; (3) considering the 
																																																						
9 This final correlation was originally r = -.37 because in the German education system 
lower numbers indicate higher AP. Appropriately, it was reversed by von Stumm, Hell, 
et al. (2011). 
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strong correlation between TIE and NFC, the best estimate of the correlation between 
TIE and AP may be closer to r = .2 than .3; and (4) when the value of the correlation 
between NFC and AP was substituted within the final model of von Stumm, Hell, et al. 
(2011), the distinct value of TIE diminishes substantially. It concluded that the true 
correlation between TIE and AP was difficult to ascertain because of very limited data, 
but is likely to be lower than von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) estimated. Therefore, the 
definitive study on the relationship of IC with AP had yet to be conducted. 
Moreover, although this was not stated in the critique itself, this assessment 
also raised the issue of the value of path models derived from meta-analytic 
coefficients. The variability in the correlations between measures of IC and AP 
appeared to be not only due to measurement error, but a consequence of underlying 
differences in the cohorts themselves. For instance, to assume that the associations 
between measures of IC and AP are the same for secondary and tertiary student 
populations requires substantiation; there are sound reasons to expect this not to be 
the case. But then to produce a correlation matrix using several such meta-analyses—
possibly derived from entirely different cohorts—and to use this as the basis for a path 
analysis that confidently attributes variance to the different predictors seems to 
permit a significant degree of uncertainty into the final model. Although this approach 
might be valid if applied to a large sample of studies that had strong evidence of being 
representative, the fact that the TIE–AP meta-analytic correlation was based on only 
three highly variable correlations gives little confidence that these requirements have 
been met. The issues raised by the fourth study indicate that the final model of von 
Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) may not accurately represent the true relationship between 
these variables; the question that remains is the degree to which this is so. 
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4.6  Conclusion 
This series of studies has relevance for the thesis that IC and confidence are 
investment traits that predict AP. It suggests that the incremental validity of IC may 
have been overstated and requires more research; and that although the present 
studies suggest that confidence has more promise as an investment trait for AP than 
does IC, this too requires more evidence to substantiate fully. Overall, this has the 












5.1  Abstract 
 
Scales of Need for Cognition (NFC), Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE), and 
Epistemic Curiosity (EC) measure intellectual curiosity (IC). These scales correlate 
strongly and have been factor-analysed individually but not together. Here N = 396 
(143 males) undergraduates completed measures of NFC, TIE, and EC. Six factors, 
labeled Intellectual Avoidance, Deprivation, Problem Solving, Abstract Thinking, 
Reading, and Wide Interest, were identified. TIE is the broadest scale, measuring all 
factors except Deprivation; NFC measures Intellectual Avoidance and Problem Solving, 
plus Abstract Thinking and Deprivation to a lesser degree; and EC largely measures 
Deprivation. Moreover, Reading may not fit in the IC domain; higher-order factor 
analysis indicated that, whereas items measuring Reading loaded more strongly on 
their first-order factor, items measuring the other factors strongly loaded on a general 
factor of IC. These results are significant for understanding the contents of these 
scales, and for future scale development. 
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5.2  Introduction 
Human curiosity is a topic of current research interest, and has been applied to 
predicting job performance (Mussel, 2013b), academic achievement (von Stumm, Hell, 
et al., 2011), and exploratory behavior (Litman, Hutchins, et al., 2005). Loewenstein 
(1994) identified two “waves” of research: the first in the 1950s and ‘60s addressed the 
psychological foundations of curiosity and the second in the ‘70s and ‘80s concerned 
its measurement and dimensionality. Given this revival, we may label current interest 
as the “third wave” of curiosity research. 
 Berlyne (1950, 1954) provided an early, influential account of curiosity, 
distinguishing perceptual curiosity (the desire for sensory experience) from epistemic 
curiosity (EC; the desire for knowledge). The Epistemic Curiosity Scale (Litman, 2008) 
is the most current scale of EC, measuring “interest” (I-type) and “deprivation” (D-
type) factors. EC has been related to feeling-of-knowing and exploratory behavior 
(Litman, Hutchins, et al., 2005), ambiguity tolerance, and need for closure (Litman, 
2010). 
Researchers (Mussel, 2010, 2013a; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011) have identified 
measures developed separately from EC but which address similar constructs, 
specifically, Need for Cognition (NFC) and Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE). 
Cohen et al. (1955) defined NFC as a person’s need to make sense of his or her 
experiential world. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) adopted the term, but defined it as “the 
tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (p. 116). NFC has been 
applied in many areas, including marketing, behavioural medicine, and education 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
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 Cacioppo and Petty (1982) developed a 34-item NFC measure, later condensed 
to 18-items (Cacioppo et al., 1984). While a single factor has routinely been extracted 
from either scale (Cacioppo et al., 1996), a number of studies have reported multiple 
factors. For the 34-item scale, Tanaka, Panter, and Winborne (1988) identified three 
factors, but used an uncommon true-false response scale, making their results difficult 
to compare with past research (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Bors et al. (2006) argued that 
negatively-worded items created spurious factors in their study—when these items 
were positively re-worded, a single factor emerged. However, Furnham and Thorne 
(2013) created a positively-worded form of the 34-item NFC scale and reported three 
factors: “need for cognitive challenge”, “need for knowledge and understanding”, and 
“enjoyment of cognitive effort”. 
For the 18-item scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984), Sadowski (1993) reported a single 
factor in a sample of undergraduates (N = 1,218). However, two considerations suggest 
a possible second factor: the first principal component accounted for 30.92% of the 
variance, while a second accounted for an additional 8.95%; and the second eigenvalue 
of 1.61 substantially exceeds the cutoff suggested by Horn’s (1965) parallel roots 
analysis to indicate a second factor. Additionally, Davis, Severy, Kraus, and Whitaker 
(1993), using a sample of 230 undergraduates, reported two factors for the NFC 18-item 
scale, representing “enjoyment of cognitive activity”, and “preference for problem 
solving”—possibly the putative second factor in Sadowski’s (1993) dataset. However, 
Furnham and Thorne (2013) concluded that a positively re-worded 18-item scale 
contained one factor, essentially the “need for cognitive challenge” factor of the full 
scale. Thus, although both scales contain a major factor appropriately labeled “Need 
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for Cognition”, the 18-item scale may contain a second factor, and the 34-item scale 
possibly a third. 
Conceptually similar to EC and NFC, TIE was defined by Goff and Ackerman 
(1992) as “a personality trait hypothesized to relate to typical vs. maximal intellectual 
performance” (p. 539). Ackerman’s PPIK theory (intelligence-as-Personality, -Process, 
-Interests and -Knowledge) extends Cattell’s investment theory of intelligence (1943, 
1971) by formally incorporating personality variables such as TIE (Ackerman, 1996). 
TIE is thus a composite measure, located between intelligence and personality. 
The TIE scale contains 59 items relating to intellectual activity (Goff & 
Ackerman, 1992). Although much research treats TIE as a unitary construct 
(Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011), factor analyses have 
suggested three (Ackerman & Goff, 1994), four (Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008) and five 
(Arteche, Chamorro-Premuzic, Ackerman, & Furnham, 2009; Ferguson, 1999) factors. 
Arteche et al. (2009) labeled the five factors “reading and information seeking”, 
“intellectual avoidance”, “directed complex problem solving”, “abstract thinking”, and 
“intellectual pursuits as a primary focus.” TIE has been of particular interest for 
education, where it has been used to argue that intellectual curiosity predicts variance 
in academic success beyond what is explained by intelligence and effort (von Stumm, 
Hell, et al., 2011). 
Research demonstrates that measures of EC, NFC and TIE overlap extensively, 
shown by strong inter-correlations, substantial shared variance in factor analysis, and 
similar patterns of association with personality variables. Using German translations 
of the EC, NFC, and TIE, Mussel (2010) reported strong correlations between all 
curiosity measures in two samples, ranging from r = .52 for EC-Deprivation and TIE, to 
	 117 
.74 for EC-Deprivation and NFC, while Woo et al. (2007) reported .78 between TIE and 
NFC. Mussel (2010) also subjected total scores of five curiosity scales to exploratory 
factor analysis, and reported that one factor explained 67% of the variance. 
Additionally, Woo et al. (2007) observed very similar associations for NFC and TIE 
with Five Factor Model (FFM) variables and Autonomous Regulation in Learning 
measures. However, Mussel (2010) cautioned that the scales may not be identical, as 
TIE correlated more strongly with Gc than did NFC on account of its “reading” factor. 
Therefore, despite strong overlap, these scales may also be meaningfully different, 
highlighting the need to integrate these measures within a broad framework (Mussel, 
2010). 
Recently, (Mussel, 2013a) outlined such a framework, which not only 
incorporates existing measures of intellectual curiosity (IC) but also points in new 
directions. This framework proposes that two dimensions encompass Intellect: 
“Process” and “Operations”. Process refers to consecutive phases in performing an 
action, and has subcomponents labeled “Seek” (a desire for new intellectual 
challenges) and “Conquer” (a desire to master current domains of knowledge). 
Operations reflects a person’s preference for engaging in different intellectual 
activities, labeled “Think”, “Learn”, and “Create”. These operations were developed as 
counterparts to aspects of intelligence theory, where Think parallels fluid intelligence, 
Learn parallels crystallised intelligence, and Create parallels creativity. When 
combined these two dimensions produce six facets which span the conceptual space of 
Intellect: Seek Think, Seek Learn, Seek Create, and Conquer Think, Conquer Learn, 
Conquer Create. Mussel (2013a) locates TIE, NFC and EC—plus several other curiosity 
measures—within this framework. TIE, NFC and I-type curiosity most closely 
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resemble the Seek Think facet, while D-type curiosity was associated with the Conquer 
Think facet.  
Two specifics should be noted about Mussel’s (2013a) approach. First, while he 
measured I-type and D-type EC separately, he treated TIE and NFC as unitary 
constructs, leaving unanswered the associations between TIE and NFC at the facet 
level. Second, the TIE scale administered was substantially truncated. The 18-item 
German version (Wilhelm et al., 2003) was used, which has three factors: “intellectual 
curiosity”, “contemplation”, and “reading”. However, Mussel (2013a) excluded five 
reading items, concluding that reading could not be incorporated into the Intellect 
framework at this stage. This 13-item measure is perhaps somewhat different from the 
59-item version, which contains up to five distinct factors; a significant point, because 
reading is perhaps what distinguishes TIE from other measures such as NFC, and is 
the main cause of TIE’s closer association with Gc (Mussel, 2010). 
It is important to examine more closely the relationships between EC, NFC, and 
TIE. Mussel’s (2013a) approach implies that these measures are subsumed by a higher-
order factor termed “Intellect”, as others have suggested (Tanaka et al., 1988). 
However, he also noted that the relations between facets, and between facets and a 
possible higher-order factor, remain unclear. To our knowledge, no study has 
compared the content of these measures at the factor level using the same dataset. 
Moreover, if these measures are not importantly different, findings across these 
constructs could be integrated, allowing the full significance of the Intellect domain to 
be appreciated. 
The present exploratory study has factor analysed the items from EC, NFC, and 
TIE. It addressed three research questions:  
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(1) How many factors exist in the general domain occupied by TIE, NFC, and EC? 
(2) Do all these factors load substantially onto a higher-order factor? 
(3) Which factors do each scale measure? 
5.3  Method 
Participants 
Participants were mostly first-year undergraduate psychology students from 
the University of Adelaide, who received course credit for their involvement. All were 
informed only that the study aimed to investigate the relationship between IC and 
academic performance. Data were collected on two occasions: 225 responses from 
May-to-October 2012 within an earlier study (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a), and another 
176 from April-to-June 2014. Means and standard deviations for all measures were very 
similar for both datasets. Five incomplete cases were excluded, leaving n = 396 (253 
females), with mean age 20.2 (SD = 3.92 yrs) for the final analysis. 
Measures 
Epistemic Curiosity (EC). The 10-item Epistemic Curiosity Scale measures 
interest (I) and deprivation (D) factors for EC. Responses were on a 4-point Likert-
type scale (1 = “almost never” to 4 = “almost always”). Higher scores indicate higher 
EC. Litman (2008) has reported acceptable internal consistency reliability (I-type: α = 
.82; D-type: α = .76), with a correlation r = .47 between the two factors, together with 
evidence that I-type curiosity relates to intrinsic motivation, whereas D-type curiosity 
relates to extrinsic motivation (Litman et al., 2010). 
Need for Cognition (NFC). Cacioppo et al. (1984) developed the 18-item NFC 
scale as an efficient measure for engagement in effortful thought. Despite having less 
evidence of dimensionality than the 34-item version, the 18-item scale was deemed 
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sufficient for two reasons: (1) most researchers have used the 18-item scale, making 
results from this analysis relevant to more studies; and (2) of the 16 NFC items 
excluded by the short form, seven are identical with items in the TIE scale, and an 
eighth has a close conceptual parallel. Given that the TIE scale was also administered 
here, using the NFC short form eliminated some redundant questions and shortened 
administration times. 
Responses were on a 9-point Likert-type scale (-4 = “very strong disagreement” 
to +4 = “very strong agreement”). Higher scores indicate higher NFC. The scale has 
high internal consistency reliability of α = .9; (Cacioppo et al., 1984), with good 
construct validity indicated by correlation with the 34-item version and with measures 
of social anxiety, intrinsic motivation and grade point average (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE). Participants responded to 59 items 
on a Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 6 = “strongly agree”). 
Higher scores indicated higher TIE. Pronouns were changed from “you” to “I”, “me” or 
“my” for questions 2, 3, 5, 13, 23, 35, 57 and 58 to make statement styles uniform. 
Internal consistency has been reported as α = .92 (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), and test-
retest reliability as .82 from two unpublished studies (cited by Chamorro-Premuzic et 
al., 2006). Validity has been demonstrated by studies (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) 
investigating TIE’s distinctness from five-factor domains (Costa & McCrae, 1992a) and 







Participants completed the questionnaires on SurveyMonkey with no time-
limit (2012: M = 36.8 min, SD = 36.1; 2014: M = 19.1 min, SD = 21.5)10. The 2012 survey 
contained nine sections: section 1 (information and consent); section 2 (age, gender, 
participation ID); section 3 (Conscientiousness items from the Quick Scales measuring 
the FFM; Brebner, 2003); sections 4 through 7 (IPIP-Intellect; Goldberg,   1999, then 
TIE, EC, NFC, respectively); section 8 (Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices—Short 
Form); and section 9 (contact details for debriefing). Section 8 was excluded from the 
2014 collection11, while International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999) 
Intellect and Conscientiousness were measured but are not analysed further here. 
Details unique to the 2012 study have been reported elsewhere (Powell & Nettelbeck, 
2014a). Analyses were conducted in SPSS Statistics Version 22, except for relative 
importance regression, conducted in R Studio Version 0.98.1103 (R Development Core 
Team, 2014) using “relaimpo” package Version 2.2-2 (Grömping, 2006). 
5.4  Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and reliabilities are shown in Table 5.1. Alpha coefficients 
were high, as were correlations between measure of IC (NFC and TIE = .86, NFC and 
EC = .69, TIE and EC = .71; all p < .01). Means for TIE and EC were close to those 
previously reported (Ackerman, Kanfer, & Goff, 1995; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006; 
																																																						
10 The large standard deviations were probably due to the small number participants 
who took an exceptionally long time to complete the surveys, presumably in multiple 
sittings. 
11 This exclusion explains the difference between the administrations in average 
completion times. 
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Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Litman, 2010), but the mean for NFC (9.22) was somewhat 
lower than reported by (Sadowski, 1993; Tidwell, Sadowski, & Pate, 2000). No sex 
differences were found for TIE (p = .32) or EC (p = .07), but males reported 
significantly higher NFC than females (r = .16, p = .002).12 Previous studies have 
generally found no sex differences (Cacioppo et al., 1996), though Tanaka et al. (1988) 
reported higher female scores for the cognitive persistence factor. 
 
																																																						
12 Eight NFC items had higher scores for males than females: four (1, 2, 6 and 13) had 
primary loadings on Problem Solving, two (7 and 9) on Avoidance, and two (10 and 14) 
on Abstract Thinking, with no sex differences for the other items. This sex difference 
is an issue for future research. 
 
Table 5.1 
Variable means and standard deviations, range of scores, and internal consistency 
(alpha) 
      Range   
Variable M SD Potential Actual Alpha 
TIE 226.05 32.10 59-354 119-313 .92 
   Males (n = 143) 228.18 34.13    
   Females (n = 253) 224.85 30.90    
EC 25.52 5.51 10-40 13-40 .86 
   Males (n = 143) 26.18 5.58    
   Females (n = 253) 25.14 5.44    
NFC 9.22 21.64 -72 to 72 -63 to 66 .92 
   Males (n = 143) 13.74 22.42    
   Females (n = 253) 6.66 20.81       
 
Note. TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; EC = Epistemic Curiosity; NFC = Need for Cognition. 
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Factor Analysis of EC, NFC and TIE Scales Combined 
 Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) recommended using 
multiple methods to determine the number of factors in a dataset, including the scree 
test, parallel analysis, and fit as measured by the Root Mean Square error of 
Approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) . Using Principal Component Analysis, the 
scree plot showed clear breaks after the first and sixth components, while parallel 
analysis using both the mean and a more conservative 95th percentile cutoff indicated 
six factors. Using Maximum Likelihood estimation, RMSEA steadily improved when 
comparing one- through seven-factor solutions, and a six-factor solution was a close 
fit (RMSEA = .045, 90% CI .033—.054) and was only marginally improved by adding a 
seventh factor (RMSEA = .043, 90% CI .032—.053). Therefore, given that this six-factor 
solution was also clearly interpretable, it was retained for subsequent analysis—thus 
addressing our first research question. 
To extract the six factors, we used Maximum Likelihood extraction with 
Promax rotation. Due to the large number of items (87), matrices of factor loadings 
and correlations are presented in Appendices 1, 2, and 3. A rotated factor loading of .3 
was considered salient yielding 73 items with salient loadings and nine cross-loading 
items.13 In consultation with prior analyses (Arteche et al., 2009; Ferguson, 1999; 
Litman, 2010), the six factors in the general IC domain were labeled: Intellectual 
Avoidance—avoiding activities that require intellectual effort (negatively-scored); 
																																																						
13 Six items in the NFC and TIE scales are identical. We decided to retain the identical 
items, permitting a more accurate assessment of the relationship between these scales 
and our six-factors solution. However, we also tested the solution with the identical 
items removed, and the factor structure did not change in a meaningful way. 
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Deprivation—feeling discomfort about unsolved problems; Problem Solving—enjoying 
complex problem solving; Abstract Thinking—enjoying thinking about abstract and 
philosophical matters; Reading—frequency and enjoyment of reading; and Wide 
Interest—being interested in a wide range of topics. 
Schmid-Leiman Higher-Order Factor Analysis 
To elucidate further the relationships between these factors, we employed a 
Schmid-Leiman solution (Schmid & Leiman, 1957). Higher-order factor analysis 
derives its most general factors from correlations between first-order factors, 
obscuring the relationship between variables and higher-order factors. Schmid-
Leiman analysis, however, derives higher-order factors from the primary variables, 
attributing the remaining variance to first-order factors. This approach assesses 
whether questionnaire items relate more closely to the general factor or their first-
order factor. The present dataset was well suited to such analysis, with substantial 
inter-factor correlations suggesting a higher-order factor. 
A dominant, general factor explained two-thirds (66%) of the variance in the 
model, and first-order factors explained the remaining third (34%). However, clear 
differences emerged in the relationships between first-order factors and the general 
factor. Ordered from most to least general, Problem Solving (81%) and Intellectual 
Avoidance (77%) relate very strongly to the general factor, capturing the essence of 
this broad domain. Still general but to a lesser degree were Abstract Thinking (65%), 
Deprivation (60%), and Wide Interest (55%). However, Reading (34%) is clearly 
distinct, with items relating more closely to the first order factor than the general 
domain.  
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Therefore, the short answer to our second research question is “No”; while 
other items relate more substantially to the general domain, items loading on Reading 
relate more strongly to their first-order factor. 
Relative Importance Regression of IC Scales on Factors 
 To assess the degree to which the original scales were measured by these six 
factors, we used regression analyses. When NFC was regressed on scores for the six 
factors (F(6,389) = 1165.3, p < .001, R2 = .95), regression coefficients for all factors were 
significant except for Reading (p = .77) and Wide Interest (p = .12). For TIE (F(6,389) = 
1171.2, p < .001, R2 = .95), regression coefficients for all factors were significant. And for 
EC (F(6,389) = 532.5, p < .001, R2 = .89) all factors except Reading (p = .80) were 
significant. 
Relative importance regression is a computationally intensive approach to the 
problem of assessing the relative contributions of correlated regressors to a regression 
model (Grömping, 2006). This approach decomposes the full variance explained by a 
regression model into regressor-specific percentages, by averaging the regressor-
specific variance across all possible orderings of regressors. Of the approaches 
available for dominance analysis, we used the LMG method (Lindeman, Merenda, & 
Gold, 1980) recommended by Grömping (2006). 
Results for the relative importance analysis for NFC, TIE, and EC are presented 
in Figure 5.1. NFC appears to largely measure Intellectual Avoidance (31%) and Problem 
Solving (32%), and captures Abstract Thinking (15%) to a lesser degree. TIE captures all 
factors substantially, with more variance explained by Intellectual Avoidance (25%) 
and less by Deprivation (11%) than the other factors (range 15-17%). The variance 
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explained by EC, however, is dominated by Deprivation (53%), with the other factors 
to a lesser extent (range 4-12%).  
Therefore, addressing our third research question, we concluded that: TIE is 
the broadest scale, measuring all factors robustly except, arguably, Deprivation; NFC 
(18-item) predominantly measures Intellectual Avoidance and Problem Solving, plus 






Figure 5.1  
Relative importance regression models  
 
	
Note: Relative importance regression models of factors contributing to scores for Need for Cognition (NFC), Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE), and 
Epistemic Curiosity (EC). The relative importance of regressions total 100% for each scale. IA = Intellectual Avoidance; D = Deprivation; PS = Problem Solving; 






5.5  Discussion 
These results are substantive in a number of respects, especially concerning 
previous factor analyses, Mussel’s proposed Intellect framework, and future directions 
for measures within this domain. 
Previous Factor Analyses 
Regarding EC, the items measuring I-type are spread across a number of the 
factors, suggesting that it can be used as a very short, broad measure of this general 
domain. However, items measuring D-type curiosity are unique, capturing an aspect 
of EC not effectively measured elsewhere. NFC items spanned a number of factors, 
suggesting that it is a broader measure that some prior analyses would suggest—
although when this scale is considered in isolation there may not be enough factor-
specific items to demonstrate this diversity.  
Our analysis of TIE closely matches the analyses of Ferguson (1999) and 
Arteche et al. (2009), except that the contents of our Wide Interest factor are slightly 
different to Ferguson’s (1999) intellectual pursuits as a primary focus. TIE has clearly 
the broadest content, measuring all factors except perhaps Deprivation. Although 
other studies have labeled the contents of our Wide Interest factor “intellectual 
curiosity”, we prefer to reserve this term for the broad domain because it may be 
unhelpful to use the same label for both the general and a specific factor when they 
have only a modest association. 
Mussel’s Intellect Framework 
Two-thirds of the variance in scale items across the three IC measures included 
in our study is explained by a general factor, which clearly implies a higher-order 
factor—very similar to Intellect (Mussel, 2013a). Moreover, the Reading factor was the 
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most independent, with its items sharing only one-third of their variance with the 
broad domain. This supports Mussel’s (2013a) finding that Reading could not be 
incorporated within the Intellect domain. One obvious difference between our results 
and those of Mussel (2013a) is his inclusion of the aspect of creativity, as implied by 
intelligence theory. None of the six factors identified here address creativity, so the 
addition of creativity is a new direction.  
Limitations 
As noted, we used the condensed 18-item NFC scale instead of the 34-item 
original. Using the larger measure may have provided another eight distinct questions 
at the cost of further redundancy. But having inspected the content of these eight 
items, we doubt that our results would have changed through their inclusion. 
Furthermore, a different factor structure might obtain in a non-student cohort, which 
would limit the generalisability of our results. Finally, the Avoidance items were 
negatively-worded, meaning that this factor could be an artifact of method. These 
remain issues for future research. 
Future Directions 
These results support using Mussel’s Intellect framework for future research, 
which represents Intellect as possessing higher-order and first-order factors—as found 
here. Further, Deprivation is distinct from the factors found in TIE, justifying its 
reconfiguration as the Conquer process of Mussel’s Intellect framework. Moreover, 
consistent with Mussel (2013a), Reading does not clearly fit within the IC domain. This 
is surprising because reading appears to be a key habit for active minds. However, the 
TIE scale was developed over two decades ago, and reflects the information-seeking 
habits of that time—mainly printed books and magazines. Updating reading items to 
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include screen-based reading habits might increase the loading of this factor on IC in a 
modern cohort. 
Finally, studies suggest that measures of IC may usefully predict both academic 
(von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011) and workplace performance (Mussel, 2013b) beyond 
established predictors. Given that we found no evidence that TIE, NFC or EC measure 
creativity, future research should investigate whether creativity improves criterion 




6 STUDY 2: THE INCREMENTAL VALIDITY OF 
INTELLECTUAL CURIOSIY AND CONFIDENCE 
FOR PREDICTING ACADMIC PERFORMANCE IN 
ADVANCED TERTIARY STUDENTS 
 
6.1  Abstract 
Intellectual curiosity is a topic of research interest and often predicts academic 
performance (AP). However, evidence for its incremental validity, which the present 
study aimed to assess, is mixed. Participants were 216 (52 males, 151 females, 13 not 
reported) third-year psychology students (age M = 23.0 yrs) who completed tests of 
fluid and crystallised intelligence, five-factor model (FFM) personality, intellectual 
curiosity, and confidence. AP was obtained from university transcripts. No 
incremental validity above intelligence and FFM personality was found for measures of 
curiosity or confidence. In all analyses, Conscientiousness was the most substantial 
predictor of AP. Future research may focus on the conditions in which curiosity or 






6.2  Introduction 
The relationship between intelligence and curiosity has long been a topic of 
research, generating theories relating to different stages of human development. We 
survey these approaches, before addressing curiosity and other constructs as 
predictors of academic performance (AP). 
Curiosity through the years 
 Berlyne (1950) viewed curiosity as an exploratory drive in animals and humans, 
excited by novel stimuli. He distinguished between curiosity for sensory experience 
(perceptual curiosity) and curiosity for knowledge and understanding (epistemic 
curiosity; Berlyne, 1954)—also called intellectual curiosity (IC; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 
2011). 
 For infants, Fagan (1970) developed the concept of “preference for novelty”, 
suggesting that infants who give more attention to novel stimuli demonstrate more 
effective information processing—a basis for the emergence of intelligence (Fagan, 
2000). This method predicts later IQ and AP (Fagan et al., 2007), and demonstrates 
continuity for intelligence through life. However, this relationship between 
intelligence and curiosity for infants should not be assumed to hold in later years. 
 Based on research with adolescents, Cattell (1963) strengthened his theory of 
fluid (Gf) and crystallised (Gc) intelligence, where Gf is genetically-determined 
abstract reasoning ability, and Gc is acquired knowledge. He explained their 
substantial correlation by his “investment theory” that Gf was “invested” in Gc over 
time. He also posited the importance of “investment traits”, such as interest and 
curiosity, that determined the strength of this investment (Cattell, 1963, 1987). Cattell 
proposed that the school curriculum provided the basis for Gc as a broad factor, and 
	134 
that the relationship between Gf and Gc would weaken in the years following 
compulsory education. 
More recently, Ackerman (1996) developed his PPIK (process, personality, 
interests, knowledge) theory of adult intelligence. Extending Cattell’s theory, PPIK 
retains the idea that Gf (process) is invested in Gc (knowledge), and formally 
incorporates the place of interest and personality variables in this process. Goff and 
Ackerman (1992) developed the Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) scale as a 
measure of IC, which has been used in subsequent research. Thus, the proposed 
relationship between intelligence and curiosity becomes more complex with age. 
Additionally, two other measures of IC are of special interest: Need for 
Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and Epistemic Curiosity (EC; Litman, 2008). 
Although TIE, NFC and EC originated in separate research contexts, their strong 
intercorrelations and lack of discriminant validity suggest that they might be used 
interchangeably (Mussel, 2010; Woo et al., 2007). NFC describes a tendency to enjoy 
cognitively stimulating activities or (negatively) the tendency to avoid thinking 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). EC is subdivided into “interest” (EC-I) and “deprivation” (EC-
D) factors, where EC-I is similar to TIE and NFC, and EC-D relates to discomfort 
arising from perceived lack of information (Litman, 2008). Powell et al. (2016) 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis across TIE, NFC and EC scale items, and 
concluded that EC-D is unique to the EC scale. Because its items measure 
tenaciousness in curiosity (e.g. “I work like a fiend at problems that I feel must be 
solved”), it merits investigation as a predictor of AP. The incremental validity of IC will 
be addressed below. 
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 Another potential investment trait is confidence (Stankov et al., 2012). 
Confidence can be measured as a dimension of personality or “online”, where, after 
answering a problem, participants are asked: “How confident are you that your answer 
is correct?” (Burns et al., 2016). Online confidence is a robust general trait distinct 
from Gf and Gc (Kleitman & Stankov, 2007) that predicts AP better than self-efficacy, 
self-concept, and anxiety (Stankov et al., 2012). Because of these qualities, confidence 
also warrants investigation as an investment trait alongside IC, and as a predictor of 
AP. 
Predictors of AP  
 We turn now to research on variables that predict AP. General intelligence is 
the pre-eminent predictor of AP, with reported correlations up to r = .81 (Deary et al., 
2007), although other studies have reported around r = .5 (Laidra et al., 2007). 
Regarding personality, several meta-analyses have reviewed Five Factor Model (FFM; 
Costa & McCrae, 1992a) variables as predictors of AP. Poropat (2009) concluded that 
Conscientiousness is a major predictor, and reported that Agreeableness and 
Openness are more modest predictors. For post-secondary students, Schuler et al. 
(2007) reported that only Conscientiousness predicted grades consistently. Because 
intelligence and Conscientiousness tend to negligible (Poropat, 2009) or small 
negative (Moutafi et al., 2006) correlations, together they predict substantial variance 
in AP. Moreover, von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) reported a meta-analysis in which IC 
and Conscientiousness together predicted as much variance in AP as did intelligence, 
concluding that IC is the “third pillar” of academic performance alongside intelligence 
and Conscientiousness. 
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However, although these studies suggest that intelligence and personality 
measures may account for roughly 50% of the variance in AP, this leaves much 
variance unexplained. Moreover, if variables such as IC and confidence can be 
modified through intervention, establishing their ability to predict AP provides a basis 
for improving academic outcomes. 
The incremental validity of IC 
Current evidence for the incremental validity of IC is inconsistent, and may 
depend on which measure is of IC is used. Because TIE has been used in several recent 
major studies we will primarily discuss this measure. Furnham et al. (2009) reported 
modest incremental validity (about 2–3%) for TIE scores above measures of 
intelligence and general knowledge for AP in British schoolchildren. Chamorro-
Premuzic et al. (2006) reported more substantial incremental validity (about 3–9% 
depending on assessment method) for TIE above intelligence and FFM variables in 
predicting AP in university psychology students. Finally, the meta-analytic study of 
von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) concluded that IC is the “third pillar” of AP. 
However, two recent studies found little evidence of incremental validity. 
Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported that TIE predicted limited incremental 
variance beyond intelligence and Conscientiousness (about 1.8%) for university 
entrance scores, while other IC measures (including NFC and EC) possessed no 
incremental validity. TIE may overlap more substantially with Gc than do other IC 
measures because it measures reading habits (Mussel, 2010), and thus it may be Gc—
rather than IC per se—that makes TIE a useful, additional predictor of academic 
success (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a). Moreover, Schroeders et al. (2015) reported only 
limited incremental variance for TIE in high school grades (0.5% for Mathematics, 
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1.3% for Physics, 1.5% for Biology, and 1.8% for Chemistry) after controlling for 
socioeconomic status, gender, migration background, Gf, and subject-specific interest. 
Together, these studies suggest that the incremental validity of TIE may be limited, 
and may be more substantial for some subject domains than others. The finding that 
different measures of IC show different patterns of incremental validity raises the 
question of whether TIE is a “pure” measure of IC, and thus whether the incremental 
validity of IC has been established clearly. 
The present study 
 Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006) and von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) measured 
only general intelligence (g), while Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) measured only Gf, 
and therefore these studies did not assess Gf and Gc as distinct contributors when 
predicting AP. Moreover, although Stankov et al. (2012) compared confidence to other 
measures of self-belief, they did not control for intelligence or personality. These 
limitations suggest a study that measures intelligence, Conscientiousness, IC and 
confidence as predictors of AP. 
 Senior year undergraduate students provide a strong test of the predictive 
power of personality variables: they have a restricted range for intelligence, potentially 
allowing personality variables more scope to predict AP (cf. Lievens, Ones, & Dilchert, 
2009). Despite mixed evidence, we anticipated small incremental validity for IC. The 
present study included TIE, NFC, and EC, measures of Gf and Gc, all FFM variables, 
and confidence. Hypotheses tested were: 
(1) TIE predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, Gc, and FFM personality. 
(2) EC-D predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, Gc, and FFM personality. 
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(3) Confidence predicts variance in AP after controlling for Gf, Gc, and FFM 
personality. 
6.3  Method 
Participants 
Data were obtained from 219 third-year psychology students at a large 
Australian university who participated to fulfill a course practicum requirement. 
Students could withhold their data from analysis (n =3), leaving 216 responses. Age (M 
= 23.0, SD = 6.20, range 19-62 yrs) and sex (52 males, 151 females, 13 not reported) were 
reported by 203 students. Tests were administered both in-class and online using 
SurveyMonkey. Because SurveyMonkey allows participants to complete surveys across 
multiple occasions, the M and SD of completion times are affected by several outliers. 
The median completion time was about 54.5 minutes, and about 2/3 of participants 
took between 30 and 90 minutes to complete the online component. Because data 
were missing in each administration, ns differed by variable. 
Scores below 3 for Advanced Progressive Matrices—Short Form (APM–SF) and 
Cattell’s Assessment Battery—Inductive Reasoning (CAB–I) were considered insincere 
attempts (n = 18 and 13, respectively) and excluded. Scores of AP were retained only for 
students averaging ≥ 75% subject load across two years (n = 146) to allow only robust 
estimates of academic performance in the analyses. Students were informed only that 
the practical would explore individual differences in intellectual curiosity and AP.  
Measures 
Fluid Intelligence (Gf). Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices—Short Form 
(Bors & Stokes, 1998) and Inductive Reasoning from Cattell’s Cognitive Assessment 
Battery (Hakstian & Cattell, 1978) measure Gf, and were used to derive scores for Gf. 
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Crystallised intelligence (Gc). The Mill-Hill (MH) vocabulary test (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 1998) and Spot-the-Word test (STW; Baddeley et al., 1993) measure 
Gc, and were used to derive scores for Gc. 
FFM personality (FFM). The OCEANIC scale measures FFM personality traits 
(Schulze & Roberts, 2006). Here responses were on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = “never” 
to 6 = “always”), and Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .80 (Openness) to .90 
(Conscientiousness). 
Epistemic Curiosity (EC). The 10-item Epistemic Curiosity Scale measures EC-
I and EC-D factors. Here responses were on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “almost never” 
to 4 = “almost always”), and Cronbach’s alphas were .84 (I) and .86 (D). 
Need for Cognition (NFC). Here we used the positively-worded NFC scale of 
Furnham and Thorne (2013), and responses were on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
“extremely uncharacteristic” to 7 = “extremely characteristic”). Cronbach’s alpha was 
.92. 
Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE). Goff and Ackerman (1992) created 
the 59-item TIE scale to measure intellectual engagement. We changed pronouns 
from “you” to “I”, “me” or “my” for questions 2, 3, 5, 13, 23, 35, 57 and 58 to make 
statement styles uniform. In the present study, participants responded on a 6-point 
Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 6 = “strongly agree”), and Cronbach’s alpha was 
.94. 
Confidence. After each intelligence test item, participants were asked “How 
confident are you that your answer is correct?” and responded on a scale of 0–100% 
with anchors at 10% intervals (Stankov et al., 2012). Item-level scores for each scale 
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were averaged across all scale items, and confidence ratings from the four measures 
were averaged for an overall confidence score. 
AP. Each student’s average percentage grade across 2014 and 2015 was accessed 
with the student’s permission from official university transcripts.  
Procedure 
Data were collected in-class and online. Gc measures (including confidence 
ratings) were administered under supervision in a 50-minute psychology class, with 
remaining variables collected online. Section 1 was information and consent, and 
section 2 included student ID, age, sex, degree major. Section 3 measured the APM-SF 
(with confidence), and section 4 the CAB-I (with confidence). Section 5 measured FFM 
variables. Sections 6 to 8 measured NFC, EC, and TIE respectively. Section 9 measured 
reading habits (not analysed further). Data were analysed in SPSS version 23, except 
for relative importance regressions, which were conducted in R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). 
Statistical analyses 
To estimate Gf, the unrotated first principal component for APM–SF and CAB–I 
scores was extracted. To estimate Gc, the unrotated first principal component for STW 
and MH tests was extracted.  
 To assess the incremental validity of measures of IC and confidence above 
intelligence and personality measures, we compared nested regression models. Given 
negligible relationships for both TIE and NFC with AP, and their strong correlation 
with each other (r = .81), we analysed only TIE. For each regression Gf, Gc and FFM 
personality were entered first (step 1), and TIE, EC-D, or confidence entered next (step 
2). Subsequently, relative importance regressions (Grömping, 2006) estimated the 
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weight of each predictor within the final regression model. This approach averages 
predictor weights across all possible orders of entry, providing a more stable 
assessment of a predictor’s importance to the outcome variable (LMG method; 
Lindeman et al., 1980). 
6.4  Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.1. The mean for AP was 70.2%. 
Mean scores for APM–SF (M = 7.43) appeared to be higher than those reported 
previously (M = 7.01) in a university sample (Bors & Stokes, 1998), as did scores for 
CAB-I (males: M = 10.08; females: M = 9.37) compared to those reported previously 
(males: M = 8.79; females: M = 8.69) in a university sample (Hakstian & Woolsey, 
1985). These differences may be due to our exclusion of scores below 3 for both 
measures, restriction of range, and possibly reflect the Flynn effect (Flynn, 1987). 
Moreover, because the CAB-I is designed to be administered in 5 ½ minutes (Hakstian 
& Cattell, 1978), the untimed administration in the present study may have increased 
scores for this measure. However, because no measure of intelligence in the present 
study correlated substantially with AP, we do not think that a timed administration 
would have changed any conclusions. Mean scores for measures of Gc (MH = 18.06; 
STW = 48.26) were substantially lower than those reported in a validation study (24.04 
and 53.00 respectively; Baddeley et al., 1993), perhaps due to younger participants (age 


































Table 6.1       
Variable means and standard deviations, range of scores and internal consistency (alpha) 
   
Variable   N M SD Range Alpha 
     Potential Actual  
Academic performance 146 70.16 9.24 0–100 39.88–90.50 N/A 
APM-SF 186 7.43 2.51 0–12 3–12 .70 
CAB-I 193 9.55 2.43 0–12 3–12 .75 
MH 200 18.06 3.68 0–34 6–30 .70 
STW 199 48.26 5.29 0–60 30–58 .85 
Openness to Experience 201 32.45 6.84 9–54 17–54 .80 
Conscientiousness 201 37.68 7.83 9–54 15–54 .90 
Extraversion 201 33.44 7.30 9–54 15–51 .86 
Agreeableness 201 43.71 5.40 9–54 23–54 .85 
Neuroticism 201 29.49 7.54 9–54 17–53 .87 
EC 201 26.04 5.91 10–40 10–40 .89 
EC-I 201 14.44 3.06 5–20 5–20 .84 
EC-D 201 11.59 3.54 5–20 5–20 .86 
NFC 201 163.99 28.05 34–238 81–233 .92 
TIE 201 232.39 34.68 59–354 119–319 .94 
Confidence 164 67.45 13.26 0–100 30.95–91.76 .96 
 
Note. APM-SF = Advanced Progressive Matrices—Short Form; CAB-I = Cattell's Assessment Battery—Inductive Reasoning; MH = Mill 
Hill vocabulary scale; STW = Spot-the-Word test; EC = Epistemic Curiosity; EC-I = EC (Interest); EC-D = EC (Deprivation); NFC = Need 
for Cognition; TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement. 
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Mean scores for FFM variables in the present study were broadly consistent 
with those reported previously (Schulze & Roberts, 2006), although our sample 
appeared to have lower levels of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Extraversion, 
and higher levels of Neuroticism. 
Correlations between variables are presented in Table 6.2. The correlation 
between Gf and Gc was r = .19, and substantial correlations were found between IC 
measures, ranging from .51 (EC-D and NFC) to .81 (TIE and NFC). IC measures 
overlapped most substantially with Openness and Conscientiousness, consistent with 
previous findings (Goff & Ackerman, 1992). Only Conscientiousness (r = .32) and 
Agreeableness (r = .18) directly predicted variance in AP. IC measures (EC-I, NFC and 
TIE) correlated r = .16 with AP, but not significantly (ps = .051, .06 and .06, 
respectively).  
Regressions predicting AP 
The regression analyses are reported in Table 6.3. Model 1 was the base model, 
and included Gf, Gc, and FFM personality variables. Model 2 added TIE to the base 
model, and found no evidence of incremental validity. Model 3 added EC-D to the 
base model, and found no evidence of incremental validity. Model 4 added confidence 
to the base model, and found no evidence of incremental validity. In each model, 
relative importance regression indicated that Conscientiousness accounted for about 
2/3 of the explained variance, whereas no other variables predicted significant variance 





Table 6.2              
Pearson correlations between variables                         
Variable Gf Gc O C E A N EC EC-I EC-D NFC TIE Confidence 
Academic performance .01 .06 .07 .32** .15 .18* -.06 .05 .16 -.06 .16 .16 -.12 
Gf  .19* .16* -.19* -.19* -.12 -.12 .10 .13 .06 .27** .20** .40** 
Gc   .27** -.01 -.01 -.01 .07 .13 .19* .06 .31** .35** .42** 
Openness to Experience (O)    .21** .07 .16* .17* .57** .58** .45** .58** .64** .40** 
Conscientiousness (C)     .27** .35** -.04 .15* .13 .13 .24** .17* -.01 
Extraversion (E)      .24** -.30** .15* .29** .01 .19** .12 .08 
Agreeableness (A)       -.07 .07 .13 .01 .18** .12 -.04 
Neuroticism (N)        .08 -.01 .14* -.17* -.09 -.05 
EC         .88** .91** .66** .69** .28** 
EC-I          .61** .69** .72** .25** 
EC-D           .51** .53** .24** 
NFC            .81** .46** 
TIE             .42** 
 
Note. Gf = fluid ability; Gc = crystallised ability; EC = Epistemic Curiosity; EC-I = Epistemic Curiosity (Interest); EC-D = Epistemic Curiosity (Deprivation); 
NFC = Need for Cognition; TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement. 
* p < .05, 2-tailed.              





Table 6.3         
Regression model comparisons for academic performance 
 
 Model 1 (base) Model 2 (with TIE) Model 3 (with EC-D) Model 4 (with Confidence) 
 F[7, 107] = 2.39* F[8, 106] = 2.17* F[8, 106] = 2.21* F[8, 106] = 2.42* 
 Adjusted R
2
 = .08 Adjusted R2 = .08 Adjusted R2 = .08 Adjusted R2 = .09 
   Adj. R
2
 change = .00 Adj. R2 change = .00 Adj. R2 change = .01 
  β RI β RI β RI β RI 
Gf .09 .02 .09 .02 .08 .02 .13 .03 
Gc .02 .00 -.01 .00 .02 .00 .08 .02 
Openness to Experience -.09 .02 -.15 .03 -.04 .01 -.04 .01 
Conscientiousness .31** .72 .31** .68 .31** .68 .30** .61 
Extraversion .13 .15 .13 .14 .12 .13 .13 .13 
Agreeableness .07 .09 .06 .08 .06 .08 .07 .07 
Neuroticism .05 .01 .08 .01 .04 .01 .04 .01 
TIE - - .10 .04 - - - - 
EC-D - - - - -.10 .07 - - 
Confidence - - - - - - -.18 .11 
 
Note: Gf = fluid ability; Gc = crystallised ability; TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; EC-D = Epistemic Curiosity (Deprivation); R2 change = change from 
Model 1; RI = relative importance, indicating percentage of total variance attributable to the predictor. 
* p < .05, 2-tailed. 





6.5  Discussion 
Incremental validity of IC 
Results support our earlier finding (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a) that measures 
of IC possess limited or no incremental validity above intelligence and personality for 
predicting AP. Moreover, these results extend the earlier finding by obtaining AP from 
academic transcripts, measuring IC during the period of assessment for AP, and 
including a measure of Gc. Current results are consistent with Schroeders et al. (2015), 
who reported modest incremental validity above background variables (gender, 
migration, and SES), subject-specific interest, and intelligence. Thus, they add to 
growing evidence that incremental validity of IC may be limited, at least in certain 
cohorts. 
These results differ from those Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006), who found 
incremental validity for TIE above intelligence and FFM personality for various 
assessment methods. Their zero-order correlations between TIE and assessment 
methods were more substantial (range r = .28–.45) than in the present study (r = .16), 
which reduced our likelihood of finding incremental validity. Moreover, 50% of each 
psychology course grade at our university is determined by examination—the method 
of assessment with the strongest relationship to TIE (r = .45) in Chamorro-Premuzic et 
al. (2006). They also differ from the meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011), 
who concluded that IC is the “third pillar” of academic success. Currently, we cannot 
give a satisfying explanation for these differences. 
EC-D did not incrementally predict AP. Although we expected that those with 
strong high scores on this scale would strive to master subject content, its negligible 
correlation with AP did not reflect this. However, because Conscientiousness 
	 147 
accounted for about two-thirds of explained variance in AP, this study supports 
Conscientiousness as the ultimate “investment trait” for academic outcomes. 
Confidence 
In prior research, confidence is a powerful non-cognitive predictor of AP in 
secondary students (Stankov et al., 2012). However, in the present study we found a 
non-significant (and possibly negative) relationship between confidence and AP, and 
found no evidence of incremental validity. These results may have been due to the 
highly-selected nature of the sample. We conclude that the role of confidence as an 
“investment trait” remains a prospect for future research. 
Limitations 
 This study was limited because the CAB-I measure of Gf was untimed, with a 
ceiling effect suggested by higher average scores than those previously reported. 
Moreover, the findings are limited to psychology students. Although humanities 
subjects show the strongest relationship with IC (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999), it may 
be that using students from other disciplines would produce different results. 
Furthermore, we assessed only total scores for subjects, whereas prior research has 
shown that the extent of incremental validity for IC varies according to the method of 
assessment (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006). However, given that the AP scores here 
are those used to determine entry to postgraduate courses, we think these are the 
preferred outcome variable. Lastly, the limited sample size of our dataset, especially 
concerning the main variable of interest (AP), and the small number of males, meant 





Current results suggest that the usefulness of IC and confidence may be limited 
to certain situations or cohorts. Because the extent of these limits is currently unclear, 
future research should determine the conditions where these variables possesses 
incremental validity. Furthermore, despite the results in this study, we think that EC-
D has strong face validity for predicting AP. The most recent framework measuring IC 
is Intellect, developed by Mussel (2013a), whose Seek and Conquer processes overlap 
with EC-I and EC-D respectively. This scale might be used in future research. Future 
research should also assess the incremental validity of confidence in a less-selected 
sample. Finally, IC remains of special interest as a personality variable that usually 
predicts AP, and possibly is open to intervention (von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011). If so, 
future research should assess the effectiveness of interventions that aim to inspire IC 





7 STUDY 3: TESTING INVESTMENT THEORY AND 
THE INTELLECT SCALE IN UNIVERSITY 
STUDENTS 
 
7.1  Abstract 
The investment theories of Cattell and Ackerman suggest that “investment traits” are 
important factors in the investment of fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallised 
intelligence (Gc) over time. The present study aimed to assess the two investment 
traits of intellectual curiosity (IC) and confidence as predictors of domain-specific 
knowledge, and the place of reading habits in the domain of IC. Participants were 162 
(47 males) third-year psychology students (age M = 23.53) who completed measures of 
Gf, Gc, domain-specific psychology knowledge, confidence, IC, and IC reading habits. 
Results indicated that IC did not predict variance in domain-specific knowledge above 
intelligence, but that confidence did. We also tested whether IC or confidence 
moderated the influence of Gf on domain-specific knowledge, and they did not. 
Moreover, although reading habits could be re-incorporated within the IC domain, we 
doubt that this is necessary. However, the reliability of our measure of domain-specific 
knowledge was poor, and this limits the strength of our conclusions. We discuss these 
results in the context of investment theory, and suggest that confidence holds the 
most promise as a key variable in the investment process.  
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7.2  Introduction 
Investment theory 
In the history of research on human intelligence, an enduring question 
concerns the relationship between fluid intelligence (Gf; abstract problem solving 
ability) and crystallised intelligence (Gc; acquired knowledge and/or verbal ability), 
labels proposed by Cattell (1943). While these terms are well-known, he also provided 
a lesser-known account of their relationship called “investment theory” (Cattell, 1963, 
1987). From the perspective of investment theory, Cattell described the formation of 
Gc as follows: “Crystallized ability consists of discriminatory habits long established in 
a particular field, originally through the operation of fluid ability, but no longer 
requiring insightful perception for their successful operation” (1963, p. 178). Stated 
briefly, Gf is “invested” into Gc over time. 
 Cattell (1963) argued that the school system played a crucial part in this 
investment process. Compulsory education in adolescent years provides the basis for a 
broad Gc factor that emerges from the school curriculum. However, after students 
graduate from compulsory education the school curriculum would no longer connect 
Gf and Gc, and the relationship between these constructs would be expected to decay 
over time. Moreover, because adults have relatively more freedom to choose their own 
intellectual pursuits, Gc in adulthood might become very diverse, and become more 
associated with occupational than scholastic knowledge. 
 Since Cattell’s time, several authors have provided accounts that retain the 
essence of investment theory (e.g. Schweizer & Koch, 2002; Ziegler et al., 2015; Ziegler 
et al., 2012), with Ackerman’s PPIK theory (1996) being the most extensive revision. 
Ackerman appropriated Cattell’s qualification that the investment process would look 
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different in adult than adolescent populations, and provided his PPIK theory to 
describe this process as it relates to the development of intelligence in adulthood. 
PPIK defines intelligence as consisting of four related components: intelligence-as-
Process, -Personality, -Interest, and -Knowledge. Briefly, Process intelligence relates to 
Gf, and Knowledge relates to Gc, while Personality and Interest differentiate the broad 
“interest” component that Cattell (1987) identified but did not define extensively. 
More than seven decades have passed since Cattell proposed investment 
theory, and several studies have assessed its specific predictions. Here we will survey 
research relating to three such predictions. First, investment theory predicts that 
general intelligence (g) will be more similar to Gf in culturally similar cohorts, and will 
be more similar to Gc in culturally dissimilar cohorts. This prediction was assessed in 
studies by Undheim and Gustafsson (1987) and Valentin Kvist and Gustafsson (2008), 
who found it strongly supported. 
Second, investment theory predicts that because of the primacy of Gf in the 
investment process, Gf will be a leading indicator of the growth of Gc. Ferrer and 
McArdle (2004) assessed this prediction using measures of broad Gc and academic 
outcomes, and reported that changes in Gf did not predict changes in Gc, but did 
predict changes in academic knowledge. This study therefore provides mixed support 
for investment theory. And third, investment theory predicts that Gf will have higher 
heritability estimates than Gc. Kan et al. (2013) tested this prediction in a meta-
analysis that assessed the heritability of intelligence subtest scores in terms of their 
cultural load. They reported that subtests with stronger cultural loads had higher 
heritability estimates—the opposite to what investment theory would predict, and 
which the authors explained by the effects of genotypic-environmental covariance. 
	 153 
Therefore, tests of predictions that follow from investment theory have reported 
mixed support, suggesting that the investment process may be even more complex 
than even Cattell expected. However, the broad idea behind investment theory 
remains viable, even if specific details require modification. 
Investment traits 
As noted, the investment theories of Cattell and Ackerman include personality 
variables that are expected to affect how and where people apply their intellectual 
abilities. These variables have been called “investment traits” (von Stumm, Hell, et al., 
2011). Although several such traits have been identified (von Stumm & Ackerman, 
2013), here we highlight two that have been assessed in recent studies: confidence and 
intellectual curiosity (IC). 
Confidence. An important individual difference variable that has the 
hallmarks of an investment trait is confidence. Confidence has been assessed using 
either the “self-report” or “online” approaches. While the self-report approach relies 
on self-report questionnaires in the manner of personality research, the online 
approach attaches the question “How confident are you that your answer is correct?” 
to each item in a test administration, and participants respond on a percentage scale. 
These ratings are then averaged to provide an overall confidence score (Stankov et al., 
2015). A recent study has shown that these approaches produce distinct confidence 
factors: the self-report approaches produces a factor that resembles personality 
variables, while the online approach produces a factor that resembles ability variables 
(Burns et al., 2016). However, because the online approach has been assessed more 
regularly as a predictor of academic achievement (e.g. Stankov et al., 2012), we will use 
this approach in our study. Furthermore, Stankov (2013) has connected confidence 
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with investment theory: “It seems reasonable to assume that self-beliefs and 
confidence in particular are the most potent forces that lead to the development of 
crystallized intelligence as postulated by the investment part of the theory of fluid and 
crystallized intelligence” (p. 731). Therefore, confidence merits further consideration as 
an investment trait. 
Intellectual curiosity. In recent years, IC has also regularly been investigated 
as a predictor of academic outcomes. All other things being equal, students who have 
stronger IC should engage more actively in intellectual pursuits than those with 
weaker IC, and therefore obtain higher grades. The current evidence for the 
incremental validity of IC is mixed: while several studies conclude that it shows 
substantial incremental validity (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006; von Stumm, Hell, et 
al., 2011), other studies have provided less optimistic conclusions (Powell & Nettelbeck, 
2014a; Schroeders et al., 2015). The reason for these different results is uncertain at 
present. 
The Intellect scale 
Several measures of IC have been identified in distinct research domains, 
especially Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Typical Intellectual 
Engagement (TIE; Goff & Ackerman, 1992), Epistemic Curiosity (Litman, 2008), and 
the facet Openness to Ideas (OI) within the Openness to Experience factor (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992b). These measures have been shown to correlate substantially and show 
only modest discriminant validity (Mussel, 2010; Powell et al., 2016; Woo et al., 2007), 
indicating that they might be used interchangeably (von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011). The 
most recent and theoretically driven attempt to assess IC is the Intellect framework 
(Mussel, 2013a). This framework defines Intellect along two dimensions, labelled 
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Process and Operations. Process includes two aspects, labelled Seek and Conquer. 
While Seek curiosity relates to pursuing new areas of intellectual interest, Conquer 
curiosity relates to mastering areas of interest once they have been encountered 
(Mussel, 2013a). Operations relates to three specific activities (Think, Learn, and 
Create) and draws upon theories that derive from intelligence research (e.g. Carroll, 
1993). When combined, the contents of Process and Operations produce six distinct 
facets. The 24-item scale that accompanies the framework has been shown to relate 
closely to NFC, TIE, and EC, and thus addresses the same broad construct. However, 
as none of the other IC scales appear to measure creativity, this is a novel 
contribution. 
Limitations 
However, there are several questions within this field that have not been 
answered clearly, and here we identify three limitations that are worth addressing. 
First, while Cattell (1963) included academic performance as a form of Gc, he also 
considered non-achievement variables (including general knowledge) to be forms of 
Gc. It is not yet clear whether the investment process operates differently for academic 
outcomes compared to non-academic outcomes. For instance, Conscientiousness has 
proved to be a consistent predictor of academic achievement (Poropat, 2009, 2014; von 
Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011), but may not influence investment outside the academic 
domain. In short, some investment traits may only influence particular investment 
outcomes. Therefore, a study that assesses Gc in terms of domain-specific general 
knowledge, instead of academic outcomes, may provide evidence of incremental 
validity for IC where this has been reported to be lacking (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a). 
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Second, the difference between adolescent and adult populations means that 
testing investment theory requires a distinct approach for each group—something not 
all studies have recognised (e.g. Christensen et al., 2013). However, a potential way 
around this difficulty might be to assess a subset of adults who are exposed to a 
common curriculum, in parallel with the curriculums of the primary and secondary 
school systems. Tertiary education provides this opportunity: because students within 
an academic program are exposed broadly to the same content, the investment 
process should operate here as it does in cohorts undertaking compulsory education. 
Moreover, university students acquire domain-specific knowledge rapidly, and provide 
an excellent chance to see “investment” in action. The ideal students to assess may be 
those in their final year of their tertiary education, because their longer exposure to 
course knowledge may provide more opportunity for the influence of investment traits 
to become apparent.  
And third, the place of reading habits in the IC domain remains currently 
unknown. Among the five main scales that measure IC (TIE, NFC, EC, OI, and 
Intellect), only TIE measures reading habits (Powell et al., 2016). Moreover, Mussel 
(2013a) reported TIE’s reading scale to have inadequate psychometric properties, and 
thus excluded reading from the Intellect framework. Consistent with this finding, 
Powell et al. (2016) reported that TIE’s reading items associated more strongly with 
their first-order factor than the general TIE factor, indicating that reading may not fit 
within this domain. However, it is noteworthy that the TIE scale was published in 
1992, well before the Internet became an important source of information. Therefore, 
an updated reading scale including both traditional and online reading habits, and 
that is written to align with the Seek and Conquer dimensions of the Intellect scale, 
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may possess better psychometric properties, and fit more closely with the other factors 
in this domain. It would also provide an opportunity to test the properties of the 
Intellect scale in an English-speaking sample. 
The present study 
Considering the limitations listed above, the aim of the present study was to 
test Cattell’s investment theory in an adult university population using a non-
achievement measure of Gc, and to assess whether reading habits might be 
incorporated within the Intellect domain. Cattell’s theory suggests that investment 
traits moderate the relationship between Gf and Gc, and we will therefore assess them 
using a moderation analysis. The present study tests the following hypotheses: 
(1) IC possesses incremental validity above Gf for domain-specific 
knowledge. 
(2) IC moderates the relationship between Gf and domain-specific 
knowledge. 
(3) Confidence possesses incremental validity above Gf for domain-specific 
knowledge. 
(3) Confidence moderates the relationship between Gf and domain-specific 
knowledge. 
 (5) Items designed to measure an Intellect–Read factor will load 
substantially on a general factor from across the Intellect scale. 
(6) When assessed in a latent variable model consistent with the Intellect 




7.3  Method 
Participants 
Initial participants were 200 third-year psychology students who participated as 
part of a third-year course, and were informed only that their practical work 
concerned individual differences in IC and its relationship with achievement. Eleven 
cases were removed due to lack of consent. Moreover, because investment theory 
suggests that the investment of Gf into Gc should become stronger over longer time 
periods, 27 students studying a compressed one-year graduate entry program were 
excluded from analysis, leaving data for 162 students. Age was reported for 152 
students (47 males; age M = 23.53, SD = 7.26). Scores that were deemed to indicate 
insincere attempts at APM-SF (< 3: n = 3) and Gc (psych) (< 5: n = 2) were also 
removed. The project received ethics approval, and informed consent was obtained for 
all students included in the final dataset.  
Measures 
APM-SF. Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices-Short Form is a subset of 12 
items correlating highly with the original scale, and validated for use with university 
students with Cronbach’s alpha = .73, and test–test reliability = .82 (Bors & Stokes, 
1998). It is a widely-accepted measure of Gf. Participants chose one of eight multiple-
choice answers. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .68. 
STW. The Spot-the-Word test is a verbal measure of Gc (Baddeley et al., 1993). 
Participants are presented with 60 pairs of English words, with each pair containing 
one real and one made-up word, and participants are asked to identify the real word. 
It is administered in 5 minutes, and in the present study its Cronbach’s alpha was .90. 
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Gc (psych). We developed a domain-specific measure of psychology 
knowledge specifically for this study. Rather than composing original questionnaire 
items, we used items from the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) Psychology 
practice test. In the United States, GRE tests are used to assess suitability for graduate 
programs, and these tests (including practice tests) are designed to measure 
knowledge gained from undergraduate programs. 
 However, given the length of the full practice test (approximately 205 items) 
and differences between psychology programs in the US and elsewhere, we selected a 
subset of items to be administered. The first author selected an initial pool of 60 
items, from which all three authors chose 20 items that they judged best spanned the 
content of our university’s psychology program. Our aim was to produce a measure of 
psychology general knowledge that overlapped with course content, but was distinct 
from course grades. Participants selected one of five possible multiple-choice answers. 
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .48 
Confidence. Measures of confidence were attached to the measure of Gc 
(psych) using the “online” approach (Stankov et al., 2015). Participants were asked 
“How confident are you that your answer is correct?” and responded on a scale of 0–
100% with anchors at 10% intervals (Stankov et al., 2012). Item-level scores for each 
scale were averaged across all scale items to produce a measure of confidence for each 
participant. 
Intellect. Mussel’s (2013a) Intellect scale is composed of 24 items that assess 
personality traits related to intellectual achievement. Participants responded to each 
item on a 6-point Likert scale (0 = “never” to 6 = “always”). In the present study, 
Cronbach’s alpha was .96. 
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Intellect–Read. To develop a scale that assesses reading habits related to 
intellectual achievements, we composed 24 questionnaire items from which to select 
eight to form a reading factor. Because the Intellect Scale assesses Seek and Conquer 
processes, we worded 12 items to align with each process. Moreover, because both 
books and the Internet are now significant sources of information, each group of 12 
included six items assessing reading books and six assessed online reading. We 
conducted a principal component analysis on each group of six items, and retained the 
two items that loaded most strongly on the first principal component. These eight 
items formed the Intellect–Read scale, and are listed Table 1. Cronbach’s alpha was .93, 
which could not be improved by removing any items. Moreover, pooling these items 
with those from the full Intellect scale produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .97, which 
could not be improved by removing any items. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the APM-SF, the Gc (psych), and the STW test in a 
psychology lecture under test conditions, with time constraints of 15, 20, and 5 
minutes respectively. Subsequently, the remaining variables were collected online 
using SurveyMonkey. In order of administration, this administration included: (1) 
information and consent; (2) ID, age, sex, and degree major; (3) a measure of five-
factor model personality (not analysed further); (4) the Need for Cognition scale (not 
analysed further); (5) the Intellect scale and reading items from which would be 
reduced to compose the Intellect–Read scale; and (5) contact details for the study.  
Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted in SPSS version 24, except for the Schmid-
Leiman transformation conducted in R (R Development Core Team, 2014). 
	 161 
7.4  Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Descriptive statistics for all analysed variables are presented in Table 7.1. The 
average score for APM-SF appeared to be slightly higher than that obtained for 
students in the same class the previous year (M = 7.40), possibly because this year’s 
administration was in-class under test conditions rather than online. The average 
score for STW appeared to be slightly lower than that obtained in a validation study 
(M = 53.00), possibly because the validation study involved participants of high verbal 
ability (Baddeley et al., 1993). 
 
Table 7.1       
Variable means and standard deviations, range of scores and internal consistency 
(alpha) 
 
Variable n M SD Range Alpha 
        Potential Actual   
APM-SF 140 7.89 2.29 0–12 3–12 .68 
STW 144 43.09 9.22 0–60 18–57 .90 
Gc (psych) 142 12.66 2.44 0–20 6–20 .48 
Confidence 143 52.29 14.79 0–100 9.50–88.42 N/A 
Intellect 152 86.19 20.6 24–144 26–141 .96 
Intellect–Read 152 27.45 9.14 8–48 8–48 .93 
 
Note: APM-SF = Advanced Progressive Matrices–Short Form; STW = Spot-the-Word test; Gc (psych) 
= crystallised intelligence psychology knowledge. 
 
The Gc (psych) measure was developed for this study, so there is no available 
comparison data. Its purpose was to discriminate between students’ levels of 
psychology general knowledge, and the mean (12.66), standard deviation (2.44) and 
range (6-20) indicated that it succeeded in this regard. However, its alpha reliability of 
.48 was unacceptable, indicating that the items do not assess a single dimension—
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probably because they spanned several distinct domains of psychology knowledge. 
Removing five items improved the alpha to .52, but it could not be improved further. 
However, removing these five items attenuated the correlations between Gc (psych) 
and other variables, and did not improve its predictive validity in the regression 
models. Moreover, because the improved alpha of .52 was still unacceptable, we 
retained all 20 items for Gc (psych) in the final analyses. Confidence ratings were 
attached to Gc (psych) items, and confidence ratings suggested an average score of 
10.5/20 compared with the obtained average of 12.7/20, suggesting underconfidence in 
this sample. 
 Intellect scores obtained here are not comparable to the validation studies of 
Mussel (2013a) because of different scale anchors, but the alphas in the present study 
(.96) and in the validation studies (.93 and .94) were comparable and very high. As 
reported below, Cronbach’s alpha for Intellect–Read (.93) was very high for an 8-item 
scale, and the overall alpha when from 32 items pooled from the Intellect and 
Intellect–Read scales was extremely high at .97. 
Sex differences were tested for all variables. Male scores for Intellect (M = 92.51) 
were higher than female scores (M = 83.36; t (150) = 2.58, p = .01) with a medium effect 
size (d = .46). This is consistent with our findings on other measures of IC in a similar 
cohort, where males reported significantly higher levels of Need for Cognition than 
females (Powell et al., 2016). No other sex differences were obtained in the present 
study. 
 Correlations between variables are presented in Table 7.2. A moderate 
correlation was obtained between APM–SF and STW, consistent with many studies 
that show overlap between measures of Gf and Gc (e.g. Goff & Ackerman, 1992). The 
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moderate correlation between APM–SF and Gc (psych) could be explained by 
investment of Gf into Gc over time, or by the fact that those with higher Gf are more 
capable in test situations. Unexpectedly, Intellect and Intellect–Read did not correlate 
significantly with APM–SF, but did show weak-to-moderate correlations with STW, 
indicating a more substantial overlap with Gc than with Gf A strong correlation was 
obtained between Gc (psych) and confidence, probably because confidence ratings 
were yoked to this test. Finally, a strong correlation was obtained between Intellect 
and Intellect–Read, which is expected given the content of these scales. No other 
correlations were statistically significant.  
 
Table 7.2      
Pearson correlations between variables 
 
   
Variable STW Gc (psych) Confidence Intellect Intellect–Read 
APM–SF .23** .25** .12 .02 .03 
STW   .12 .11 .17* .19* 
Gc (psych)     .48** .00 .11 
Confidence       .03 .03 
Intellect         .83** 
Note: APM–SF = Advanced Progressive Matrices–Short Form; STW = Spot-the-Word test; Gc (psych) 
= crystallised intelligence psychology knowledge. 
* p < .05, 2-tailed.     
** p < .01, 2-tailed.     
 
Regression models 
Stepwise hierarchical multiple regression was used to test hypotheses 1–4 in 
this study, where the outcome variable was Gc (psych). Because of the possibility of 
multicollinearity with the interaction terms, all predictor variables analysed in the 
regression models were transformed into z-scores. 
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Assumptions. Assumptions underlying multiple regression were tested for 
each analysis. Using the transformed variables, no violations of multicollinearity were 
found from the correlations of predictors with one another (r > .7) or considering 
Tolerance and VIF statistics. Moreover, scatterplots revealed no violations of 
normality, linearity, or homoscedasticity, indicating the that the data were suitable for 
regression analysis. 
Incremental validity and moderation. To assess the incremental validity of 
IC and Confidence over Gf for predicting domain-specific knowledge we used stepwise 
hierarchical multiple regression—reported in Table 7.3. Models 1–3 assessed Intellect 
as a predictor of Gc (psych). Step 1 was the base model and included only APM–SF. 
Step 2 added Intellect, which explained no significant additional variance. Step 3 
added an interaction term between APM–SF and Intellect, which explained no 
significant additional variance. Therefore, IC did not possess incremental validity over 
Gf for predicting domain-specific knowledge, and did not moderate the relationship 
between Gf and domain-specific knowledge. These results do not support hypotheses 1 
or 2.  
Next, models 4–6 assessed Confidence as a predictor of Gc (psych). Step 1 was 
the base model and included only APM–SF. Step 2 added Confidence which explained 
significant and substantial incremental variance above step 1. Step 3 added an 
interaction term between APM–SF and Confidence, which explained no significant 
additional variance. Therefore, IC possessed incremental validity over Gf for 
predicting domain-specific knowledge, but did not moderate the relationship between 
Gf and domain-specific knowledge. These results support hypothesis 3 but not 





 Table 7.3       
Regression model comparisons for predicting Gc (psych) 
     
  Model 1 (base) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 (base) Model 5 Model 6 
 F[1, 128] = 11.13** F[2, 127] = 5.57** F[3, 126] = 3.71* F[1, 135] = 9.06** F[2, 134] = 24.99** F[3, 133] = 16.55** 
 R2 = .08 R2 = .08 R2 = .29 R2 = .06 R2 = .27 R2 = .27 
   R2 change = .00 R2 change = .01  R2 change = .21** R2 change = .00 
Predictor Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
APM–SF .28** .28** .29** .25** .19* .19* 
Intellect - .03 .02 - - - 
APM–SF x Intellect - - -.03 - - - 
Confidence - - - - .46** .46** 
APM–SF x Confidence - - - - - .02 
 
Notes. APM–SF = Raven's Advance Progressive Matrices (Short Form). 
* p < .05, 2-tailed. 
** p < .01, 2-tailed. 
165 
	166 
Analysis of the Intellect–Read scale 
To assess the Intellect–Read scale, we decided first to conduct an exploratory 
factor analysis on the items pooled from the Intellect scale (24 items) and the 
Intellect–Read scale (eight items). We first assessed the suitability of the scale items 
for component analysis, which was confirmed by a KMO value of .94 and a significant 
result for Bartlett’s test of sphericity. To determine the number of factors or 
components to extract, we used the scree test (Cattell, 1966) and Horn’s Parallel 
analysis (Horn, 1965). Using Principal Component Analysis, the scree plot showed a 
single, domain component, and little-to-no evidence of more components. Parallel 
analysis using a 95th percentile criterion suggested a root value cutoff of 1.94 for a 
second component, which exceeded the root value of 1.87 in the dataset. When 
considered alongside the Cronbach’s alpha of .97 for all 32 items, this analysis strongly 
suggests the presence of a single factor that overarches this domain, which lead us to 
extract a single principal component. The component matrix is reported in Table 7.4. 
The Intellect–Read items are spread throughout component loadings, and appear to 
be indistinct from the Intellect items. This analysis supports hypothesis 5.
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Table 7.4   
First principal component loadings for Intellect and Intellect–Read items 
  
Scale and Item number Item Loading 
Intellect 15 I take the time to investigate practical solutions until I have discovered the underlying theory. .83 
Intellect 20 Once I have become familiar with a new subject, I cannot rest until I have understood it. .82 
Intellect 4 I enjoy occupying myself with theories that are new to me. .80 
Intellect 16 Once I get to know a new theory, I cannot rest until I have understood it fully. .80 
Intellect 8 I find it fun getting familiar with new subjects. .80 
Intellect–Read 4 I become absorbed reading about new theories online. .79 
Intellect–Read 2 I become absorbed reading books about new theories. .78 
Intellect–Read 5 I spend a lot of time reading books to learn everything I can about a subject. .78 
Intellect–Read 6 I read books in order to conquer topics that are important to me. .77 
Intellect 17 I take a lot of time so as to gain in-depth understanding of a new process. .76 
Intellect–Read 7 I often surf the net, reading everything I can about a subject. .76 
Intellect 6 I enjoy learning about subjects that I’m not familiar with. .75 
Intellect 3 Regarding practical problems, I’m also interested in the underlying theory. .75 
Intellect 21 I give a lot of time to developing new ideas until they are fully developed. .74 
Intellect 18 I concentrate on new subjects for as long as it takes to learn everything about them. .74 





Intellect 7 I find it fascinating learning new things. .72 
Intellect 24 When I’m developing something new, I can’t rest until it’s completed. .72 
Intellect–Read 1 I enjoy reading books on subjects that are new to me. .71 
Intellect 19 If there is something that I don’t know or have not understood, I spend a lot of time on it. .70 
Intellect 11 I enjoy developing new concepts. .69 
Intellect 22 I persevere with the development of new products until they are ready. .69 
Intellect 9 I like being part of developing new ideas. .69 
Intellect 12 I enjoy developing something new. .68 
Intellect–Read 8 I spend a lot of time reading online about particular subjects. .68 
Intellect 1 I enjoy solving complex problems. .68 
Intellect 13 I take time thinking about complex problems until I have found a solution. .65 
Intellect 5 I would like to learn new ways of doing things. .64 
Intellect 2 I enjoy puzzling and thinking things out. .64 
Intellect 23 When I am working on a new concept, I make every effort to see it through to an end. .62 
Intellect 10 I enjoy developing new products. .61 






To assess the sixth hypothesis, we produced two latent variables models 
informed by Intellect framework. Model 1 was equivalent to Model 1 reported by 
Mussel (2013a, pp. 893-4)—the model with the closest fit among those he compared, 
and which included the two processes and three operations. Our Model 2 also 
included two processes, but added Read as a fourth operation. This allowed us to 
compare the fit of the models without and with the Read operation, and also to 
compare our results directly with those of Mussel (2013a). Fit statistics are reported in 
Table 7.5, and Models 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, respectively. 
 
 
The main difference apparent between Model 1 in both datasets was that the 
relationship between Seek and Conquer processes was stronger in our data (.90) 
compared with Mussel’s (.44).14 Possibly because of this difference, this model 
attributed more variance in our data to the processes, whereas it attributed more 
variance in Mussel’s data to the operations. These different results may have been due 
to different characteristics in the sample population. 
																																																						
14 Given the strong overlap between the processes in our data, we also assessed a bi-
factor model (with a single process factor), but this did not provide a superior fit.  
Table 7.5 
Results from confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Model c2 df c2 / df CFI RMSEA 
M1 678 262 2.59 .84 .10 
M2 1203 477 2.52 .82 .10 
 
Note. n = 152; M1 = model without Read scale (equivalent to M4 in Mussel [2013], p. 894); M2 = model 
with Read scale; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square 
error of approximation. 
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Neither model showed evidence of close fit according to conventional 
standards (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Although fit statistics were close for the two models, 
CFI was slightly better for M1. Moreover, as is apparent from figure 2, the correlation 
between Read and Learn operations was very strong (.93), indicating that these items 
measure virtually the same latent construct. Therefore, in the interests of theoretical 














Note. Figure displays standardised estimates from CFA Model 1 (reported in Table 5). Item codes follow 
the pattern: scale (I = Intellect), Process (S = Seek, C = Conquer), Operation (T = Think, L = Learn, C = 
Create), item number. Thus, IST 1 = Intellect Seek Think item 1. Loadings and covariances are next to 






Standardised estimates for Model 2 
 
 
Note. Figure displays standardised estimates from the CFA Model 2 (reported in Table 5). Item codes 
follow the pattern: scale (I = Intellect), Process (S = Seek, C = Conquer), Operation (T = Think, L = 
Learn, C = Create, R = Read), item number. Thus, ICR 4 = Intellect Seek Read item 4. Loadings and 





7.5  Discussion 
 We will discuss the significance of these results in four sections: (1) investment 
theory, (2) the Intellect framework, (3) limitations, and (4) future directions.  
Investment theory. The present study was novel because it directly compared 
the predictive power of two distinct investment traits, IC and confidence. Despite 
their associations with investment theory, the lines of enquiry for each of these 
variables have remained separate, as we know of no other study that has compared 
them. Only confidence explained incremental variance in domain-specific knowledge, 
and this is consistent with Stankov’s suggestion that measures of self-belief generally, 
and confidence in particular, are the “most potent” forces in the investment process 
(2013, p. 731). 
These results add to the growing body of evidence that the predictive power of 
IC may differ by the population being assessed, and provide further evidence that 
confidence is an important predictor of learning outcomes above the influence of 
intelligence. Moreover, the absence of interaction effects indicates that the 
contributions of intellectual ability and investment traits are independent of one 
another. However, these findings and their potential implications for investment 
theory remain speculations because of several limitations in this study—especially the 
poor reliability of the scale measuring Gc (psych), discussed below. 
The Intellect framework. This study is also relevant to the Intellect 
framework proposed by Mussel (2013a) and other approaches to measuring IC. 
Although TIE includes items assessing reading habits, no other scale measuring IC 
does so. Practically, the very high reliability indicates that the English translations of 
the original German items measure a unitary construct in this Australian population. 
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Furthermore, these findings indicate that readings habits could be added to this scale, 
as reliability improved slightly with their inclusion (Cronbach’s alpha increased from 
.96 to .97). Theoretically, however, this addition may not advance the Intellect domain 
very far, as this scale already includes the operation Learn—an activity that surely 
includes reading habits. Moreover, if the reading items are virtually indistinguishable 
from the existing items, there is no clear benefit from adding them. Thus, we suggest 
that the Intellect scale already captures essence of reading habits that relate to IC, and 
does not need to include this activity formally. 
Limitations. We will discuss three significant limitations with the present 
study. A first, major limitation was the poor reliability of the scale designed to 
measure Gc (psych), indicating that this scale does not assess a single, broad factor of 
psychology knowledge. This might have been due to the lack of a fully-fledged 
validation process, where many items are administered initially, and reduced 
subsequently based on factor loadings. It may also indicate that psychology knowledge 
in psychology students is composed of relatively discrete domains, and that assessing 
investment theory as it relates to domain-specific knowledge would require a still 
narrower sampling of knowledge.  
A second limitation relates to the measure of domain-specific knowledge itself. 
Because we selected questionnaire items that overlapped with course content, it could 
be argued that what we have measured is in fact a variable that captures academic 
achievement, albeit loosely. Although we have not reported the FFM variables that we 
measured as part of this study, the correlation between Conscientiousness and Gc 
(psych) was negligible and non-significant (r = .02, p = .83). Given the robust 
associations reported between Conscientiousness and course outcomes (e.g. Schuler et 
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al., 2007), this lack of relationship suggests that our measure of Gc (psych) is not 
simply a proxy for academic achievement. However, we could have tested this idea 
more effectively had we assessed university grades in this study. 
 A third limitation of the present study was its correlational design. Investment 
theory suggests that the Gf is invested in Gc over time, so the present study at best 
could have provided results that are consistent with investment theory without 
providing definitive proof. A stronger test would involve a longitudinal study of 
change in the variables, ideally from the beginning to the end of an academic 
program. 
Future directions. This study suggests several possible future directions. First, 
it would be helpful to replicate the approach we have advocated here, but with a more 
robustly-developed measure of domain-specific knowledge. This would likely include 
a two-stage process, where (1) a large initial pool of questions is used to derive a scale 
that measures domain-specific knowledge, and (2) subsequently this scale is used in a 
study like the present study. This would help to assess whether our finding that 
confidence predicted more variance in domain-specific knowledge than IC is robust, 
or is due to this scale’s poor reliability.  
 Second, future studies might re-assess the claim that IC is the “third pillar” of 
academic performance alongside intelligence and Conscientiousness (von Stumm, 
Hell, et al., 2011). Although several studies have reported that IC possesses incremental 
validity when predicting academic outcomes (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006; 
Furnham et al., 2009; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011), other studies have been less 
optimistic (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a; Schroeders et al., 2015). The explanation for 
these different results is currently uncertain. We note that the meta-analysis of von 
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Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) used TIE as the measure of IC, but that the meta-analytic 
correlations were based on very few studies, which calls their robustness into 
question. Moreover, von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) report associations between 
several investment traits and investment outcomes, and indicates that there are 
substantially more studies associating NFC with academic performance than there are 
for TIE. Given the strong association between these constructs (Powell et al., 2016), it 
may be enlightening to substitute NFC for TIE and assess this question again with a 
larger dataset.  
 Third, the present study indicates that Confidence deserves further attention as 
a predictor of investment outcomes. To our knowledge, this is the only study that has 
compared directly IC and Confidence as they relate to learning outcomes. Although 
Confidence possessed substantial incremental validity above intelligence, this finding 
should be replicated for the reasons noted above. Moreover, although few studies 
associate Confidence with intelligence, personality variables, and academic 
performance, more such studies might permit the approach of von Stumm, Hell, et al. 
(2011) to be used for Confidence rather than IC. If any broad conclusion can be drawn 





8 STUDY 4: THE UNSTEADY PILLAR—A 
CRITIQUE OF VON STUMM, HELL, AND 
CHAMORRO-PREMUZIC (2011) 
 
8.1  Abstract 
“The Hungry Mind: Intellectual Curiosity is the Third Pillar of Academic Performance” 
(von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2011) has been an influential study since its 
publication. However, here we challenge its major conclusion, and seek to clarify what 




8.2  Introduction 
In the field of personality predictors of academic performance (AP), an 
influential study in recent years has been von Stumm, Hell, and Chamorro-Premuzic 
(2011). Based on a path model using meta-analytic coefficients, the authors argued that 
intellectual curiosity (IC) has been established as the “third pillar” of academic 
performance, together with general intelligence (g) and Conscientiousness. Although 
we do not dispute the associations presented between intelligence and AP, and 
between Conscientiousness and AP, we are not persuaded that the relationship 
between IC and AP has been demonstrated sufficiently. In the present study, we 
critique the approach taken by the authors, and provide what we think are more 
adequate interpretations of the research available. 
The authors focused on Typical Intellectual Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 
1992) as a marker of IC. While acknowledging that TIE is a valid measure of IC, we 
suggest that the evidence base at the time of the publication was insufficient to 
support their conclusion. Moreover, we argue that the true relationship between TIE 
and AP may be substantially weaker than is suggested by the path coefficient reported 
by von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011). Our critique comprises four parts: Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and Academic Performance; the Incremental Validity of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement; Need for Cognition and Academic Performance; and 
Alternative Path Models. 
8.3 Typical Intellectual Engagement and Academic Performance 
A crucial component of the argument advanced by von Stumm, Hell, et al. 
(2011) involved calculating the meta-analytic correlation between TIE and academic 
performance (AP). The authors provided an estimate of ρ = .328 between TIE and AP, 
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with a 95% confidence interval of .17 to .49 using a random effects model. This interval 
width is clearly due to the small number of studies (k = 4) and overall participants (N 
= 608).  
 However, the calculation of the TIE–AP correlation appears to have been based 
on an error. Although the studies were listed as k = 4, two of the correlations were 
drawn from the same study (Wilhelm et al., 2003). Given that participant numbers for 
both studies were identical (n = 183), these correlations appear to have been grades for 
different subjects using the same students. A more suitable method would have been 
to average correlations between TIE and the grades (-.26 for humanities GPA and -.37 
GPA for Science GPA)15, resulting in r = -.32, and reducing the overall number of 
studies (k = 3) and participants (N = 425).  
 Indeed, this approach was used in the subsequent meta-analysis by von Stumm 
and Ackerman (2013), who reviewed correlations available between TIE and AP. Here, 
the same three studies were used to calculate the meta-analytic correlation, and the 
corrected correlation reported was ρ = .29 (reduced from .33), with confidence 
intervals .05 to .50 (random effects model). Therefore, although the relationship 
between TIE and AP is likely positive, the range of possible values is very wide. Using 
this corrected correlation changes the values in the path model of von Stumm, Hell, et 
al. (2011), weakening the path between TIE and AP in the final model. Moreover, given 
the very limited number of studies available, this correlation will be influenced by any 
correlations reported subsequently.  
																																																						
15 The negative correlations were due to the German system of assessment, where 
lower numbers represent better grades. These were reversed for the meta-analysis. 
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The three correlations used by von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) to estimate the 
relationship between TIE and AP varied considerably—r = .04 (Goff & Ackerman, 
1992), r = -.32 (Wilhelm et al., 2003), and r = .36 (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006)—as 
have the correlations reported subsequently. In our research, we have obtained zero-
order correlations of r = .35 (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a) and .16 (Powell, Nettelbeck, & 
Burns, 2017) between TIE and AP, while Schroeders et al. (2015) reported r = .27 
between TIE and mathematics achievement in German secondary students. Although 
two of the values were not statistically significant (Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Powell, 
Nettelbeck, & Burns, 2016), these observations suggest that the correlation between 
TIE and AP is positive but varies considerably in magnitude from study-to-study. As 
we demonstrate below, gauging the strength of this correlation accurately is crucial to 
evaluating von Stumm et al.’s (2011) conclusion. 
8.4  The Incremental Validity of Typical Intellectual Engagement 
The aim of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) appeared to be to demonstrate the 
incremental validity of TIE for AP beyond known major predictors, via meta-analysis. 
We are aware of four studies that have attempted this; surveying them highlights the 
strengths and weaknesses of the meta-analytic approach.  
The strongest evidence comes from Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006), who 
obtained substantial incremental validity for TIE beyond variance explained by 
intelligence and Five Factor Model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992a) personality 
measures in 104 university psychology students (range 3–9% depending on the method 
of assessment). However, the correlation between TIE and Openness to Experience in 
this study was low (r = .24) compared with other studies (usually around .6), the 
sample size was small, and we are not aware of another study replicating this result. 
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In a sample of 7,207 German secondary students, Schroeders et al. (2015) 
reported substantial zero-order relationships between TIE and AP for mathematics 
and science subjects. However, after controlling for fluid intelligence, gender, 
migration background, SES, and subject-specific interest, TIE showed only limited 
incremental validity (range 0.5–1.8% across academic subjects). Notably, this study did 
not assess other personality variables (such as Conscientiousness)—doing so would 
likely have reduced the incremental validity of TIE further. The authors concluded 
that the evidence for incremental validity for TIE was marginal for mathematics and 
science subjects, but noted that it may be more substantial for humanities-type 
subjects. 
 In our own research, using first-year psychology students (Powell & Nettelbeck, 
2014a), we reported a correlation of r = .35 between self-report AP (university entrance 
scores) and TIE measured about six months later. However, we found little evidence of 
incremental validity for TIE beyond fluid intelligence and Conscientiousness (about 
1.8%), and no significant incremental validity for other IC measures (Need for 
Cognition, Epistemic Curiosity, and the Intellect scale from the International 
Personality Item Pool). In another study using third-year psychology students (Powell 
et al., 2017), we obtained a non-significant correlation of r = .16 between TIE and AP, 
measured by average percentage grades across second and third-year subjects. 
However, we found no incremental validity whatsoever for TIE beyond variance 
explained by fluid (Gf) and crystallised (Gc) intelligence, and FFM personality.  
 Therefore, despite the apparent similarity between these approaches, the extent 
of incremental validity for TIE has varied substantially. The strength of an approach 
such as von Stumm et al.’s (2011) is the same as for any meta-analyses: it allows a more 
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robust estimate of the relationships between variables where those relationships can 
be affected by the context in which they are measured. However, this is also the 
weakness of such an approach: meta-analysis is not intended to accommodate 
contextual issues, and conclusions do not aim to explain variation between the studies 
they integrate. Given the inconsistent nature of evidence reviewed here, we suspect 
that this may be the case for the incremental validity of TIE. 
8.5  Need for Cognition and Academic Performance 
As several authors have observed, TIE is one of many scales measuring IC (e.g. 
Mussel, 2010; von Stumm & Ackerman, 2013; von Stumm, Hell, et al., 2011; Woo et al., 
2007). Another measure is Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which 
has been shown to correlate very strongly with TIE. Our own studies have found 
correlations of r = .86 (Powell et al., 2016) and .81 (Powell et al., 2017) between these 
measures, and Mussel (2010, 2013a) has reported correlations of .75 and .73, 
respectively. Woo et al. (2007) obtained r = .78, and concluded that these scales assess 
essentially the same construct. Moreover, studies that have measured both scales 
report similar patterns of association between these measures and a number of 
outcome variables (e.g. Mussel, 2010; Woo et al., 2007). 
Our research on AP has found near-identical correlations between AP and both 
TIE and NFC: Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported correlations for AP with TIE and 
NFC of r = .35 and .33 respectively, and Powell et al. (2017) reported correlations of .16 
in both cases. The magnitude of their relationship is similar to different measures 
assessing the same FFM construct, and their principal difference is that TIE includes 
reading habits while NFC does not (Powell et al., 2016). All things considered, 
however, we concur with the assessment of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011): 
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That is, measures of intellectual investment and curiosity have matching 
conceptual roots, include semantically identical items, and share criteria 
validity for academic performance and intelligence; therefore, they appear to 
assess the same trait dimension, and corresponding scales might be 
interchangeably used. (p. 577) 
 
Furthermore, the review by von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) indicated that 
NFC has received more extensive research than TIE as a predictor of AP. They 
identified 12 studies (N = 2,998) correlating NFC with AP, but only three (N = 425) on 
TIE—and the vast majority of the NFC studies were available in the few years before 
the publication of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011). Their review also indicated that more 
correlations are available between NFC and Gc: they reported 16 (N = 5,164) 
correlations between NFC and Gc, but only seven (N = 1,487) between TIE and Gc. 
Given this substantial overlap, and that meta-analyses generally are stronger when 
they include more correlations, the decision of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) to use 
TIE instead of NFC is questionable. We will return to this point shortly.  
8.6  Alternative Path Models 
Given the above considerations, we have re-run the path models presented by 
von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011), but substituted alternative values for correlations 
involving TIE and AP. This exercise demonstrates that ostensibly minor changes can 
induce substantial variation in such models, and emphasises the tentative nature of 
conclusions based on limited evidence. Table 8.1 presents the correlations between the 
all variables, reproduced from von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011). We began by using these 




Meta-analytic correlation matrix from von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) 
 
Variable g AP C TIE 
General intelligence (g) -    
Academic performance (AP) .39 -   
Conscientiousness (C) -.04 .24a -  
Typical Intellectual Engagement (TIE) .22 .33 .28 - 
 
Note. Reported sample sizes ranged from N = 608 [actual 425] to N = 28,471 [actual 68,063]. 
a 
von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) reported this correlation inconsistently as ρ = .24 (p. 581) and .23 
(p. 584), but appear to have used .24 in the final model. The original study of Poropat (2009, p. 















Path model from von Stumm, Hell, and Chamorro-Premuzic (2011)	
TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; g = general intelligence; C = 
Conscientiousness; AP = academic performance. 
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For the second model, we used the corrected correlation between TIE and AP 
(ρ = .29, random effects) provided by von Stumm and Ackerman (2013). This resulted 
in the modified path model presented in Figure 8.2. The broad pattern of relationships 
was similar for the two models, but the strength of the direct path from TIE to AP was 
reduced from the estimate in the initial model. Using this model to estimate these 
variables as predictors of AP, we would conclude that intelligence is most important 
predictor, followed by Conscientiousness, followed by TIE. 
 
However, we suggest that the most informative approach appears in Figure 3. 
In our third model, we substituted the correlation provided by von Stumm and 
Ackerman (2013) between NFC and AP, reported as ρ = .22 (random effects). We 
noted, however, that this figure was overstated due to several clerical errors, 
especially: (1) the correlation between NFC and AP obtained by Taube (1995/1997) was 
reported as r = .30, while the original study reports .16; and (2) the correlation between 











Alternative path model using corrected value (ρ = .29) for TIE 
TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; g = general intelligence; C = 
Conscientiousness; AP = academic performance. 
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study reports -.14. Although we estimated that these corrections reduced the 
correlation between NFC and AP to approximately ρ = .20 (95% CI .13–.27), we lacked 
details on which random effects model von Stumm and Ackerman (2013), and 
therefore retained their original value of ρ = .22. Using this higher estimate served to 
overstate the unique contribution of NFC as a predictor of AP in our final model. 
 
 This path model changed substantially different the models presented in 
Figures 1 and 2. Although intelligence and Conscientiousness remained substantial 
predictors, the distinct contribution of NFC became marginal. When the strengths of 
the paths from predictors to AP were re-calculated as percentages of the total 
explained variance for AP, general intelligence was the most powerful predictor (55%), 
Conscientiousness was substantial but less powerful (35%), while NFC predicted very 











Alternative path model substituting NFC value (ρ = .22) for TIE value 
NFC = Need for Cognition; g = general intelligence; C = 
Conscientiousness; AP = academic performance. 
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TIE, this lead to an appreciably different conclusion about TIE as a predictor of AP 
than von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) provided.16 
8.7  Discussion 
Let us be clear: we are not arguing that we can simply substitute the value for 
NFC for the value of TIE and thereby discount the conclusion of von Stumm, Hell, et 
al. (2011). Our position is that, given strong correlations between NFC and TIE, and the 
limited research correlating TIE with AP, we think that an accurate assessment of the 
relationship between TIE and AP is currently very difficult to make. However, if this 
correlation lies at the lower end of its probable range—and the association of NFC 
with AP suggests that it may be closer to r = .2 than .3—then the conclusion that IC is 
the “third pillar of academic performance” becomes untenable. 
Meta-analyses have an important place in the hierarchy of research, for the 
obvious reason that their conclusions are based upon a larger body of research than 
provided by individual studies. However, they cannot be stronger than the evidence 
base they synthesise. Although we have not specifically taken issue with the general 
approach of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011), we think that their conclusion was 
premature—at least in the case of TIE. The more extensive research on NFC make it a 
stronger candidate for such an analysis, although our observations suggest that it may 
account for less variance in AP than does Conscientiousness.  
 Our intention is not to dismiss research to date in this field. Although we 
remain agnostic about whether IC is vitally important for AP (consistent with our 
studies), intuition suggests that it must play some role. However, in scientific 
																																																						
16 Moreover, when we used our estimate of ρ = .20 for the NFC–AP association in this 
model, these figures become 57% (g–AP), 35% (C–AP), and 7% (NFC–AP, p = .12). 
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research, we heed the general caution of Josh Billings: “Wisdum don’t konsist in 
knowing more that iz new, but in knowing less that iz false” (Billings, 1874, p. 430). We 
conclude that the definitive study showing the significance of IC for predicting 






9.1  Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the overall significance of the studies within this 
thesis. First, it will re-state the Findings of each study briefly. Second, it will discuss 
the Implications of these findings in terms of investment traits, incremental validity, 
and investment theory. Third, it will provide Future Directions in four possible follow-
up studies. Fourth, and finally, it will provide a Concluding Statement. 
9.2  Findings 
Here, the findings of the present series of studies will be summarised briefly. 
The first study assessed the number of factors to be found across items drawn from 
the TIE, NFC, and EC scales, and identified six: Intellectual Avoidance, Deprivation, 
Problem Solving, Abstract Thinking, Reading, and Wide Interest. It provided evidence 
for a higher-order factor that spanned these items and accounted for about 2/3 of the 
explained variance, while the first-order factors accounted for the remaining 1/3. It 
also included a Schmid-Leiman analysis indicating that items pertaining to the 
Reading factor loaded predominantly on their first-order factor, while the other factors 
loaded predominantly on the higher-order factor—indicating that reading habits (as 
measured by the TIE scale) may not fit within the IC domain. Moreover, a relative 
importance regression indicated that the three scales measured different profiles of 
factors; for instance, only the TIE scale measured Reading, and only the EC scale 
measured Deprivation (or D-type curiosity). 
The second study aimed to replicate and extend the approach used in my 
honours study (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a) in order to assess the incremental validity 
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of IC and confidence for predicting AP. Measures of Gf and Gc, FFM personality, two 
measures of IC (TIE and EC-D) and a measure of online confidence were used. No 
measure of IC possessed incremental validity for predicting AP above intelligence and 
FFM personality, and neither did confidence. Moreover, confidence appeared to 
possess a non-significant negative relationship with AP in this study. This unusual 
finding requires further research to substantiate. However, Conscientiousness 
remained a powerful predictor in each regression, and accounted for around 2/3 of 
explained variance. In conclusion, while this study did not provide support for the 
incremental validity of IC or confidence, it provided further support for the critical 
importance of Conscientiousness as an investment trait for academic outcomes.  
The third study aimed to test investment theory in an adult population using 
university students, and whether reading habits could be incorporated within Mussel’s 
Intellect domain. The investment theories of Cattell and Ackerman suggested that 
crystallised ability—the outcome of the investment of fluid ability—would become 
increasingly narrow once students left compulsory education, and therefore difficult 
to test in adults. Therefore, using psychology students, this study assessed whether the 
proposed investment traits of IC and confidence predicted incremental variance in 
domain-specific psychology knowledge above Gf, and whether these traits moderated 
this relationship. Here, confidence predicted variance in the outcome variable above 
Gf while IC did not, and neither showed any evidence of moderation. However, the 
measure of domain-specific psychology knowledge had poor reliability, which 
weakens the strength of this finding. Moreover, although the reading scale developed 
to complement the Intellect scale improved overall reliability, evidence from 
confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the Reading scale was likely to be 
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redundant within this framework. In conclusion, this study suggested that confidence 
held more promise as an investment trait than did IC, and that there was no obvious 
benefit to incorporating reading habits within the Intellect scale. 
 Given the general lack of incremental validity obtained in Studies 2 and 3, 
Study 4 re-examined the argument of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) that IC is the 
“third pillar” of academic performance alongside intelligence and conscientiousness. It 
was argued that the correlation between TIE and AP—on which their conclusion 
depended heavily—was miscalculated, and was based on three rather than four 
studies. This meant that the confidence intervals were wider than those reported, and 
called into question the accuracy of their obtained estimate. Moreover, although 
estimates for the TIE–AP correlation were around ρ = .3 (based on three correlations), 
TIE and NFC correlated very strongly, and estimates for the NFC–AP correlation 
(using 12 correlations) were closer to ρ = .2, suggesting that the best estimate for the 
TIE–AP correlation is probably nearer ρ = .2 than .3. When the NFC–AP correlation 
was substituted for the TIE–AP correlation, the path estimate for NFC–AP was 
reduced substantially. Given these issues, this study concluded that the true degree of 
incremental validity for IC was difficult to estimate at present, and that a definitive 
study on IC as a predictor of AP had not yet been published.  
9.3  Implications 
When these results are considered in the context of other research on these 
issues, several implications emerge. These include implications for investment traits, 





Although many variables might function as investment traits, two are 
considered that have been identified previously as potentially important in this 
connection: IC and confidence. This section will address theoretical issues relating to 
measuring these traits, while the next section will assess their practical relevance as 
incremental predictors of academic performance. 
Intellectual curiosity. As has been stated several times already, there are 
several measures spread across diverse domains of research that measure IC. The 
present studies have provided further evidence on which to judge whether one (or 
more) of these scales is the most suitable to use in future research. To assess this 
question, we will consider six issues: (1) the existence of a higher-order IC factor, (2) I-
type and D-type curiosity, (3) reading habits, (4) creativity, and (5) negatively-worded 
items, and (6) IC within the investment process. 
Higher-order intellectual curiosity factor. Several lines of evidence from our 
studies indicate that a broad factor for IC overarches the content of these scales—as 
was suggested by Tanaka et al. (1988). Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a) reported that a 
single factor extracted from the scale totals of the TIE, NFC, EC, and IPIP–Intellect 
scales accounted for 72% of the explained variance across these scales. This result was 
consistent with the finding of Mussel (2010) who reported that a single factor 
extracted from the totals of six IC scales accounted for 67% of the explained variance. 
The findings of the Study 1 also provided support for the existence of a higher-order 
factor that spanned all the factors identified through exploratory factor analysis, 
except for Reading. This finding is consistent with the validation study of Mussel 
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(2013a), who found that several constructs (including TIE, NFC, and EC) could be well-
integrated within the Intellect domain.  
Further, Study 3 has a more minor bearing on this issue, suggesting that 
reading habits are more closely aligned with this broad construct than other studies 
have indicated—discussed further below. The existence of this broad factor does not 
diminish the importance of its sub-factors, but it does indicate that this domain 
possesses a hierarchical structure. The conclusion here is that the ideal measure of IC 
would possess a hierarchical structure: a broad factor that overarches several 
theoretically-distinct but related sub-domains. 
I-type and D-type curiosity. The findings of the Study 1 also provided support 
for the distinctiveness of D-type curiosity within the IC domain. Of the IC scales 
assessed (TIE, NFC, and EC), only EC measured D-type curiosity. Because the 
motivation behind D-type curiosity is argued to come from discomfort arising from a 
perceived lack of knowledge (rather than I-type, argued to arise from the enjoyment of 
learning), this construct appears to be a theoretically distinct aspect of information-
seeking behaviour. This position has been supported empirically by research on 
systems of the brain that are engaged for I-type and D-type curiosity (Litman, 2005), 
by evidence suggesting that I-type curiosity overlaps more with tolerance for 
ambiguity, whereas D-type curiosity overlaps more with need for closure (Litman, 
2010); and by cross-cultural research showing differential relationships between these 
constructs and measures of self-regulation (Lauriola et al., 2015). Taken together, these 
results suggest that future research within the IC domain should use a comprehensive 
framework that assesses both I-type and D-type curiosity. 
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 Reading habits. The findings of the Study 1 indicated that the reading habits 
measured with items from the TIE scale are distinct from a broad factor overarching 
items from TIE, NFC, and EC scales. This raised the possibility that reading habits did 
not fit within the IC domain. However, Study 3 tested this idea by administering a 
reading scale developed specifically to align within Mussel’s Intellect framework. 
Results indicated that these items were essentially redundant within the model. This 
being so, there is no obvious benefit in adding them to the existing scale, because its 
reliability of .96 is already extremely high. Although reading habits are almost 
certainly a core activity of those who are high in IC, they do not appear to provide 
additional explanatory power, and the Learn operation within the Intellect scale 
probably includes variance explained by reading habits. Based on the present studies, 
therefore, it is concluded that although reading habits could be added to the Intellect 
domain, there would be little point in doing so. 
 Creativity. Creativity has been discussed as part of major theories of 
intelligence (e.g. Carroll, 1993; Sternberg, 1984), potentially making its contribution in 
the domain of curiosity important to measure. Within the Intellect framework, Mussel 
(2013a) defined the Create operation as the “personality component of contributing 
toward creative intellectual achievements”, whereby those who possess higher levels 
are oriented toward “novel and unusual solutions” (Mussel, 2013a, p. 3). 
Several studies have assessed the relationship of creativity with intelligence. 
Kim (2005) conducted a meta-analysis assessing the relationship between creativity 
and intelligence, and reported findings that did not support the “threshold” theory—
i.e. that IQ and creativity would be related up to, but not beyond, a threshold of IQ 
(possibly around 120). Instead, Kim (2005) reported correlations between different 
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ranges of IQ and creativity of around r = .2, which indicated that the two domains 
overlap only modestly. However, Silvia (2008) argued that this association may have 
been attenuated because it was assessed using observed rather than latent variables; 
his own study reported a more substantial regression coefficient of β = .43, indicating 
moderate overlap between creativity and IQ. Following this line of enquiry, Nusbaum 
and Silvia (2011) assessed this overlap in terms of executive function, and argued that 
so-called “divergent” and “convergent” thinking may be more similar than has often 
been assumed. Moreover, other studies have also assessed the association between 
personality variables and measures of creativity (Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina, 2010; 
Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008), and have reported substantial associations between some 
FFM variables (especially Extraversion) and creativity—although the overlap was 
stronger when creativity was assessed as a self-report rather than as an ability trait. 
Although this survey is not exhaustive, the trend in this research relating 
creativity to intelligence and personality variables appears to be drawing these 
variables together into a closer theoretical account—a trend that is consistent with the 
approach that informs the Intellect framework. Indeed, Loewenstein (1994) noted 
concerning curiosity, cognitive ability, and creativity, “…it would be disturbing not to 
find a positive interrelationship among these three constructs” (p. 79). However, of the 
major measures of IC surveyed here, only the Intellect scale measures creativity. It is 
concluded here that the ideal scale measuring IC would include creativity as a 
component. 
 Negatively-worded items. A final consideration is the issue of whether the 
results of factor analyses of IC scales have been affected by the presence of negatively-
worded items. Bors et al. (2006) assessed this issue for the NFC scale, and concluded 
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that item polarity was responsible for producing trait-method factors. However, 
Furnham and Thorne (2013) factor-analysed a 34-item positively-worded NFC scale, 
and found evidence for three factors—indicating that the multiple factors identified 
previously for the 34-item NFC scale may not simply have been due to item-polarity. 
Given these issues, it remains possible that the factor labelled Intellectual Avoidance in 
Study 1 was a method factor caused by negatively-worded items. If so, a factor analysis 
of positively-worded equivalent items from across these scales may have yielded only 
five factors. Given this uncertainty, it is suggested that in future the ideal scale would 
have only positively-worded items, to avoid this potential confound. 
 Intellectual curiosity within the investment process. Although the results 
of the studies reported here, which have assessed the incremental validity of IC (and 
Confidence) for predicting AP, also inform this issue, we will discuss these matters in a 
separate section below. Study 3 assessed whether the investment process could be 
observed through the relationships between Gf, IC, and acquired domain-specific 
psychology knowledge in university students. Contrary to expectations, this was not 
demonstrated in this study—although the poor reliability of the measure of domain-
specific psychology knowledge may have obscured these relationships. The finding 
(discussed below) that Confidence predicted variance beyond variance explained by Gf 
in domain-specific knowledge suggests that this variance was, at least in part, able to 
be predicted, despite the poor alpha. Moreover, outside the academic context, much 
of the evidence for IC as an investment trait relies on the work of Ackerman, whose 
studies have provided evidence that is consistent with the idea that personality 
variables relating to IC influence the degree to which adult knowledge is acquired. 
However, the present studies have found little evidence that IC is uniquely important 
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in the investment process, Nonetheless, it is recognised that this suggestion must be 
tempered by other evidence suggesting that IC might be important to investment. 
Confidence. In addition to the implications of these findings for IC, they also 
relate to interest in confidence as a variable that influences investment. Two issues are 
addressed here: (1) the overlap of confidence with personality variables, and (2) 
confidence within the investment process.  
Overlap of confidence with personality variables. Burns et al. (2016) 
assessed confidence in both online and self-report forms, and concluded that self-
reported confidence overlaps more substantially with FFM personality (especially 
Emotional Stability/Neuroticism), and that online confidence overlaps more 
substantially with abilities. However, an overlap between Openness to Experience and 
online confidence was also reported by Stankov and Lee (2008), who yoked confidence 
assessments to measures of verbal comprehension. In Study 2, confidence correlated 
negligibly and non-significantly with FFM variables, except for its moderate 
correlation with Openness to Experience (r = .40, p < .01). Moreover, confidence also 
overlapped substantially with measures of IC (TIE: r = .42; NFC: r = .46; EC: r = .28; all 
ps < .01), indicating that a significant overlap may exist between the IC domain and 
confidence. Nonetheless, although the FFM variables were not reported in the 
analyses, in Study 3 confidence did not correlate significantly with any FFM variable, 
nor with any measure of IC (Intellect, OE, and NFC). At this stage no firm conclusion 
can be drawn about a relationship between IC and confidence, and further research is 
required. 
A possible explanation for this discrepancy concerns how confidence was 
measured: Study 2 attached confidence ratings to measures of intelligence, whereas 
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Study 3 attached them to the experimental measure of domain-specific psychology 
knowledge. Therefore, it was possible that in Study 2 the overlap between confidence 
and both Openness to Experience and IC variables was due to their shared variance 
with intelligence. However, this possibility was tested by calculating their partial 
correlation controlling for Gf and Gc, and all these correlations remained significant 
and substantial (OE: r = .32; TIE: r = .29; NFC: r = .34; EC r = .23; all ps < .01). This 
suggests that these associations are not due simply to the shared associations with 
intelligence.  
To interpret this overlap, it is tempting to suggest that confidence and 
Openness to Experience correlate because they both are located within a broad 
domain that encompasses these (and possibly other) investment traits. Potentially, 
higher levels of confidence may predispose individuals to engage in new experiences 
and to entertain new ideas, fostering greater Openness to Experience and IC over 
time. However, this speculation is highly tentative, and requires substantially more 
research to evaluate it. In conclusion, research has yet to establish a clear pattern of 
association between online confidence and FFM variables—possibly except for 
Openness to Experience. 
Confidence within the investment process. Study 3 found that the 
confidence ratings yoked to a measure of cognitive ability predicted substantial 
variance in domain-specific psychology knowledge. This finding is consistent with 
investment theory, and with Stankov’s suggestion that confidence may be a uniquely 
important metacognitive trait that serves to assess a person’s strengths and weakness, 
and indicates where best to apply his or her intellectual abilities (Stankov, 1999, 2013; 
Stankov & Lee, 2017). Moreover, it provides some evidence that the process of 
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investment may be observable in adults if the outcome measures are constrained 
appropriately to relevant domain-specific knowledge—despite the strength of this 
evidence being weakened by the poor reliability of the outcome measure. This is also 
consistent with the study of Rolfhus and Ackerman (1999), who demonstrated that 
personality variables (TIE and Openness to Experience) and interest types predicted 
adult domain-specific knowledge in the a way consistent with PPIK theory. It is 
concluded that the studies reported here have provided qualified evidence for 
confidence as an investment trait. 
Conclusion. When considered in the context of available research, the present 
studies support the use of the Intellect scale as a reliable and theoretically-informed 
measure of IC. This scale assesses IC as a hierarchical structure, measures both I-type 
and D-type curiosity (reconfigured as Seek and Conquer processes, respectively), 
excludes reading habits, assesses creativity and does not contain negatively-worded 
items. Moreover, it captures the essence of existing scales within this domain, and its 
high reliability has been demonstrated now in both German and Australian samples. It 
is concluded that Mussel’s Intellect scale is the best current measure of the IC domain, 
and should be used in future research. 
Furthermore, findings reported here suggest that the domains of IC and 
confidence may overlap substantially, and that future studies should attempt to assess 
their relationship more thoroughly. Moreover, this direct comparison of these 
investment traits suggests that confidence may be the more promising candidate—





From investment theory, it follows that investment traits should possess 
incremental validity above intelligence and FFM variables. Here, the contribution of 
the present studies to assessing the incremental validity of IC will be considered under 
two headings: (1) the extent of incremental validity for IC, and (2) the variability of IC–
AP associations. 
The extent of incremental validity for intellectual curiosity. Here, the 
studies assessing the incremental validity of IC measures for predicting AP will be 
divided into three categories: substantial incremental validity, modest incremental 
validity, and no incremental validity. Only a single study appears to have provided 
strong evidence of incremental validity, that of Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006), 
which demonstrated that TIE explained 3–9% more variance than did cognitive ability 
and FFM personality measures in a sample of university students. Although von 
Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) might also be placed in this category, that study will be 
addressed below. 
Several studies have indicated only modest incremental validity for measures of 
IC. Furnham et al. (2009) assessed the contribution of TIE in the context of measures 
of cognitive ability and FFM personality for British secondary students. In their 
regressions, TIE only added 2–3% incremental validity above demographic variables 
and cognitive ability—FFM variables were then added in the final step. Powell and 
Nettelbeck (2014a) assessed the incremental validity of several measures of IC for 
university entrance scores, and found that TIE predicted 1.8% incremental variance 
above cognitive ability and Conscientiousness, while NFC, EC, and IPIP-Intellect 
predicted no significant incremental variance. Consistent with this, in a large-scale 
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study assessing German secondary students, Schroeders et al. (2015) reported 
incremental validity of 0.5–1.8% across several subjects for TIE after accounting for 
gender, migration background, SES variables, subject-specific interest, and fluid 
intelligence. Notably, this study did not assess FFM personality variables; it is possible 
that including these (especially Conscientiousness) may have eliminated entirely the 
reported incremental validity of TIE. Finally, the second study reported here found no 
incremental validity in AP for measures of IC above cognitive ability or FFM variables 
within a university population. Therefore, having added the present studies to the 
extant research, it is concluded that evidence for the incremental validity of IC 
remains mixed.  
This state of affairs calls into question the meta-analysis of von Stumm, Hell, et 
al. (2011), and especially its conclusion that IC is the “third pillar” of academic 
performance, with a predictive power rivalling that of Conscientiousness. It also raises 
the question of how to explain this variability among different studies, a question that 
is now addressed. 
 The variability of IC–AP associations. It is suggested that the incremental 
validity of IC varies because the associations between different measures of IC and AP 
also vary substantially. Although only a few studies have assessed the question of 
incremental validity, far more have reported zero-order correlations between IC and 
AP. In this regard, Study 2 found zero-order correlations between AP and both TIE 
and NFC fell short of statistical significance (r = .16, p = .06), and, most importantly, 
they did not predict incremental variance above measures of intelligence and FFM 
personality variables. This study therefore indicated only a modest overlap between IC 
and AP. 
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 The most relevant research with which to compare the results of Study 2 is that 
of Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006), which used a very similar approach and a similar 
sample. Interestingly, this study reported an uncommon pattern of relationships 
between TIE, Openness to Experience, and the four measures of AP. The correlation 
between TIE and Openness to Experience was unusually low (r = .24, p < .05)—
especially considering theoretical debate concerning whether these are in fact the 
same construct (Ackerman & Goff, 1994; Rocklin, 1994). This low correlation may also 
have been responsible for the differential patterns of relationship between these 
variables and the four measures of AP, where TIE predicted substantial variance in 
each AP measure (ranging from r = .28 to .45, all p < .01), while Openness to 
Experience predicted no significant variance in any AP measure (ranging from r = -.13 
to .11, all p > .05). The TIE appears to have been the standard scale (Goff & Ackerman, 
1992), and the established measure of the NEO-FFI was used to measure FFM 
personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992b). Moreover, in the final regression model assessing 
the incremental validity of TIE, Conscientiousness was not a significant predictor of 
variance in AP—an uncommon finding. 
It is plausible that these unusual relationships may reflect idiosyncrasies of the 
sample, and do not call into question the results themselves. A possible explanation 
for this discrepancy concerns the selection procedures for university courses, where 
differences between approaches in Britain and Australia may result in less restriction 
of range for academic ability in one of these groups. Overall, however, when the 
results of Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2006) are considered alongside Study 2, they 
indicate that further research is required to understand the reasons for the substantial 
variability observed for associations between IC and AP. 
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 The variability among correlations between IC and AP at the meta-analytic 
level is now considered further. As noted in Study 4, von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) 
compared the correlations between AP and both NFC and TIE, and reported 
correlations of ρ = .22 (AP–NFC; random effects model) and .29 (AP–TIE). Although 
this would appear to indicate that TIE predicts AP more substantially than does NFC, 
there are two prima facie reasons from the current studies that suggest doubt about 
this: (1) the manifest correlations between these variables in current studies have been 
very strong, being r = .87 and .81 (Powell & Nettelbeck, 2014a; Powell et al., 2017, 
respectively); and (2) the correlations between these variables and AP are nearly 
identical, being r = .35 and .33 for TIE and NFC respectively (Powell & Nettelbeck, 
2014a), and r = .16 for both (Powell et al., 2017). Therefore, the reason for the 
substantial difference in meta-analytic coefficients must lie elsewhere. 
A likely explanation for this difference concerns the cohorts in question: the 12 
studies assessing the AP–NFC correlation all assessed university students, while two of 
the three studies assessing the AP–TIE relationship used secondary students. Given 
the considerations listed above, for this exercise it is assumed that their correlations 
with AP were interchangeable. The studies reported in von Stumm and Ackerman 
(2013) plus those from the present series of studies, Powell and Nettelbeck (2014a), and 
the study of Furnham et al. (2009), were grouped according to educational level. This 
resulted in four correlations between TIE/NFC and AP for secondary students with a 
median correlation of r = .33, and 15 correlations between TIE/NFC and AP for tertiary 
students with a median value of r = .20. Therefore, based on this limited evidence, the 
association between IC and AP appears to be stronger in secondary students than in 
tertiary students. This point is highly significant, and has strong implications for the 
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approach of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) who treated secondary and tertiary cohorts 
interchangeably; whereas the evidence available suggests that they are not. Moreover, 
results from Study 4 have indicated that what might appear to be a trivial difference 
between correlations of ρ = .3 and .2 for the IC–AP relationship results in a non-trivial 
difference for the final model.  
Conclusion. Therefore, it can be concluded that the evidence available for the 
incremental validity of IC provides mixed support, which moderates the sweeping 
conclusion of von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011). Moreover, there is sufficient variability in 
the underlying associations between IC and AP to warrant further investigation for 
why this might be so. 
Investment Theory 
Assimilation or accommodation? As Chapter 1 made clear, investment 
theory has received mixed support from studies that have assessed it. This should not 
be surprising because a theory first proposed some 70 years ago has had ample time 
for its predictions to be assessed and challenged. To help assess the status of 
investment theory, a key part of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (Piaget, 
1964) will be invoked. Although Piaget formulated this theory to account for 
childhood cognitive development, it also captures the process by which theories 
mature. 
 Piaget argued that the development of knowledge structures in children 
involves three related processes: assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration. 
Defined briefly, assimilation means fitting new knowledge within existing knowledge 
structures, accommodation means modifying knowledge structures to fit new 
knowledge, and equilibration is the process that regulates assimilation and 
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accommodation. When the knowledge structures are in equilibrium—that is, when 
knowledge structures are sufficient to make sense of new information—assimilation is 
preferred, but when they are in disequilibrium, accommodation takes place to return 
the system to equilibrium (Piaget, 1964). 
 If investment theory is assessed in Piagetian terms, the weight of evidence 
contradicting some of its basic assumptions indicates that assimilation is no longer an 
option. In this regard, the judgment of Schweizer and Koch (2002) seems appropriate: 
“The failure to confirm a basic assumption of a theory leaves two alternatives: 
rejection or revision. The high intuitive appeal of Investment Theory suggests that 
revision should be preferred over rejection” (p. 59). Therefore, to survive, investment 
theory must be developed to accommodate the evidence that has accumulated since 
Cattell proposed it.  
 Increased complexity. The kind of changes that investment theory must 
undergo will very likely make it more complex, because this appears to have been the 
case for each suggested revision since its proposal. Three issues in particular suggest 
the need for a more complex investment theory: state and trait curiosity, genotypic-
environmental covariance, and the Dickens and Flynn model of the development of 
intelligence. These will be surveyed in turn. 
State and trait curiosity. As noted in Chapter 2, a longstanding issue is the 
relationship between state and trait measures of curiosity. The example of Epistemic 
Curiosity illustrates this: its early history under Berlyne involved the state approach, 
whereas its latter history under Litman, Mussel, and others has involved the trait 
approach, as have approaches to most other recent measures of IC. This shift in 
approach may have been driven by convenience, because self-report personality 
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questionnaires are easier to administer than experimentally manipulating curiosity 
itself in a laboratory setting. However, this time-saving probably has come at the cost 
of further explanatory power that could be provided by a more complex model. 
In this regard, the model of Litman, Hutchins, et al. (2005) maintains the state-
trait distinction. It suggests that a chain reaction takes place between components of 
curiosity: trait curiosity exerts an influence on state curiosity, which then influences 
exploratory behaviour. According to this model, someone who possesses strong trait 
curiosity is differentially more likely to experience strong state curiosity than someone 
with less trait curiosity. Although situational factors should also be expected to 
influence state curiosity, ultimately it is state curiosity that is proposed to be the 
proximal cause of exploratory behaviour—a view affirmed by Loewenstein (1994), who 
argued that state curiosity held “greater promise” than trait curiosity for predicting 
behaviour (p. 79). If this model is correct—or is at least a closer approximation of the 
real-world relationship between these variables—then approaches that assesses only 
trait measures of curiosity are missing critical information. Including all relevant 
variables would have the potential to provide a more powerful account of the variables 
that are the consequence of exploratory behaviour—including academic achievement, 
knowledge, or other forms of Gc. Therefore, although state and trait approaches to 
curiosity probably measure constructs that overlap substantially, these are not 
identical, and a more complex revision of investment theory might seek to integrate 
both aspects of curiosity. 
Genotypic-environmental covariance. Another issue that demonstrates 
clearly the need for a more complex formulation of investment theory is the mounting 
evidence for the significance of genotypic-environmental covariance. Cattell’s view on 
	208 
the relative heritability of Gf and Gc made much intuitive sense: Gf should have 
relatively stronger heritability because it derives from innate, biological capacities, 
while Gc should have relatively weaker heritability because it is determined largely 
from cultural preferences. However, recent evidence indicates that this is not the case 
(Kan et al., 2013), leading to discussions around the important contribution of 
genotypic-environmental covariance. 
This issue will be returned to shortly, but it should be noted that both Cattell 
and Ackerman remarked that the investment process would probably be more 
complex than either of their theories indicated. This applies both to the issue of the 
relationship between Gf and Gc, and to the relationship between interests and 
abilities. Explaining his rationale for preferring the labels Gf and Gc over “process” and 
“product” respectively, Cattell (1963) suggested that: 
 …the capacity to learn is not only a function of the process (fluid ability) but 
often of the product, as well as of personality and motivation. Particularly when 
aids have been acquired, the rate of learning is a function not only of fluid 
ability but of the crystallized products of former application of process. (1963, p. 
2, footnote 2) 
Moreover, Ackerman (1996) made a similar suggestion concerning the relationship 
between interests and abilities, suggesting that they might develop “along mutually 
causal lines”: 
That is, abilities and interests develop in tandem, such that ability level 
determines the probability of success in a particular task domain, and 
personality/interests determine the motivation for attempting the task. Thus, 
subsequent to successful attempts at task performance, interest in the task 
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domain may increase, along with the knowledge level for that task. Conversely, 
unsuccessful attempts at task performance may result in a decrement in 
interest for that domain… (1996, pp. 244-5, italics in original) 
Therefore, although a superficial reading of their theories may suggest simple, 
directional relationships between the components of intellectual investment, both 
authors clearly recognised that real-world investment would contain a level of 
complexity that exceeded their theoretical specifications.  
Returning to the issue of Cattell’s heritability estimates, probably the most 
powerful challenge to this aspect of investment theory has been the landmark study of 
Kan et al. (2013), who concluded that the most heritable abilities are also the most 
culture-dependent, and that a test’s loading on a factor for general intelligence is a 
function of its cultural load. Moreover, it has also become clear that heritability 
estimates of general intelligence gradually increase with age, rising from about 20% in 
infancy to around 80% in adulthood (Plomin & Deary, 2015). These findings obviously 
contradict Cattell’s intuition about the relative heritabilities of Gf and Gc, and 
highlight the need for a more elaborate account of the relationship between these 
variables. 
 To explain these relationships, the contribution of genotypic-environmental 
covariance has been proposed. Briley and Tucker-Drob (2013) have suggested that 
genotypic-environmental covariance comes in two forms, labelled innovation and 
amplification. In the early developmental period (up to around 8 years) they found 
evidence for genetic innovation, where genes that were previously inactive are 
“switched on” because of environmental effects. However, in the latter developmental 
period (after about 8 years) they reported that genetic amplification took over, where 
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propensities conferred by genes are amplified subsequently by environmental factors. 
Thus, in contrast to a simplistic, directional view where nature is static and nurture is 
dynamic, this viewpoint suggests that both are dynamic and interact in complex ways.  
Dickens and Flynn model of intelligence. In this regard, Dickens and Flynn 
(2001) have provided a detailed account of how nature and nurture might interplay in 
the development of intelligence. Flynn (1984, 1987) drew attention to the very 
substantial increase of scores on intelligence tests across the twentieth century of on 
average approximately 3 IQ points every 10 years—the so-called Flynn Effect. He has 
argued extensively that this rise cannot be due solely to genetic factors, and must 
therefore be caused by changes in the environment. However, because heritability 
estimates indicate that intelligence is highly heritable—possibly being around .75 
(Neisser et al., 1996)—this results in the so-called IQ paradox expressed in the 
question: How can IQ be strongly heritable and yet be strongly influenced by the 
environment? 
Dickens and Flynn (2001) developed their model of intelligence to resolve this 
paradox. This demonstrates how interaction between genetic and environmental 
factors might account for the observed rise in intelligence test scores. In brief, the 
model specifies that small initial differences in cognitive ability conferred by genes are 
then amplified by the environment—the “amplification” noted by Briley and Tucker-
Drob (2013). This amplification is proposed to take place through the influence of 
individual multipliers and social multipliers. On the one hand, individual multipliers 
are environmental factors that operate on an individual level. For instance, a student 
who has inherited slightly greater cognitive potential than another student might be 
placed in a class for gifted students, which increases this initial difference and allows 
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this student to excel academically, gain entry to university, and increase this 
difference further. Over the course of many years, this small initial advantage becomes 
large, partly through individual multipliers. On the other hand, social multipliers 
operate on society broadly, and increase a population’s ability at a task. Universal 
education could function as a social multiplier, where education is provided to an 
entire population, thereby increasing the knowledge base of everyone within that 
population. Overall, this approach suggests that including the influence of both 
individual and social multipliers can account for the observed, dramatic rise of IQ 
scores across the twentieth century—by modelling explicitly the kind of complex 
interactions that take place in the real world. 
 Connecting these last two issues, it is likely that investment theory needs to 
become sufficiently complex to deal with the issue of genotypic-environmental 
covariance, and that the Dickens and Flynn model of intelligence may highlight how 
this can be done. It has become clear that the relationship between Gf and Gc cannot 
be expressed merely by pointing a causal arrow from the former to the latter; the 
arrow very likely points in both directions. Moreover, it is possible that investment 
theory has received mixed support because the reciprocal relationship between Gf and 
Gc, and probably between these and proposed investment traits, has not been 
modelled adequately. Cattell recognised the need for this complexity, and Ackerman 
expressed it more fully in PPIK. However, when considering the complexity of 
genotypic-environmental covariance, future researchers may need to make investment 
theory more complex still, possibly by incorporating interaction and/or multiplier 




In conclusion, multiple lines of evidence surveyed in this section indicate that 
the investment process is complex—probably much more complex than current 
investment theories have indicated. Given the state-trait distinction, the issue of 
genotypic-environmental covariance, and the instructive parallel of the Dickens and 
Flynn model of intelligence, investment theory will likely need to become more 
complex to model effectively the investment process in the real world, and therefore 
to remain relevant. 
9.4  Future Directions 
These considerations point to several potential follow-up studies, and four are 
suggested here: (1) a meta-analysis of NFC and AP, (2) a replication of Study 3, (3) the 
development of an objective measure of curiosity, and (4) a revision of investment 
theory. These are now considered in turn, ordered from least to most difficult. 
Meta-analysis of Need for Cognition and Academic Performance 
 An obvious future direction would be to repeat the approach of von Stumm, 
Hell, et al. (2011) using NFC instead of TIE. Although von Stumm, Hell, et al. (2011) 
stated that they chose TIE over other IC measures because it had attracted the most 
research attention, this claim is clearly questionable; the subsequent meta-analysis of 
von Stumm and Ackerman (2013) revealed that NFC possesses a research base about 
four times larger. Obviously, this makes it a more suitable candidate for meta-analysis, 
where the strength of the conclusions is largely a function of the number of studies 
available to analyse. Moreover, it would be far better to assess secondary or tertiary 
populations independently. The IC–AP association differs according to educational 
level, which is also the case for cognitive ability and Conscientiousness (Poropat, 
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2009), and so modelling these within a particular level of education would produce 
more accurate outcomes. For NFC, such analysis would need to be undertaken using 
tertiary students because nearly all the research on its relationship with academic 
performance relates to this group.  
A Replication of Study 3 
 Although it is argued here that Study 3 was well-conceived, its major 
shortcoming was the poor reliability of the measure of domain-specific psychology 
knowledge. To produce a reliable measure that assessed more adequately psychology 
knowledge as a single dimension, a multi-stage process of item administration and 
selection would need to be undertaken first to develop the scale. Moreover, Rolfhus 
and Ackerman (1999) provided evidence that TIE relates more strongly to humanities-
type subjects than with mathematics and science subjects. Therefore, although 
Schroeders et al. (2015) found limited evidence for the incremental validity of TIE, this 
was for math and science subjects in secondary students and may not be generalisable 
to other subject domains. Repeating the approach of the Study 3, but using students in 
other disciplines (e.g. medicine or engineering), could provide further evidence of the 
investment process in adults, and whether this takes place differently within distinct 
disciplines. It would also provide another opportunity to compare the relative efficacy 
of IC and confidence as investment traits. 
The Development of an Objective Measure of Intellectual Curiosity 
Chapter 2 concluded that a significant shift had taken place from measuring 
curiosity as a state to measuring it as a trait. Although necessary and helpful, this shift 
has possibly led to a general neglect of the importance of measuring curiosity as a 
state. The potential value of developing an objective measure of IC is suggested by two 
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observations. First, preference for novelty is an objective measure that appears to 
parallel IC in adults, and is a major predictor of later life outcomes. And second, 
recent evidence suggests that the more objective measures of personality (i.e. other-
rated assessments) can predict substantially more variance in AP than can more 
subjective measures. Other-reported personality assessments may be particularly 
valuable for Conscientiousness, because this trait has a strong behavioural component 
(Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, & Dienstbier, 2002), and it has been found to predict a 
substantially larger proportion of variance in AP when assessed by other-report (ρ = 
.38) than by self-report (ρ = .22) measures (Poropat, 2014). 
Finally, recent research has attempted to assess IC in accordance with the dual-
process model of self-concept (see the overview by Smith & DeCoster, 2000), by 
validating versions of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998) designed to measure NFC. Fleischhauer et al. (2013) and Fleischhauer 
et al. (2015) have compared explicit NFC (measured by self-report) with implicit NFC 
(measured using IAT), and reported that these constructs related differentially to 
reflective and spontaneous behaviour. Although these studies have not yet established 
clearly whether these measures assess the same underlying construct, potentially they 
represent a move toward assessing personality constructs in ways that are potentially 
less susceptible to the limitations of self-report.  
A Revision of Investment Theory 
The last proposed follow-up study, and almost certainly the most difficult, would be to 
revise investment theory itself. As argued earlier, a substantial body of evidence has 
accrued since Cattell first proposed investment theory, which has called into question 
his major premise that Gf is static and relatively independent of cultural influence, 
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while Gc is dynamic and strongly influenced by culture. Instead, developmental 
perspectives have shifted to viewing both as taking part in a complex and dynamic 
interplay. Ackerman’s PPIK theory goes further than Cattell’s original statement in 
modelling this complexity, but arguably still is not sufficiently complex to capture the 
real-world process—which means that investment theory must now accommodate 
these perspectives that challenge some of its major predictions. This accommodation 
might involve incorporating both state and trait measures of curiosity, and modelling 
genotypic-environmental covariance as the Dickens and Flynn model of intelligence 
does. 
Lastly, it is likely that some investment traits might only serve investment in 
some situations. For example, Conscientiousness appears to be an important 
investment trait in the context of AP, but does not appear to have a strong 
relationship with the development of general knowledge in adults. As noted earlier 
Cattell’s insight was that there might be as many forms of Gc as there are occupations, 
and this point stands. But to extend—and exaggerate—this point, it might be said that 
that there are as many investment theories as there are investment domains. Future 
research on IC, confidence, and Conscientiousness could clarify this possibility. 
9.5  Concluding Statement 
 The present series of studies aimed to assess investment traits intellectual 
curiosity and confidence as predictors of academic performance. In this regard, it is 
concluded that (1) the incremental validity of IC for predicting AP needs to be re-
evaluated because of limitations in, and substantial variations between, the major 
studies that have reported this. Moreover, when considering the influence of 
investment traits more generally, it is concluded that (2) the contribution of IC toward 
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investment outcomes may have been overstated, but the contribution of confidence 
may have been underappreciated. Finally, when these findings are considered in the 
context of research addressing investment theory since its proposal, it is concluded 
that (3) investment theory remains viable, but needs to be revised substantially to 
accommodate several findings that have contradicted specific predictions that follow 
from it. 
 This thesis will conclude by drawing attention to an observation made in 
Chapter 2 regarding the history of curiosity research. The single best measure of 
intelligence in infancy—the only measure that predicts substantial variance in adult 
intelligence and AP—is preference for novelty. This construct looks remarkably like 
measures of curiosity that have been developed for adults, which is not surprising 
since they have common ancestry in Berlyne’s accounts of curiosity. What is 
surprising, however, is that this basic measure that overlaps with both curiosity and 
intelligence for infants becomes associated predominantly with personality traits in 
adulthood—traits that conventionally have been defined as independent of 
intelligence. Given that this construct has been used to demonstrate a strong 
continuity for intelligence across the lifespan, demarcating clearly between 
intelligence and all personality variables in adulthood has the potential to provide a 
misleading perspective on their relationship. They are probably not as distinct as they 
have been expected to be. 
Since Cattell first proposed investment theory, evidence has been mounting 
that the investment process is complex for both children and adults. And the more 
investment theory takes its cues from the close interplay between curiosity and 
intelligence during infancy, the better it will capture this process during adulthood. 
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Indeed, this may be why the incremental validity of IC as an “investment trait” has 
been difficult to demonstrate: for adults as well as for infants, it seems that 
intelligence and curiosity are not identical, just inseparable.	  
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Study 1: Pattern matrix of factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation for intellectual curiosity items 
Scale and item 
number 
Item* IA D PS AT R WI 
NFC(17) It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. .78 .02 -.06 .06 .00 -.07 
TIE(7)  .76 .01 -.05 .00 -.02 -.17 
TIE(6)  .70 .05 -.05 .03 -.02 -.18 
TIE(42)  .69 .13 -.21 .09 -.05 .07 
TIE(9)  .66 .21 -.12 -.19 -.01 -.05 
NFC(4) 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities. 
.66 -.04 .26 -.04 .05 -.02 
TIE(13)  .62 -.07 .09 .05 .07 -.08 
TIE(49)  .62 -.04 -.04 -.07 -.13 .04 
NFC(5) 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something. 
.61 -.13 .20 .06 .04 .03 
NFC(3) Thinking is not my idea of fun. .54 -.03 .02 .09 .02 .19 
TIE(12)  .54 .06 -.12 .07 -.01 .29 
NFC(12) Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. .52 .04 .02 .17 -.01 .16 
TIE(48)  .51 .02 .02 -.22 .06 .14 
NFC(7) I only think as hard as I have to. .49 -.13 .25 .07 .03 .01 
NFC(9) I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. .49 -.12 .36 -.24 -.03 .13 
TIE(52)  .46 -.04 .35 -.09 -.15 .03 
TIE(36)  .46 .18 .06 -.01 -.01 -.29 
247 
	248 
NFC (8) I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. .44 .00 -.01 .00 .03 .04 
TIE(47)  .38 .09 .00 -.05 .02 -.03 
TIE(57)  .37 .03 -.13 .12 .26 -.10 
TIE(45)  .36 .04 .06 .35 -.06 -.14 
TIE(54)  .35 -.09 .05 -.03 -.09 .27 
TIE(51)  .34 -.17 .22 .01 -.10 .11 
EC(5) I find it fascinating to learn new information. .30 .29 -.05 .12 .10 .13 
TIE(31)  .28 -.01 -.13 .01 .09 -.05 
TIE(4)  .25 .07 -.16 .03 .12 .19 
TIE(20)  .22 -.13 .00 .12 .01 -.01 
EC(6) 
I feel frustrated if I can’t figure out the solution to a problem, so I work even harder to 
solve it. 
.15 .72 .08 -.19 -.07 -.05 
EC(4) 
I can spend hours on a single problem because I just can’t rest without knowing the 
answer. 
.10 .70 .07 -.16 -.07 .08 
EC(10) I work like a fiend at problems that I feel must be solved. -.11 .64 .16 .05 .00 -.02 
EC(8) I brood for a long time in an attempt to solve some fundamental problem. -.09 .58 .14 .00 -.02 .15 
EC(2) Difficult conceptual problems can keep me awake all night thinking about solutions. -.10 .57 .15 -.12 -.02 .04 
EC(7) When I learn something new, I would like to find out more about it. .05 .42 -.01 .00 .06 .18 
NFC(18) I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. -.06 .38 .05 .33 .01 -.10 
TIE(8)  -.22 .37 .01 .01 .10 .12 
TIE(28)  .22 -.35 .29 .13 .04 .08 
TIE(40)  .13 .34 -.03 .21 .07 .04 
TIE(10)  -.10 .34 -.04 .31 .06 -.10 
TIE(30)  .24 .33 -.09 .13 .07 -.08 
TIE(58)  .10 .33 -.26 .28 -.07 .14 
EC(3) I enjoy learning about subjects that are unfamiliar to me. .15 .23 .13 .05 .20 .13 
TIE(59)  .18 .22 .03 .16 .06 -.11 
TIE(21)  .13 -.21 .04 .10 .05 .15 
248 
	 249 
TIE(23)  .06 .16 .10 -.08 .09 .01 
NFC(13) I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. -.07 .07 .77 -.01 .07 -.01 
TIE(18)  -.14 .07 .69 -.04 -.01 .14 
TIE(43)  .15 .10 .67 -.05 .04 -.05 
TIE(35)  .07 .21 .62 .10 -.01 -.10 
NFC(2) I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. .08 .20 .58 .00 -.13 .10 
NFC(1) I prefer complex to simple problems. .15 .26 .56 -.06 .02 -.07 
NFC(15) 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
.07 .19 .44 .13 .08 -.06 
NFC(11) I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. .06 .17 .42 .18 -.06 .15 
NFC(6) I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. -.01 .12 .41 .11 -.03 .13 
TIE(56)  -.01 .15 .39 .17 -.10 .28 
NFC(16) 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental 
effort. 
.33 -.12 .36 .00 .06 -.12 
TIE(34)  -.16 .31 .34 .16 -.01 -.05 
TIE(2)  .06 .24 -.33 .27 -.07 .28 
TIE(26)  -.14 .01 .28 .12 .09 -.06 
NFC(14) The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. -.09 -.09 .30 .81 -.02 -.08 
TIE(16)  .13 -.17 .03 .80 .01 -.03 
EC(9) I enjoy discussing abstract concepts. -.07 -.01 .15 .77 -.03 -.04 
TIE(3)  -.06 .00 -.06 .67 .03 .11 
TIE(44)  .43 -.08 -.07 .54 -.07 -.16 
TIE(29)  -.09 .08 .16 .40 .00 -.05 
TIE(39)  -.01 .21 .06 .37 -.01 .02 
NFC(10) The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. .09 .13 .23 .29 -.02 .03 
EC(1) I enjoy exploring new ideas. .13 .19 .06 .27 .01 .20 
TIE(24)  .15 -.05 -.13 .25 -.07 .12 
TIE(19)  .15 -.08 .11 .24 -.05 .00 249 
	250 
TIE(22)  .02 .00 -.11 -.05 .85 .01 
TIE(50)  .04 -.05 .01 -.01 .84 -.14 
TIE(41)  -.04 -.08 .07 .01 .75 .24 
TIE(14)  .09 .01 .11 -.03 .71 -.05 
TIE(38)  -.10 -.02 .00 -.01 .70 .09 
TIE(37)  -.05 .07 .02 -.05 .69 -.02 
TIE(33)  -.03 .09 .13 .11 .33 -.15 
TIE(46)  .13 .08 .17 .04 .24 .17 
TIE(55)  -.05 -.02 .20 .04 -.11 .57 
TIE(15)  -.08 .11 -.13 .11 -.02 .53 
TIE(27)  -.06 .10 .16 -.08 -.02 .47 
TIE(5)  -.16 -.11 -.19 .34 .01 .45 
TIE(1)  .01 .09 -.07 -.12 -.03 .43 
TIE(11)  -.08 .09 .13 .13 .06 .43 
TIE(25)  .06 .01 .10 -.07 .18 .39 
TIE(17)  .11 -.17 .23 -.02 .00 .37 
TIE(53)  -.15 .12 .12 -.16 .01 .30 
TIE(32)   .04 .04 .17 -.08 .10 .26 
Note. Factor loadings >= .20 are in boldface. NFC = Need for Cognition; TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; EC = Epistemic Curiosity; IA = Intellectual 
Avoidance; D = Deprivation; PS = Problem Solving; AT = Abstract Thinking; R = Reading; WI = Wide Interest. 






Study 1: Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation and Schmid-Leiman rotation for intellectual curiosity items 
 
Scale and item 
number 








It's enough for me that something gets done. I don't care why 
or how. 
.65 .36 .01 -.03 .04 .00 -.05 56% 43% 14% 
TIE (7)  .52 .36 .00 -.02 .00 -.02 -.12 41% 27% 14% 
TIE (6)  .51 .33 .04 -.03 .02 -.02 -.13 39% 26% 13% 
TIE (42)  .61 .32 .09 -.10 .05 -.04 .05 50% 37% 13% 
TIE (9)  .45 .31 .15 -.06 -.12 -.01 -.04 34% 20% 13% 
NFC (4) 
I would rather do something that requires little thought than 
something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 
.76 .31 -.03 .13 -.02 .04 -.01 70% 58% 11% 
TIE (13)  .61 .29 -.05 .05 .03 .06 -.06 47% 38% 10% 
TIE (49)  .38 .29 -.03 -.02 -.05 -.11 .03 24% 14% 10% 
NFC (5) 
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely 
chance I will have to think in depth about something. 
.72 .29 -.09 .10 .04 .04 .03 62% 51% 10% 
NFC (3) Thinking is not my idea of fun. .68 .25 -.02 .01 .06 .01 .14 55% 46% 9% 
TIE (12)  .65 .25 .04 -.06 .05 -.01 .22 54% 42% 12% 
NFC (12) Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. .74 .24 .02 .01 .11 -.01 .12 63% 54% 9% 
TIE (48)  .43 .24 .01 .01 -.14 .05 .11 28% 19% 9% 
NFC (7) I only think as hard as I have to. .64 .23 -.09 .13 .05 .03 .01 49% 41% 8% 
NFC (9) I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. .53 .23 -.08 .18 -.15 -.03 .10 41% 29% 12% 
TIE (52)  .55 .21 -.02 .18 -.06 -.12 .02 40% 30% 10% 
NFC (8) I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. .42 .21 .00 -.01 .00 .03 .03 22% 18% 4% 
EC (6) 
I feel frustrated if I can't figure out the solution to a problem, 
so I work even harder to solve it. 




I can spend hours on a single problem because I just can't rest 
without knowing the answer. 
.55 .05 .48 .03 -.10 -.06 .06 55% 30% 25% 
EC (10) I work like a fiend at problems that I feel must be solved. .53 -.05 .44 .08 .03 .00 -.02 49% 28% 21% 
EC (8) 
I brood for a long time in an attempt to solve some 
fundamental problem. 
.55 -.04 .40 .07 .00 -.02 .11 48% 30% 18% 
EC (2) 
Difficult conceptual problems can keep me awake all night 
thinking about solutions. 
.38 -.05 .39 .07 -.07 -.02 .03 31% 15% 17% 
EC (7) 
When I learn something new, I would like to find out more 
about it. 
.49 .02 .29 -.01 .00 .05 .14 35% 24% 11% 
NFC (18) 
I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do 
not affect me personally. 
.47 -.03 .26 .03 .20 .01 -.08 34% 22% 12% 
TIE (8)  .23 -.10 .25 .00 .01 .08 .09 14% 5% 9% 
TIE (28)  .37 .10 -.24 .14 .08 .04 .06 23% 14% 10% 
TIE (40)  .56 .06 .23 -.02 .13 .06 .03 39% 32% 8% 
TIE (10)  .33 -.05 .23 -.02 .19 .05 -.07 21% 11% 10% 
TIE (30)  .46 .11 .23 -.05 .08 .06 -.06 29% 21% 8% 
TIE (58)  .37 .05 .22 -.13 .17 -.06 .11 25% 14% 11% 
TIE (34)  .46 -.08 .21 .17 .10 -.01 -.04 31% 22% 9% 
NFC (13) I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. .68 -.03 .05 .39 -.01 .06 -.01 61% 46% 16% 
TIE (18)  .58 -.07 .05 .35 -.02 -.01 .11 47% 33% 14% 
TIE (43)  .73 .07 .07 .33 -.03 .04 -.04 65% 53% 13% 
TIE (35)  .76 .03 .14 .31 .06 -.01 -.07 70% 57% 13% 
NFC (2) 
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that 
requires a lot of thinking. 
.71 .04 .14 .29 .00 -.11 .08 63% 51% 12% 
NFC (1) I prefer complex to simple problems. .73 .07 .18 .28 -.03 .02 -.05 65% 53% 12% 
NFC (15) 
I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and 
important to one that is somewhat important but does not 
require much thought. 
.70 .03 .13 .22 .08 .07 -.04 57% 49% 8% 
NFC (11) 
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new 
solutions to problems. 
.75 .03 .12 .21 .11 -.05 .12 66% 57% 9% 
252 
	 253 
NFC (6) I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. .58 -.01 .08 .20 .07 -.03 .10 40% 34% 6% 
NFC (14) The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. .69 -.04 -.06 .15 .51 -.02 -.06 77% 48% 29% 
TIE (16)  .63 .06 -.12 .02 .49 .01 -.02 66% 40% 26% 
EC (9) I enjoy discussing abstract concepts. .62 -.03 -.01 .07 .48 -.02 -.03 62% 38% 24% 
TIE (3)  .51 -.03 .00 -.03 .41 .03 .08 44% 26% 18% 
TIE (44)  .54 .20 -.05 -.04 .33 -.06 -.12 46% 29% 17% 
TIE (29)  .40 -.04 .06 .08 .25 .00 -.03 24% 16% 7% 
TIE (39)  .49 -.01 .15 .03 .23 -.01 .01 32% 24% 8% 
TIE (45)  .55 .17 .03 .03 .22 -.05 -.11 40% 31% 9% 
TIE (22)  .37 .01 .00 -.05 -.03 .70 .00 63% 13% 50% 
TIE (50)  .38 .02 -.03 .00 -.01 .70 -.11 64% 14% 50% 
TIE (41)  .55 -.02 -.06 .03 .01 .62 .18 72% 30% 42% 
TIE (14)  .52 .04 .00 .06 -.02 .58 -.04 62% 27% 35% 
TIE (38)  .34 -.05 -.01 .00 -.01 .58 .07 46% 12% 34% 
TIE (37)  .35 -.02 .05 .01 -.03 .57 -.02 46% 12% 33% 
TIE (33)  .32 -.01 .06 .06 .07 .28 -.12 20% 10% 10% 
TIE (57)  .41 .17 .02 -.06 .07 .21 -.07 26% 17% 9% 
TIE (55)  .46 -.02 -.01 .10 .02 -.09 .43 42% 21% 21% 
TIE (15)  .32 -.04 .07 -.06 .07 -.02 .40 28% 10% 18% 
TIE (27)  .40 -.03 .07 .08 -.05 -.02 .35 30% 16% 14% 
TIE (5)  .19 -.07 -.08 -.10 .21 .01 .34 22% 4% 18% 
TIE (1)  .19 .01 .06 -.04 -.07 -.03 .33 15% 4% 12% 
TIE (11)  .52 -.04 .07 .07 .08 .05 .32 40% 28% 12% 
TIE (25)  .45 .03 .01 .05 -.04 .15 .30 32% 20% 12% 
TIE (17)  .40 .05 -.12 .11 -.01 .00 .28 27% 16% 11% 
TIE (53)  .14 -.07 .08 .06 -.10 .01 .22 9% 2% 8% 
TIE (36)  .38 .21 .12 .03 -.01 -.01 -.22 25% 14% 11% 
TIE (56)  .71 .00 .10 .20 .11 -.08 .21 61% 50% 11% 253 
	254 
TIE (2)   .29 .03 .16 -.17 .17 -.06 .21 21% 8% 13% 
TIE (54)  .39 .16 -.06 .02 -.02 -.08 .20 23% 15% 8% 
EC (5) I find it fascinating to learn new information. .67 .14 .20 -.02 .08 .08 .10 53% 45% 8% 
EC (1) I enjoy exploring new ideas. .64 .06 .13 .03 .17 .01 .15 48% 41% 7% 
EC (3) I enjoy learning about subjects that are unfamiliar to me. .64 .07 .16 .06 .03 .17 .10 48% 41% 7% 
NFC (10) 
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top 
appeals to me. 
.60 .04 .09 .11 .18 -.01 .03 42% 36% 5% 
TIE (46)  .59 .06 .05 .09 .03 .20 .13 42% 35% 7% 
NFC (16) 
I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that 
requires a lot of mental effort. 
.47 .15 -.08 .18 .00 .05 -.09 29% 22% 7% 
TIE (59)  .43 .09 .15 .01 .10 .05 -.08 24% 19% 5% 
TIE (51)  .39 .16 -.12 .11 .00 -.08 .08 21% 15% 6% 
TIE (32)  .38 .02 .03 .09 -.05 .08 .20 20% 15% 6% 
TIE (47)  .36 .18 .07 .00 -.03 .02 -.02 16% 13% 4% 
TIE (4)  .35 .12 .05 -.08 .02 .10 .14 18% 12% 5% 
TIE (19)  .33 .07 -.06 .06 .15 -.04 .00 14% 11% 4% 
TIE (23)  .25 .03 .11 .05 -.05 .07 .01 9% 6% 2% 
TIE (26)  .23 -.07 .01 .14 .07 .07 -.04 9% 5% 4% 
TIE (24)  .22 .07 -.03 -.07 .15 -.06 .09 10% 5% 5% 
TIE (21)  .20 .06 -.14 .02 .06 .04 .11 8% 4% 4% 
TIE (20)  .20 .10 -.09 .00 .07 .01 -.01 6% 4% 2% 
TIE (31)   .16 .13 .00 -.06 .01 .08 -.03 5% 3% 3% 
 
Note. Factor loadings > .20 are in boldface. NFC = Need for Cognition; TIE = Typical Intellectual Engagement; EC = Epistemic Curiosity; G = General curiosity 
factor; IA = Intellectual Avoidance; D = Deprivation; PS = Problem Solving; AT = Abstract Thinking; R = Reading; WI = Wide Interest; H2 total = percentage of 
item-level variance explained by general and first order factors; H2 total = percentage of item-level variance explained by the general factor; H2 first order = 
percentage of item-level variance explained by the first order factor. 







Study 1: Factor correlation matrix for the six factors 
Factor A D PS AT R WI 
Avoidance (A) 1           
Deprivation (D) .44 1     
Problem Solving (PS) .62 .50 1    
Abstract Thinking (AT) .60 .49 .50 1   
Reading (R)  .41 .34 .39 .36 1  
Wide Interest (WI) .41 .43 .49 .39 .34 1 
 
Note. All correlations are significant to p < .01, 2-tailed. 
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